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How the Church Performs Jesus' Story: Improvising on the Theological
Ethics of Stanley Hauerwas
Abstract
The model of improvisation in the theatre vividly expresses all the principal themes
of Stanley Hauerwas' work, and resolves many tensions.
I first accept Hauerwas' diagnosis of the flaws in the rational account of ethics.
Hauerwas concentrates on person, rather than action or consequences. I argue that
Hauerwas asserts (Aristotelian) efficient and formal causes as more significant than
material and final causes.
Hauerwas' epistemology avoids universally-held first principles. My second step is
to show how the 'Christian story', in the hands of Hauerwas and Lindbeck, overaccepts
smaller human narratives - that is, it fits them into a much larger perspective.
Considering third the skills of the community, the communion of saints emerges as
Hauerwas' key doctrine: Christian ethics imitates Christ in his way of confronting the
powers that oppress us. The Church establishes an alternative politics which creates
conflict without violence.
Fourth, the latent eschatological implications of Hauerwas' ethics are drawn out.
The community lives in a new time, and not in a separate space from the rest of society; it
is an ironic satire on the 'world'. Reincorporation is at the heart of nonviolence because it
imitates the way God in the eschaton rehabilitates all the 'stray' and neglected elements in
the story. Because the community is not finally answerable for the destiny of the world it
can take time for 'trivial' practices - such as having children - that embody its hope in God's
sovereignty.
Improvisation involves immersion in the Christian narrative, thereby learning the
skills of patience, courage, hope, peaceableness, constancy: this takes moral effort. In a
crisis, the community trusts the habits formed from those skills, and concentrates on doing
the obvious. In this way it 'overaccepts' issues which come to it from its own experience
and from the wider society, and transforms fate into divine destiny.
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Introduction
0.1. Overview
Stanley Hauerwas was born in 1940 in Texas, the son of a bricklayer. He grew up
as a Southern Methodist. He studied at Southwestern University before moving to Yale
where he took his Ph.D. in 1968. From 1970 he taught at the Roman Catholic foundation
of Notre Dame, Indiana. In 1985 he moved to Duke University, a Methodist foundation in
North Carolina.
He has published fourteen books, and edited four others. All but three of these
books are collections of essays; altogether he has published more than 250 scholarly
articles, including those reproduced in his eleven collections. The occasional essay plays an
important part in his approach to Christian ethics. He is shy of the thorough systematic
ordering of theology, since he fears that this kind of disembodied scholarship can become
a substitute for living the gospel through the disciplined practices of a particular Christian
community.
For it is in such communities that he perceives the heart of Christian ethics to rest.
His writing is intended to make clear the way Christian communities are formed by the
Christian story, the kinds of practices that this story entails, and the way the Church relates
to such issues as arise in community and society. A faithful Church does not dominate the
secular agenda: it has no big battalions to win consent and enforce its notion of truth. But
it does have a distinctive story to tell, and the task of theological ethics is to show how the
distinctive claims of that story shape the life and practices of the Christian community.
Hauerwas' considerable ire is chiefly directed against those who suppose the Church's task
is to seek the general improvement of society, sharing a broad consensus with all 'people
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of good will'. In contrast, he insists the Church's first social ethical task is to be itself it
serves neither God nor society by neglecting its distinctive claims and practices.
Through the large collection of Hauerwas' writings, several consistent themes
emerge. He begins with a deep-seated frustration with the way ethics - especially Christian
ethics - is generally done. The thrust of post-Enlightenment ethics has been to free
discussion from the contingent, the historical, the subjective, the particular, in favour of
the universal, objective and rational. This came about because of the violence of the
disputes that arose between rival subjectivities, and the need to arbitrate between them.
Hauerwas regards these efforts as folly, because this supposed objectivity is nothing but
another subjectivity - the more dangerous because it does not know itself as such.
Claiming to know us better than we know ourselves, this style of ethics in fact ignores the
historical particularities that make us recognisably 'us'. Hauerwas locates ethics not in what
we all have in common - actions - but in where we differ - our character and historical
community. Much of his writing concerns the way the distinct practices of the Christian
community form people of a particular character - or should do. This is the subject of my
first chapter.
Hauerwas demonstrates convincingly that one cannot make ethical judgements
without accounting for historical particularities. Rather than ground his thinking in an a
priori account of the human condition, he makes a virtue of the contingencies of life.
The extraordinary claim of Christianity is that God himself chooses to be revealed through
human contingency - through Israel, Jesus and the Church. Any attempt to approach
ethics by abstracting from the particularities of community is therefore a departure from
God's way of dealing with the world. Only Christianity provides a story capable of forming
communities of character. But how do we know that the Christian story is a true story?
This is a key issue in the criticism of Hauerwas - but hardly one that is unique to him
alone. Hauerwas' own tendency is to look to the community itself to 'perform' the story: if
this performance creates faithful people, this is the best evidence available that the story is
true. These issues form the substance of my second chapter.
The key to faithful performance by the community is that its witness is peaceful.
The uniqueness of Jesus lies fundamentally in his acceptance of the cross as the way of
disarming the powers that oppress us, and in the vindication of his nonviolent witness in
the resurrection. Christ is at the centre of Hauerwas' theology, insofar as Christ
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inaugurates and makes possible the peaceable kingdom - the nonviolent witness of
Christian community. The Church is called to be holy in the way that Jesus is holy: it
should be wary of the temptation to control the wider society, since this invariably results
in setting up some norm other than Jesus as the path for all to follow. The resort to
violence always reveals a lack of trust in God, a lack of faith in his definitive revelation in
Jesus. In order to avoid resorting to violence, the Church must set up a form of politics
which creates the right kind of conflict. The way the Church imitates Christ is the subject
of my third chapter.
These three themes - character, narrative, and nonviolence - form the most abiding
rhythms in Hauerwas' project. They each deserve detailed investigation. Meanwhile the
most consistent criticisms have come from two related sources - one theological, the other
ethical.
The theological question is of how Hauerwas justifies his belief in the truth of
Christianity. This is of course a difficult issue for all theologians, but it is particularly
pressing for Hauerwas. This is because he makes such a virtue of the contingency of the
Christian narrative (as of all narratives) that he seems to open the door to relativism.
Meanwhile it is hard to see how his constant reference to the Christian story, in the
singular, does justice to the plurality of Christian witness over two thousand years. I
address these issues in chapter two.
The ethical question is the one most commonly directed at Hauerwas. Does his
emphasis on the distinctiveness of the Christian story and the importance of community
inevitably imply a sectarian model of the Church? Some of Hauerwas' language invites this
criticism. Hauerwas is anxious to insist that he is not a sectarian - indeed he doubts the
validity of the terminology used in the debate. I discuss this question in chapter three.
Rather than set up Hauerwas' work as a finished product, and go on to discuss in
detail various criticisms which can be made of it, I have chosen a different approach to
assessing his work. The criticisms are of course assessed in the course of this study; but in
each of the first three chapters, and particularly in the last two, I highlight areas which,
though consistent with Hauerwas' thinking, remain undeveloped in his theology. Two
particularly stand out.
For the gospel to be a story it must have an end. Christian faith in God's
sovereignty is finally expressed in the belief that the eschaton is in his hands, and he will
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close the story when he chooses to do so. While the faults of deontological ethics lay in
chapters one and two, with the thick description of the detail of historical life and of
revelation, the faults of consequential ethics cannot be fully explained without
eschatology. The consequentialist's story is too short - it ends at the furthest point he or
she can imagine reaching with the consequences of the proposed action. It implies one's
own sovereignty. In chapter four I discuss the ways an eschatological perspective shapes
the life of the Christian community.
Christian ethics concerns the performance of Christian doctrine; and Church
history thus concerns the history of Christian ethics - the history of the performance of
Christian doctrine. Performance is a vital but undeveloped theme in Hauerwas' work. He
earmarks performance as the way to test the truth of doctrine - but he does not go into
detail. In order to test the performance of my own arguments, I provide practical
examples towards the end of four of my five chapters. In chapter five I develop a detailed
model of how a particular kind of performance best expresses the kind of ethics Hauerwas
writes about.
I am aware that in appearing to systematise the work of Stanley Hauerwas I am
writing in a manner he himself might not fully endorse. Systematisation has overtones of
control, and can be a substitute for commitment to the life of a particular community.
Nonetheless I have gone ahead. And this is not systematisation faute de mieux: for the
shape of the thesis embodies the force of my argument no less than the form of Hauerwas'
writing embodies his. The shape of the thesis does not become fully apparent until chapter
five, and its detailed character will be explained in the conclusion. Here I need only say
that I seek in this study to perform the method of Christian ethics I advocate.
11
0.2. Summary of Main Arguments
0.2.1. Hauerwas' claims that I uphold
1.Rationality is an inadequate basis for Christian ethics. In 1.2. I endorse Hauerwas' claim
that totalising accounts of ethics ('ethics for everybody') are flawed because they do not
understand particular narrative. These accounts fail to describe the moral life. I have
assumed the importance of description in the titles of my chapters. Hauerwas s discussion
of children (4.6.) and mental handicap (5.4.) helps to reconceptualise what it means to be a
Christian - fiirther demonstrating the flaws in the rationalist approach.
2. Narrative best expresses the commitment of Christian theology to understand God's
revelation in human particularity. The foundationalist-antifoundationalist debate is
somewhat arid because all epistemologies have to start somewhere: there is no high
ground from which all can be surveyed. (I also conclude in 2.3.2. that both
foundationalists and antifoundationalists end up being anthropocentric for different
reasons.) Hauerwas' emphasis on community averts the postliberal danger of
dehistoricising scripture.
3. There is a connection between the relationship of the Church to the state and the kind
of ethics the Church espouses. For instance, the Constantinian Church is likely to have a
consequentialist ethic. See 3.2.
4. If a community is committed to nonviolence it is forced to use its imagination much
more than it would do otherwise. Imagination is the most neglected area in ethics. See
3.5.6.
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0.2.1 My own original contributions
I Hauerwas' project can be seen in terms of Aristotelian causality as asserting the priority
of efficient and formal causes over material and final causes See 1.5.
2. The tensions in postliberal narrative theology can be considerably eased by further
attention to the end of the story. See 2.6.
3. Hauerwas' Christology centres around Christ as the norm of peaceableness. More
central to his theology is the Church as the communion of saints. Thus the holiness of the
Church and its imitation of Christ are more significant to him than its unity or catholicity.
See 3 3-4.
4. Hauenvas appears to be a sectarian because he uses spatial metaphors: in fact the
Church lives in a new time, rather than in a different space from the world. (I owe this idea
to Philip Kenneson.) See 4.3.
5. Eschatology offers ethics an ironic perspective which is a better model for Christian
character and Church-state relations than Hauerwas' emphasis on tragedy. Irony does
justice to the whole of the Christian story - not just the cross. See 4.2 and 4.5.
6. John Milbank's notion of God's nonviolent creation of difference makes a great
contribution to Hauerwas' more eschatological perception of peace by freeing it of a
world-denying implication. See 4.2.1.
7. Performance is crucial to Hauerwas' ethics but he does not discuss it in detail. Recent
theological literature on performance is limited in scope - often considering only the
preacher. See 5.2.
8. Improvisation in the theatre offers a model which correctly expresses the relationship of
the community to the written word, and offers skills analogous to those advocated by
Hauerwas. In the notion of 'overaccepting' it provides a way of applying the Christian
13
story to the contemporary situation of the Church and dispels criticisms of sectarianism. It
offers a way for the Church to retain the initiative without setting the agenda. See 5.3 and
3.4.3.
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The Description of Humanity:
Character and Virtue
1.1. Introduction: 'Virtue Ethics'
1.1.1. The historical background
Virtue ethics is a large and rapidly growing scholarly subject. This was not the
case in 1974 when Stanley Hauerwas published Vision and Virtue and then in the
following year Character and the Christian Life.' Hauerwas attributes this transformation
from a cottage industry to an industrial giant 2 to a 'paradigm shift' along the lines described
by Thomas Kulin. 3 The tradition of ethics inherited from Kant has died the death of a
thousand anomalies, exceptions and qualifications. 'Virtue ethics' was a prime candidate to
step into its shoes. This revolution is symbolised by the publication in 1981 of Alasdair
MacIntyre's After Virtue!'
MacIntyre tells the story of how this fragmented ethical world came to be. Our
current ethical condition is a chaos of incompatible fragments of past ethical systems. The
prevailing modem view concentrates on a particular understanding of freedom. As an
individual, one is free to determine one's own good: it is not a question of there being one
united good end for human life. Such an end tends, if at all, to be expressed as freedom or
'Stanley Hauerwas Vision and Virtue: Essays in Christian Ethical Reflection Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press 1974; Character and the Christian Lift: A Study in Theological Ethics third printing
with a new introduction, San Antonio: Trinity University Press 1985.
2Lee Yearley, Recent Work on Virtue' Religious Studies Review 16/1 1990 1-9, see p. 1.
3Stanley Hauerwas Character and the Christian Life p. xiv.
4Alasdair Maclntyre After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory Second edition London: Duckworth 1984.
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happiness. These are inadequate as ends since they are quiet on method and empty of
content. They neither offer practical guidance for the conduct of a life oriented to such an
end, nor describe what an end might be like were one to arrive at it. What has been
rejected in the process is the teleological understanding of ethics - the idea that ethics is
designed for a certain end, that is, the good for humankind. This teleological
understanding is central to the way ethics was understood in the classical period, and is
assumed by Plato and Aristotle. It sees the purpose of ethics as the production of good
people. In the medieval period the understanding of the good was redefined in more
theological terms and the means to the end, the virtues, were expanded to include faith,
hope and love, lest they otherwise seem to imply some form of merit. The end of ethics
was the production of good character, understood as the possession of the virtues. Today,
however, there is no such consensus on the good. Even if there were perceived to be a
single good to seek, the quest would be considered purely a matter of personal choice.
Thus there is not so much an ethical vacuum as a cacophony of voices with little
agreement on the method, possibility, or desirability of adjudicating between them.
Maclntyre recommends a return to the classical-medieval approach: the development of
human character through the practice of the virtues.
He and Hauerwas are both aware that in this fragmented condition, a renewal of
interest in human community, and the virtues that community entails, is unsurprising. Yet
it is significant that this approach to ethics is still a minority pursuit. Few share the view
that the barbarians are waiting beyond the frontiers - let alone that they have been ruling
over us for some time.' The mainstream of ethicists remains committed to articulating an
ethic of principle which can resolve conflicts in a manner that avoids arbitrariness. 'Virtue
ethics' in this light seems subjective and relative, and thus of at best limited usefulness for
the ethical project. And of those who do share Maclntyre's general diagnosis, there is no
consensus over the cure. Virtue ethics' is an umbrella term covering those who see
themselves as standing in the same tradition as MacIntyre. Their diversity is shown by the
number who would not describe MacIntyre as either a leader or even a highly significant
member. The reason for this is that 'virtue ethics' has subscribers in several fields -
theology, philosophy, and public philosophy, with interested parties among
5A1asdair Macintyre After Virtue p 263.
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educationalists, psychologists and sociologists - while MacIntyre's book is less easy to
classify.6
In theological ethics, one can distinguish three broad approaches to 'virtue ethics'.'
The first sees virtue and character as being nurtured in particular communities which
witness to the larger community but stand in some sense apart from it. They inherit from
MacIntyre ideas surrounding narrative, community and tradition, and consider the vision
of their tradition through history, symbol and story. This approach encompasses
Hauerwas, McClendon and Meilaender. 8
 The second group are anxious to avoid forming
particular communities, being more concerned to converse with the larger, secular culture.
By using philosophic and social scientific approaches, as well as the prominent place of
virtue in Christian tradition, they can critique the types of character and world-view of
contemporary society. This group includes Gustafson, Herms, Adams and Sokolowski.9
The third approach is more interested in theories of human development as discussed in
debates surrounding Piaget, Erikson and Kohlberg. This involves rather more
consideration of education and psychology than of theology. Dykstra and Capps have
been the most significant contributors in this area.1°
&Yearley pp 1-3. Yearley identifies three types of philosophical work on virtue. Philippa Foot, Bernard
Williams, Edmund Pincoffs and others consider the relation of virtue to deontological or contractarian
theories of morality, investigating whether virtue can replace or at least supplement such theories. Amelie
Rorty and others discuss philosophies of mind and action the way character affects action and the
relationship of practical judgements, emotions, and dispositions (Hauerwas engages with some of these
issues in Character and the Christian Life. See also Thomas Tracy, God, Action and Embodiment Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans 1984) Finally the first group are among those concerned with axiological questions of
whether one can justify one kind of life that manifests the good more thoroughly than other kinds.
The debate in public philosophy largely surrounds R. Bellah et at eds. Habits of the Heart (Berkeley:
Universit) of California Press 1985), R. Bellah et al eds. The Good Society (New York: Knopf 1991), and
further discussions in Richard Neuhaus ed. Virtue - Public and Private (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 1986).
'Yearley p. 3.
8Jarnes McClendon, Ethics: Systematic Theology Volume One Nashville: Abingdon Press 1986. Gilbert
Meilaender The Theory and Practice of Hrtue Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 1984.
9James Gustafson, Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective 2 volumes Chicago: University of Chicago
Press volume 1 1981 volume 2 1984. Eilert Herms, 'Virtue: A Neglected Concept in Protestant Ethics'
Scottish Journal of Theology 35/6 481-95. Robert Adams, The Prtue of Faith and Other Issues in
Philosophical Theology Oxford: Oxford University Press 1987. Robert Solcolowski, The God of Faith and
Reason: Foundations of Christian Theology Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 1982.
°Craig Dykstra, Vision and Character Paulist Press 1981. Donald Capps, Deadly &ns and Saving
Virtues Philadelphia: Fortress Press 1987. Hauerwas discusses this approach in 'Character, Narrative and
Growth in the Christian Life' in A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic
Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 1981 pp 129-154.
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1.1.2. The theological background
Theologians concerned with 'virtue ethics' have faced opposition from some traditional
positions, both Catholic and Protestant. Those who understand ethics primarily in terms of
natural law tend to see 'virtue ethics' as subjective and relative. Nonetheless, Catholic
moral theology has tended to be more open to the language of character and virtue than
has Protestant theology. This reflects the latter's concern not to confuse good works with
attaining merit, and the insistence that on grace and faith alone rests our righteousness.
This concern has entailed the distinction between the internal, passive, justified self and the
external, active, sinful self Hauerwas points out in Character and the Christian Life that
the metaphor of corrunand 12 demonstrates the implications of this distinction: 'The object
of the moral life is not to grow but to be repeatedly ready to obey each new command'.13
This contrasts with Meilaender's use of the metaphor of journey (which corresponds to
Hauerwas' understanding of character). Whereas the command/dialogue metaphor sees
righteousness as relational, in the journey metaphor righteousness genuinely transforms
the person by the pilgrimage on which they travel:
Righteousness ... consists not in right relation with God but in becoming (throughout
the whole of one's character) the sort of person God wills us to be and commits himself
to making of us. Picturing the Christian life as a journey, we can confess our sin without
thinking that the standard of which We fall short, in its accusation of us, must lead us to
doubt the gracious acceptance by which God empowers us to journey toward his goal for
our lives.14
This sits uneasily with the tradition inherited from Luther, for whom 'life is not the
gradual development of a virtuous self; it is the constant return to the promise of grace.
"Stanley Hanerwas Vision and Virtue p. 50-52.
I2Meilaender replaces the term command with the metaphor of dialogue in his article The Place of
Ethics in the Theological Task Currents in Theology and Afission 6 1979 p. 199 - a change Hauenvas
recognises and endorses in his new introduction to Character and the Christian Life p xxvii.
13 Stanley Hauerwas Character and the Christian Life p. 2.
14Meilaender, The Place of Ethics' p. 200.
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The examined life, if honestly examined, will reveal only that the best of our works are
sin'. 15
The traditional Protestant approach, with its deep distrust of the shaping of a
Christian life, its tendency to distinguish between the internal and external self and the
consequent difficulty in how the acts of the 'external' self manifest the 'internal' self
deprives ethics of the conceptual categories to consider moral development. This has left
Protestants vulnerable to whatever moralities their cultures happened to endorse. Hence
the widespread identification of being Christian with the general social definition of being
decent.16
Having briefly placed Stanley Hauerwas in relation to the history of virtue ethics,
and in relation to the theological context, I propose now to outline what he sees himself as
opposing in the tradition of philosophical ethics. I shall then outline his constructive
proposals for a specifically Christian ethic of character and virtue.
15Meilaender, The Theory and Practice of Virtue pp 106-7. Meilaender suggests an inevitable tension
between dialogue and journey; Hauerwas borrows Meilaender's terminology bUt insists that the metaphor
of journey is primary for the shape of the Christian life. (Character and the Christian Life p
It is not clear that Meilaender is justified in contrasting command and journey like this. John
Burryan's Pilgrim's Progress is a prominent example of a Protestant perception of sanctification as a
journey. One may also doubt if Luther is really as committed to seeing acts as good and bad in themselves
as Meilander suggests. R.L. Simpson has brought to my attention the following quotation from Luther's
1520 treatise, The Freedom of the Christian': 'As it is necessary, therefore, that the trees exist before their
fruits and the fruits do not make trees either good or bad, but rather as the trees are, so are the fruits they
bear, so a man must first be good or wicked before he does a good or wicked work, and his works do not
make him good or wicked, but he himself makes his works either wicked or good' (Martin Luther Three
Treatises translated by Lambert, Philadelphia: FOTITeSs 1970 p. 297) This implies the agent's perspective
that Hauerwas advocates.
16A Community of Character p 132.
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1.2. The Rationalist Captivity of Christian
Ethics: What Hauerwas Opposes in the
Standard Account of Moral Rationality
At the start of Truthfulness and Tragedy Stanley Hauerwas sets out his definitive
description of the ethical context in contrast with which his understanding of ethics
appears so radical. r He names this context The standard account'. He does not identify the
standard account with any single author. Rather, he sees the customary antagonists in
ethics - for instance Kantians and utilitarians - as agreeing more significantly than they
disagree.
For all the efforts of several authors to summarise what Hauerwas calls the
standard account, the precise definition remains elusive. The account Hauerwas opposes
has arisen since the late eighteenth century. No contemporary moral philosopher can be
identified as subscribing to the entire range of elements, though its ancestry is recognizably
Kantian. Perhaps the best exposition of these tenets is by Trianoslcy, whose account of
'neo-Kantianism' includes the following:
1.The most important question in morality is, What is it right or obligatory to do?'
2. Basic moral judgements are judgements concerning the rightness of
actions.
3. Basic moral judgements take the form of general rules or principles
about right action. Particular judgements of the right are always
instances of these.
4. Basic moral judgements are universal in form. They contain no essential
reference to particular persons or particular relationships in which
the agent might stand.
5. Basic moral judgements are not grounded on some account of the
human good which is itself independent of morality.
'Stanley Hauerwas 'From System to Story An Alternative Plan for Rationality in Ethics', TrutlifitIness
and Tragedy: Further Investigations into Christian Ethics Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press
JD. 15-39.
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6. Basic moral judgements are categorical imperatives. They have a certain
'automatic reason-giving force' ... independently of their relation to
the desires and/or interests of the agent.' 8
Hauerwas rejects all but one of these tenets, for reasons I shall discuss below. The
one he maintains is the fifth one. In doing so, he stands not only against the deontological
thrust of the other tenets, but also against utilitarianism and similar consequential theories.
These latter theories ground morality on some independent account of the good - such as
happiness or the satisfaction of desire or freedom. For Hauerwas there is no foundation to
be abstracted from the moral process, no 'still centre'.
Trianoslcy, writing about philosophical ethics, discerns four categories within the
debate: duty deontologists, duty teleologists, virtue deontologists, and virtue teleologists.
Hauerwas is clearly one of the latter two. But which one? The key issue for settling this is,
can one define the good independently of reference to moral virtue? If yes, one is a virtue-
teleologist; if no, one is a virtue-deontologist. The problem is that his emphasis on
perfection puts Hauerwas in the latter camp, as a virtue-deontologist; but his concern that
actions (and doctrines) be judged by whether or not they produce people of character
implies the former perspective. Triano sky goes some way toward resolving this confusion:
Non-teleological ethics of virtue offer important advantages over any other view. They
do justice to two guiding intuitions which seem at first to be irreconcilably at odds. The
first is the minimal Kantian idea [see 5 above] that morality is autonomous. The second
is the idea that, as utilitarians have always insisted, morality is essentinily connected
with the human good. Defenders of the non-teleological ethics of virtue [i.e. Hauerwas]
can accept this latter utilitarian idea, for they can maintain that virtue is a constitutive
element of the human good19
Thus Hauerwas is able to reject both a certain kind of deontological reasoning and
a certain kind of teleological reasoning, which together he calls the standard account, and
which he perceives as agreeing with each other more significantly than they disagree
(because they share the assumptions I shall shortly outline). Yet he is also able to retain
18Gregory Trianosky What is Virtue Ethics All About?' American Philosophical Quarter 27/4 Oct
1990 p. 335. Trianosky has three further tenets, less relevant to the discussion here.
19Trianosky p. 339.
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features of his ethic which at times seem to resemble both kinds of 'standard' reasoning, in
a new form.
The time has now come to identify what Hauerwas sees as the key features - and
the key flaws - in the standard account."
1.2.1. Foundations, facts, and the observer
Inspired by the scientific ideal of objectivity, the standard account founds moral
judgements upon the basis of impersonal rationality. Ethics is about the particular only
insofar as it translates to the general. The particular point of view of the agent - the agent's
history, community, beliefs, and character - is distrusted and seen as arbitrary and
contingent, subjective and relative: in short, unscientific. Instead, various proposals have
been put forward for an impersonal starting point - a basic moral principle, procedure, or
viewpoint which applies to everyone engaged in moral judgement or action. Such
proposals include the categorical imperative, the ideal observer, universalisability, or the
original position. The search for some such foundation of ethics seems interminable. These
theories make the assumption that what constitutes us as persons is not any attribute,
achievement, relationship, community, role, commitment, belief or history, but our
reason. 'Such theories are not meant to tell us how to be good in relation to some ideal,
but rather to ensure that what we owe to others as strangers, not as friends or sharers in a
tradition, is nonarbitrary'.21
But is even this modest project realisable? The standard account does not fully
recognise the value-laden nature of the terms it regards as factual. Notions such as
'murder', 'stealing', and 'abortion' are not simple descriptions whose meaning can be
derived from rationality in itself. If they were, why then are moral controversies so hard to
20Revisions: Changing Perspectives in Moral Philosophy, edited by Stanley Hauerwas and Alasdair
MacIntyre, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 1983 gathers together the leading criticisms of
the 'standard account'.
21 Stanley Hauerwas 'From System to Story p.17.
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resolve?22
 Pro- and anti-abortion activists struggle to discuss issues of right and wrong
because they hardly agree on the language they use. Moral notions depend for their
display upon examples and histories. No deontological or utilitarian theory can free them
from this dependence without sacrificing their rich texture, and thus failing to describe
them adequately.
Thus the standard account is misguided on the what of morality since it
overestimates our ability to separate fact from value. It is also misguided on the who of
ethical theory since it privileges the observer's point of view. Participants, it says, cannot
see as well as viewers. Morality is seen more truly by the art-critic than by the artist. There
are two points to criticise here. First, is this form of disinterestedness desirable? Second, is
it possible?
It is largely the contingent nature of our projects that makes them valuable to us.
They matter because they are ours. The distancing implied by the standard account is
identified by Hauerwas as alienation.23 Thus we are encouraged to see the self as made up
of reason's efforts to control desire - a description which seems to separate pleasure from
good altogether. Reason connects us with the universal rules of conduct: desire only with
our own contingent appetite. Having dismissed our passions, the standard account
dispenses with our past:
Morally, the self represents a collection of continuous decisions bound together only in
the measure they approximate to the moral point of view. Our moral capacity thus
depends on our ability to view our past in discontinuity with our present ..., to alienate
ourselves from our past in order to be able to grasp the timelessness of the rationality
offered by the standard accotuit.24
Iris Murdoch points out that it is only the hire of a greater or more beautiful good
than we can ourselves will into existence that can occasion genuine disinterest in the self.25
22This is where MacIntyre begins in After Virtue (chapter 2). The examples he cites are war and peace,
abortion, and freedom and equality. See also his 'Why is the Search for the Foundation of Ethics so
Frustrating? Hastings Center Report 9/4 1979 pp 21-2 where he discusses three areas of disagreement
between deontologists and consequentialists: 1. causality, predictability, and intentionality, and the
relationship of consciousness to the world; 2. law, evil, emotion, and the integrity of the self, 3. the relation
of individual identity to social identity and ethics to politics.
23 Stanley Hauerwas 'From System to Story p.23.
24ibid p.24. Hauerwas bases this assessment on two quotations from Kant's Religion within the
Limits of Reason Alone. See Stanley Hauerwas Truthfulness and Tragedy pp. 207-8 n.19.
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Thus disinterestedness implies access to a neutral point of view, a neutral story,
independent of the past, eternally present. This appears to be the perspective of God. But
this discloses Hauerwas' most important, most theological, and most far-reaching
contention: there is no such neutral standpoint, no neutral story Even God is no neutral
observer, for the God of Jews and Christians wills to reveal himself in and through a
particular narrative. The reason of humanity comes face to face with the foolishness of
God. If God's actions take the form of a narrative, so should ours. This is the starting
point for Hauerwas' narrative ethics.
1.2.2. Decisions and actions
By overemphasizing moments of decision the standard account fails to describe
adequately the moral life. In the process it reduces moral rationality to one of its parts -
and a secondary, dependent part at that - and thus fails to describe the moral experience as
it is lived. For this critique, Hauerwas is primarily indebted to a key article in the 'first
wave' of virtue literature by Edmund Pincoffs. 26 Pincoffs describes how often it is assumed
that ethics concerns problems - dilemmas involving a conflict of choice - and concerns
itself with evaluating alternative rational solutions. Such solutions involve judgements that
are justified without reference to the particular agent involved in the situation.
What is wrong with 'decisionism'? Hauerwas certainly affirms that decisions are
morally significant (and unavoidable). But they are 'in a certain sense ... morally
secondary'. 27
 They are not, for an ethic of virtue, The paradigmatic centre of moral
reflection'. The centre of moral reflection is not the development of solutions or principles
for decision-making, or rules no decision should break: it is the development of people -
' 25 The Sovereignty of Good Over Other Concepts Cambridge UP 1967. I shall return to Iris Murdoch in
chapter 5.
26Edinund Pincoffs, 'Quandary Ethics' Mind 80 1971 552-571.
27Stanley Hauerwas The Virtues and Our Communities: Human Nature as History, in A Community of
Character p. 114.
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people of character. The manner of the actions of such people must display their moral
character. It is no use talking about actions apart from the people that do them. There is
no such thing as an action that is not done by somebody. The kind of events that ethics is
interested in are those that can be done differently. What ethics changes is first of all the
person - and only subsequently and consequently the action. A changed (saintly) person
can make mistakes; and a bad person can do good. But in Hauerwas' view this risks a
misuse of the notion of good: for a good action is one which encourages or reflects the
creation of a good person. An overemphasis on decision implies a hard and fast distinction
between an action and an agent. For Hauerwas, no such distinction is sustainable (though
communities sometimes fasten on one for educative and legal purposes). 28
 Even the
description of circumstances is a moral event, since our terms and notions presuppose that
we are people capable of using them.
Decisionism is thus inadequate in two senses. On the one hand, the vast majority
of the things we do in life we do, not because we decide to do them, but because of the
kinds of people we are. We do them by habit rather than by choice. An ethics that
emphasizes moments of decision ignores the great preponderance of the events of life. Life
is not a perpetual crisis of choice.
Morality is not primarily concerned with quandaries or hard decisions; nor is the moral
self simply the collection of such decisions. As persons of moral character we do not
confront situations as mud puddles into which we have to step; rather the kind of
'situations' we confront and how we understand them are a function of the kind of
people we are.29
The convictions we hold form our descriptions of the world and determine the
shape of any quandary that presents itself These convictions 'are like the air we breathe -
we never notice them'." The convictions Hauerwas has in mind are for instance the duty
to provide children and the infirm with care that we do not give to the stranger. The force
of such convictions is the very fact that we take them for granted. 'And morally', he adds,
'we must have the kind of character that keeps us from subjecting them to decision'. 31 It is
28Stan1ey Hauerwas Character and the Christian Lift pp. xiciii-xxiv.
29Stanley Hauerwas A Community of Character pp. 114-5.
30Stanley Hauerwas 'From System to Story p. 19.
31 ibid p. 20.
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these qualities that make up the substance of the moral life - yet they are so fundamental
that we do not notice them.32 The examined life dwells more on them than on decisions.
On the other hand when it seems there is in fact a crisis, and a major decision does
have to be made, that decision is not made in a vacuum: it is dependent on a deeper, prior
moral commitment.
Thus persons of character or virtue may, from the perspective of others, make what
appear to have been momentous and even heroic decisions, but feel that in their own
lives they 'had no choice' if they were to continue to be faithful to their own characters.33
Hauerwas stresses that character is not formed by decisions - though decisions
may confirm or reveal character: it comes instead from our beliefs and dispositions - which
the standard account holds to be contingent and non-rational, and thus a retreat from
moral objectivity'''. The issue becomes one of how to reintroduce the 'dreaded first person
singular' without moral rationality being reduced to 'because I want to'.
Thus decisionism fails to describe the full complexity of the moral life. Moreover,
one could go further than Hauerwas and add that decisionism fails even in its own terms:
for rules or principles by themselves cannot tell us how they are to be applied in specific
situations, or when they are being applied well.
1.2.3. Principles, violence, and the Importance of Tragedy
Finally, the abstractions made by the standard account have a subtle but real
connection with violence. The two are both expressions of alienation.
321f fish ever developed intelligence and began to codify and describe their environment, one of the last
things they would notice would be the water' (Stanley Hauerwas 'Community and Diversity: The Tyranny
of Normality in Suffering Presence: Theological Reflections on Medicine, the Mentally Ilandcapped and
the Church Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark 1986 p. 211).
"Stanley Hauerwas The Virtues and Our Communities' p. 114.
34 Stanley Hauerwas 'F-rom System to Story p. 20. The standard account does not claim that dispositions
are irrelevant, but that what counts for moral consideration is the rational, objective, a nd universal.
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This connection is implicit first of all in the universalism on which the standard
account depends. Within the logic of categorical imperatives and universal laws there lies a
powerful justification for violence. Once the presuppositions of a universal law have been
accepted, the existence of one who will not act according to it becomes morally
objectionable, since such differences should not exist. It is difficult to separate rational
failure from moral failure. If someone were to deny the 'universal' laws understood by the
standard account, they would seem morally obtuse: it is a short step to forcing them to
mend their ways. The more 'universal' the law appears to be, the more this is the case.
The formation of moral principles is the second potentially coercive abstraction.
Hauerwas sees a sense of the tragic as that which enables us to be moral and thus keeps us
from violence. He focuses on the practice of medicine to make this clear." It is a fallacy
that greater techniques of preventing and curing disease will ever free our lives from tragic
dilemmas." The sometimes tragic story of caring can never be thoroughly reconstrued
into a comedy of curing.37 Just as in medicine, so in the rest of moral existence, the right is
not always the successful.
When a culture loses touch with the tragic ... we must redescribe our failures in
acceptable terms. Yet to do so ipso facto traps us in self-deceiving accounts of what we
have done. Thus our stories quickly acquire the characteristics of a policy ... . Phrases
like 'current medical practice', 'standard hospital policy', or even 'professional ethics',
embody exemplary stories ... . Since we fail to regard them as stories, however, hit must
see them as a set of principles, the establishment must set itself to secure them against
competing views. If the disadvantaged regard this as a form of institutional violence,
they are certainly correct.38
Description again appears as Hauerwas' bone of contention with the standard
account. Because of our inability to recognise the tragedy implicit in the limits of our
existence, we cannot bring ourselves to describe an abortion as a death, however
unavoidable. Thus we deceive ourselves.
35 Stanley Hauerwas 'Medicine as a tragic profession' in Truthfidness and Tragedy pp. 184-202.
Stanley Hauerwas prom System to Story' p. 37.
in my discussion of tragedy, comedy and irony, both here and in chapter four, I am indebted for my
notions of these genres to Northrop Frye The Anatomy of Criticism Princeton: Princeton University Press
1957 and James Hopewell Congregation: Stories and Structures London: S.C.M. 1988.
38Stanley Hauerwas 'From System to Story' p. 38. I return to the analysis of violence in chapter three
below.
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Deontological and utilitarian theories seek to overcome the moral divisions of the
world by an appeal to an understanding of universal moral rationality. Hauerwas sees in
such attempts an inability to face the tragic. The tragic is experienced when a person
(perhaps a highly virtuous person) with several responsibilities and obligations, confronted
with a single decision having irreversible consequences, finds that these many interests
conflict with both his or her own interest and with each other. The lurking temptation is
always to avoid the tragic through violence. Hauerwas quotes Stanley Cavell: 'if you
would avoid tragedy (and suffering), avoid love; if you cannot avoid love, avoid integrity;
if you cannot avoid integrity, avoid the world; if you cannot avoid the world, destroy it'.39
The world cannot be forced into a premature unity. The standard account is designed to
avert violence through resolving moral conflicts. Such an ethic of abstract principle based
on universal moral rationality is an attempt to resist evil and is not in itself violent; but to
the extent that it fails to see the tragic dimension of moral existence it slips into coercion
through its own self-deception.
1.3. Towards an Identifiably Christian Ethic:
Hauerwas' Constructive Proposals
Hauerwas outlines his ethic of character in various places, but the general
description is broadly consistent.° His concern arises from the doctrine of sanctification,
39Stanley Ca\ ell Must We Mean What We Say? Cambridge UP 1969 p. 349 quoted in Stanley Hauerwas
The Church in a Divided World' A Community of Character p. 107.1 return to the discussion of tragedy in
chapter four below.
49See Stanley Hauerwas Character and the Christian Life especially chapters 1 and 3, Toward an Ethic
of Character' chapter 3 in Vision and Virtue, The Virtues and Our Communities: Human Nature as
History' chapter 6 in A Community of Character, and On Being Historic: Agency, Character and Sin'
chapter 3 in The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics London: S.C.M. 1983.
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and the way that this doctrine becomes unintelligible within the occasionalistic emphasis of
the ethics of command. It is my argument that the key doctrine for Hauerwas is that of the
communion of saints: it is this doctrine that unites the diverse elements in his writings.
Character and virtue concern the formation of the saints (always plural, never singular -
this is not about ethical elitism). An action is good if it expresses or builds up the
formation of the saints - what Hauerwas calls people (or communities) of character.
In what remains of this chapter I shall examine Hauerwas' understanding of the
self,and the attendant considerations of agency, causality, formation and freedom. I shall
offer a neo-Aristotelian proposal of my own, in an effort to show the significance of what
Hauerwas is proposing. This will lead into a preliminary discussion of the place of
narrative in the ethics of character. 41 I shall go on to discuss Hauerwas' conception of
virtue and the virtues, general and particular. In conclusion I shall consider some of the
implications of the constructive account that has been offered.
Hauerwas' virtue ethic claims that ethics is about people rather than about actions.
It is more concerned with the form of our actions than with their content: with the how
more than with the what. The virtuous person may do what others do: yet for different
reasons or in a different way. Actions are judged from a teleological point of view: the
question is, 'to what extent will this action contribute to or fulfil my moral character?' or,
'what does this action say about what kind of person I have been, am, and want to be?'.
Actions must 'fit' with the history of their agent.
The process of acquiring character is frequently compared by Hauerwas to the
development of a set of skills. 42 The analogy here is with the artisan, who learns, practises,
and coordinates those skills which enable a creative response to unanticipated difficulties
as they may arise. The person of character is constantly in need of such skills in order to be
faithful to a moral tradition - all the more so because such a moral adventure encounters
obstacles that might not have been recognized by the non-virtuous. Hauerwas identifies
41 1 shall return to more general discussion of the place of narrative in Hauerwas' ethics in chapter two.
42See for example Stanley Hauerwas The Politics of the Church: How We Lay Bricks and Make
Disciples' in After Christendom: Haw the Church is to Behave i f Freedom, Justice, and a Christian Nation
are Bad Ideas Nashville: Abingdon pp. 93-111, where he compares discipleship to apprenticeship in a
craft.
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these skills as linguistic, emotional and rational.° Moral skill, like all skill, embodies power
- the ability to do with facility what others do with difficulty. It is in this power, rather than
in a choice between options, that freedom resides.
In Character and the Christian Life Hauerwas maps the field of character ethics.
The moral importance of character begins to be seen only when the moral problem is
taken to be the agent standing before a decision. There we see the importance of that
which the agent brings to his decision that is either not assessable or irrelevant to the
spectator making his judgement about the resulting action. Thus, the problem of
character is an attempt to stress the importance of our subjectivity for the moral
direction of our lives. It is concerned with how that direction becomes embodied in our
selves through our beliefs, intentions, and actions.44
Hauerwas' perspective develops in his later work. For example, he would no
longer use an expression like 'an agent standing before a decision', since what agents
regard as decisions depends on their prior moral formation, and thus the decision itself
cannot be separated so succinctly from the agent. Nonetheless this assessment of character
sets out the project that dominates the first phase of his writing.
1.4. The Self as Agent
In Character and the Christian Life Hauerwas defines character as 'the
qualification or determination of our self-agency formed by our having certain intentions
(and beliefs) rather than others'''. He spends most of the book explaining this definition,
justifying it, and drawing out its implications. What does this definition mean?
43 Stanley Hauerwas The Virtues and our Communities' p. 115.
44 Stanley Hauerwas, Character and the Christian Lift p. 33.
45p. 115. In his 1985 Introduction, Hauerwas acknowledges a 'lingering "Kantianismm in this definition,
for it 'still suggests a kind of dualism insofar as a "self' seems to stand behind our character' (x). He
prefers in the introduction to call character the 'form of our agency.
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In the first place Hauerwas insists that persons are
in essence self-determining beings, who act upon and through their nature and
environment to give their lives particular form. In a sense [they] control their futures by
becoming the kind of [persons] they are through their present choices and actions.
[Persons] are at the mercy of external forces only if they allow themselves to be. To be a
[person] is to be an autonomous centre of activity and the source of one's own
determinations.46
Hauerwas is not here trying to insist that humanity is self-made and in the centre
of the universe. The emphasis is rather that one cannot conceive of action without
considering the person or persons acting and that the person acting is formed by the
actions he or she performs.
To emphasize the idea of character is to recognize that our actions are also acts of self-
determination; in them we not only reaffirm what we have been but also determine what
we will be in the future. By our actions we not only shape a particular situation, we also
form ourselves to meet firture situations in a particular way.4'
The term self-agency therefore is not an assertion that ethics concerns
autonomous individuals with wide-ranging powers to create their own personalities; it is
instead an affirmation of the interrelation of action, the agent, and the agent's character.
The agent's character both shapes and is shaped by the action.
1.4.1. Indeterminism
Hauerwas' concern in outlining his notion of character as the qualification of our
self-agency (or the form of our agency) is to steer a path between libertarianism and
indeterminism on the one hand and behaviourism and determinism on the other.
Indeterminism arises out of a commitment to the concept of self-agency. Self-agency
understands that the self is not simply a link in a chain of causes. The self is not determined
He also retracts some of his enthusiasm for 'action theory', but recommends Thomas F. Tracy
God, Action, and Embodiment (Grand Rapids: Eenimans 1984) for the metaphysical background to the
theory.
46ibid p. 18.
41 Stanley Hauerwas Vision and Virtue p. 49.
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by external forces to act in any particular way - it is thus, in some sense, indeterminate.
But indeterminism contradicts some other presuppositions about actions: in particular, the
assumption that all events have causes. If one holds that all events have causes, then self-
agency, the self-determination of an agent's actions, appears to be an anomaly: an
uncaused cause. Everything is caused except the agent's actions: this is absurd, unless the
agent is considered to be divine - and it is not clear it makes much sense even then. And
this is not the only problem with seeing the agent's actions as indeterminate. For it is hard
to see how the indeterminate person can be free and responsible - two conditions which
seem integral to the concept of self-agency. Consider the case of a person acting out of
will, motives, desires or character: this person is not entirely free, in the sense of being
indeterminate. By contrast, if one acts thoroughly indeterminately, without any sufficient
cause, how can one be considered responsible? Such a self can hardly be praised or
blamed." Indeterminism is therefore to be rejected on two counts, both involving
incompatibility with prior assumptions.
Thus the self is not indeterminate. The self is determined; but character is that
which ensures that the self is nonetheless not lost in the fact of being determined. This is
made possible by appreciating the interrelation of agent, action, and character. The self is
determined, but this determination need not take the form of a 'cause'. We do not need to
think in terms of a physical, social or mental cause for our behaviour `volitions, motives,
intentions, reasons do not cause or move [persons] to act, but [persons] acting embody
thee°. Character emerges as that which breaks out of the confusion surrounding the
indeterminate-yet-determined self If we see character in this way we dispense with trying
to understand all behaviour in terms of 'causes' visible to an observer. The connections
with Hauerwas' critique of the 'standard account' are clear we have rejected the privileged
status of the objective observer.
48 Stan1ey Hauerwas Character and the Christian Life p. 18-29.
49ibid p. 21 my italics.
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1.4.2. 'Free Will'
If indeterminism is self-contradictory, then libertarian or dualist approaches are no
more helpful. These latter approaches identify the true self as possessing a 'free will', which
cannot be affected by actions. Just as Hauerwas rejected indeterminism because it made an
unwarranted separation between action and character, so now he rejects 'free will'
arguments because they make an unwarranted separation between action and agent. 'Free
will', Wit is not to be affected by actions, implies a separation between interior action (will)
and exterior action (what the agent actually does). How could one begin to demonstrate
this interior action? How can one be sure there is not another action (or many in turn)
inside it?" Does the interior will correlate to the whole of the exterior action or only part
of it? Such questions are very difficult to answer. It seems impossible to separate
causation entirely from the action itself How can one describe an act of will except in
relation to what it has caused? Hauerwas insists that the will is a property of an action, and
not a separate quality."
Hauerwas points out that 'free will' arguments have little time for character. They
see character as a limiting factor which the self must transcend if it is to be a free agent.
'Character is but the external and accidental feature of a moral real "internal" and
substantive self. 52 There is no point in developing character: one must overcome it. Again
the connections with Hauerwas' description of the standard account are clear: just as
indeterminism supposed the observer's point of view, so 'free will' emphasises moments of
decision rather than development of character. For Hauerwas, by contrast, it is character
that is the stuff of ethics; it refers to the way our being is determined by our doing:
Character is not an accidental feature of OUT lives that can be distinguished from 'w-hat
we really are'; rather character is a concept that denotes what makes us determinative
moral agents. Our character is not a shadow of some deeper but more hidden real self.,
it is the form of our agency acquired through our beliefs and actions."
This corresponds to what Timothy O'Connell &fends as the 'onion peel view of the self - moving
inward from environment to actions to body to feelings to cornictions to the dimensionless pinpoint - the
T. See Timothy O'Connell Principles for a Catholic Morality New York Seabory 1978, quoted in Stanley
Hauerwas The Peaceable Kingdom p. 40.
51 Stanley Hauerwas Character and the Christian Life pp. 23-24.
52ibid p. 23.
53 ibid p. 21. Hauerwas puts this another way when he denies that there is one aspect of our being (such
as rationality) that distinguishes us from all other species. He quotes Mary Midge/y (Beast and Man: The
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1.4.3. Determinism
Having rejected indeterminist and 'free will' arguments, Hauerwas is careful to
distance himself from behaviourist and determinist models of the self. Behaviourists
assume that each person is no more than the product of the interaction of external forces.
The observer can therefore perceive the dispositions and actions that go to make up the
self. Determinists tend to have a predominantly passive understanding of the self as a being
to whom things happen rather than as a self-determining agent. Determinists do not
obliterate choice, but understand a set of preconditions that limit the field of choice. Both
'free will' and behaviourist arguments assume the need for a cause for behaviour: the
former locate the cause inside the the latter outside. Hauerwas steers a path between
them by denying the need to search for such a cause beyond the activity itself
The self does not cause its activities or have its experiences; it simply is its activities as
well as its experience. I am rather than have both my activities and my norwoluntary
traits and processes. To the extent that I am the latter, I am largely the product of
heredity and environment to the extent that I am my self-activity, I am self-creating and
self-detennining.54
Hauerwas insists that if we are looking for an explanation (or an evaluation) of
behaviour, we need look no further than the agent. The agent defines and determines the
activity. There is no 'event' that can be separated from the action (the determinist mistake)
any more than there is a substantive 'self that can be separated from the agent (the
indeterminist mistake). Character refers to the extent and manner of the determination of
the agent.
Roots of Human Nature Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press 1978 p. 207) to point out that what is special
about each creature, including humans, 'is not a single, unique quality but a rich and complex arrangement
of powers and qualities, some of which it will certainly share with its neighbours. And the more complex
the species, the more true this is. To expect a single differentia is absurd. And it is not even effectively
flattering to the species, since it obscures our truly characteristic richness and versatility.' See A Community
of Character p. 123-124.
Hauerwas' use of Mary Midge/y in his later work is significant because it marks a departure from
his attention to Iris Murdoch in his earlier Vision and Virtue. Midgelys more Aristotelian concentration
on the concrete particularity of the moral life coincides with Hauerwas' interest in narrative and counters
Murdoch's more Platonist perception of The Good'. See chapter five below for further discussion of these
matters.
54Stanley Hauerwas Character and the Christian Life p. 26.
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Hauerwas' early critics focused on the sometimes contradictory claims he made for
character. Character, for Hauerwas, appears to be the fundamental way in which the self is
oriented to the world in general, and the particular choices that shape this orientation.
Thomas Ogletree calls this account intellectualistic, voluntaristic, and downright Pelagian,
because it exaggerates the role of core convictions and our ability to form our lives by
means of them. 55 Gene Outka wrestles with whether Hauerwas is interested in sustaining
his early claim that it is better to shape than to be shaped. Outka correctly predicts that
Hauerwas will leave this claim behind. The fact that Hauerwas does so weakens the force
of most of Outka's and Ogletree's criticisrns.56
Both Ogletree and Outka concentrate on the underlying conflict between
Hauerwas' emerging theme of narrative and his earlier theme of character. Ogletree
anticipates that narrative will prove to be the more lasting theme of the two. Outka points
out that vision and narrative both incline towards taking the self out of the centre of the
picture, in a way that might appear to interfere with the autonomy of the self In the light
of such observations, one may wonder if there is still an abiding place for character within
Hauerwas' ethics - at least, if the notion of character involved is to be compatible with the
one outlined in Character and the Christian Life .
I suggest that Hauerwas' original notion of character still has a place in his overall
picture, but that in order for it to do so, we must look into an area that Hauerwas does not
explore. That area is causality. In what follows I hope to show that an understanding of
causality can restore the place of character in an understanding of Hauerwas' ethics.
55Thomas Ogletree 'Character and Narrative: Stanley Hauerwas' Studies of the Christian Life' Religious
Studies Review 6/1 January 1980 25-30.
56Gene Outica 'Character, Vision, and Narrative' Religious Studies Review 6/2 April 1980110-118.
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1.5. Causality
Lying behind Hauerwas' discussion of agent, action and character, is an
understanding of causality which he does not sufficiently explore. I do not believe it is
necessary, possible or desirable to dispense with all talk of causes. Hauerwas excludes
discussion of causes in order to deny the privilege of the observer and to explain how the
self is inseparable from its experiences and activities. I believe that in rejecting talk of
causality, Hauerwas is showing a (justified) suspicion of an overemphasis on one type of
causality - final causality. In the discussion that follows, I develop an understanding of
Aristotelian causality that demonstrates the subtleties of what Hauerwas is doing in
Christian ethics. I hope to show first that final causality must take its place as one among
several forms of causality, and second that final causality is not to be construed
individually. I believe that a reexamination of Aristotelian causality will clarify, rather than
obscure, Hauerwas' notion of character.
Two commentators on Hauerwas hint that causality may have a significant part to
play in clarifying Hauerwas' position. Leslie Muray and John Milbank, in their discussions
of Hauerwas, allude to the possibility of a departure from a concentration on final
causality. John Milbank's argument in Theology and Social Theory is that Aristotle
understands ethics as rhetorical rather than dialectical; in other words, ethics is not about
the proving or testing of virtue, but about the demonstration and thus the description of
virtue. In the course of this argument Milbank points out what he describes as 'a key to
deconstructing Aristotle'. The key is, that 'at the heart of [Aristotle's] ethics the apparent
dominance of final causality, the means/end axis, is subverted by formal causality and a
form/matter axis'.57
Meanwhile from a very different starting point Leslie Muray, a process theologian,
argues that Hauerwas fails to discount a substantialist understanding of the self. By a
'substantialist view Muray means the dualist view corresponding to the one I have
described in terms of the 'free will' argument above: it sees the self as a separate substance
with accidental (and thus detachable) properties. In Muray's view, Hauerwas identifies
57John Milbank Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason Oxford: Blac.kwell 1990 p. 350.
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agency and human freedom with efficient causality, in sentences like the following: 'The
self is not different from our agency, for we have the power of efficient causation through
our capacity to intentionally form our action'." Muray calls on Hauerwas to provide 'a
conceptual elaboration of the relationship between efficient and final causality': Muray
himself is anxious not to let go of the latter, which he identifies as the capacity for self-
creation and thus freedom." I am aiming here to provide the conceptual elaboration which
Muray seeks.
What implications does Hauerwas' understanding of character have for causality?
For Aristotle, there are four causes - material, efficient, formal and final. These may be
illustrated in relation to a statue: the material cause, out of which the statue is made
(bronze); the efficient cause, which brings the statue about (the chisel or sculptor); the
formal cause, the shape into which the statue is made; and the final cause, the purpose for
which the statue is made (the decoration of the square, or the glorification of the model).6°
Since Aristotle, attention has come to concentrate on what makes things the way they are
- and thus on efficient and final causes; meanwhile what things are in themselves - formal
and material causes - have come to be seen not as causes at all but as properties of the
things themselves.
What Hauerwas is doing should now be easier to explain. Ethics cannot jump
straight to final causes, as if there were a consensus on the other three areas. One cannot
simply discuss whether or not an action should take place without first considering who
the person is who is doing it and how a community understands the action that is being
considered. This is Hauerwas' constant complaint about 'value-free' ethics, such as the
supposedly autonomous disciplines of medical ethics and business ethics. It is therefore a
mistake to assume that matter and form are simply the properties of things which can be
objectively described by the outside observer. In Hauerwas' hands, the efficient cause is
58 Stariley Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue p. 56.
59L,eslie A. Muray, 'Confessional Postmodernism and the Procms-Relational Vision' Process Studies
18/2 1989 p. 85. In his response to Muray, Charles Pinches highlights Muray's concern about the
relationship between efficient and final causality: he &scribes the suggestion as 'quite promising' (Charles
R Pinches, 'Hauerwas Represented: A Response to Muray' Process Studies 18/2 p. 100).
60Aristotle Metaphysics 1014.
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king - to the extent that even the 'nature' of things (their matter and form) is not always
able to withstand it. In short, things are what we make of them. 61 There is no objective
definition of matter and form to which all agents (efficient causes) must subscribe. Baldly
put, the question is not 'What is this thing for (in itself)?', but 'What can it become in the
kingdom of God?'.
Once it has been established that final causality is not king, it is easy to see why
Hauerwas is so concerned not to place decision-making at the centre of ethical debate. For
decision-making is about final causality - the 'means-ends axis', as Milbank calls it. Despite
Muray's protestations, freedom does not lie in final causality. The stuff of ethics lies further
upstream, in the formation of the agents who are to become the efficient causes. Decisions
are still important, but now because they are part of the inescapable form of the self.
The self is not simply matter - that would be the substantialist view. But we can
see the force of Muray's criticism that Hauerwas' position 'lends itself to a substantialist
interpretation'. 62 Statements such as '[the self] simply is its activities as well as its
experience' are designed to get away from a self separate from activity. But the self does
develop - it is in some sense a material cause, if not a detachable substance. The self is not,
however, just a material cause. If we are self-agents, then the self is also an efficient cause.
What enables the self to be both a material and an efficient cause? The answer is, its
character. Character is the formal cause - the form of our self-agency. It is thus
character, the formal cause, that prevents the self from becoming simply matter - the
subject of the efficient causes of other agents - and enables the self to be an efficient cause.
The self is of course not the only efficient cause in the world - there are countless
circumstances beyond our control - but it is because of character that the self is able to be
an efficient cause at all. Without character, we would be simply material at the mercy of
circumstance - in short, simply determined beings. Indeterminism, on the other hand,
stresses the self as an efficient cause to the exclusion of the self as a material cause: thus
the self appears to be an 'uncaused cause'.
61 For an essential elaboration of this rather sweeping claim, see chapter five below. Hauerwas does not
altogether deny the existence of 'natural' properties: he simply resists making them the starting-point of
ethical enquiry. John Milbank points out that natural laws are lavvs of physis, and thus subject to change,
since physis is the changeable. 'Aristotle does not really connect the ethical with what is eternally valid
(Theology and Social Theory p. 350).
62Leslie Muray 'Confessional Postmodernism' p. 85.
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Thus when Hauerwas talks about 'active and passive aspects of our existence°,
on my present interpretation he is talking about how the self is both an efficient (active)
cause and a material (largely passive) cause. He points out that 'much of what we are is
that which "happens to us"... the passive resides at the very core of our agency'. He goes
on to say that though a person may conform to a society's expectations, his or her
resulting character is still uniquely his or her own. This discussion is, I suggest, made
clearer by restoring the notions of causality. The material cause is subject to outside forces
- notably culture, society, place and time of birth. 64 These are the 'given' aspects of our
existence. But we are never just material causes: our character is that which 'transforms
our fate into our destiny'.65
The expression 'transforming fate into destiny' gives a clue to the way character
ensures our freedom. Freedom is an aspect of our character. Character is that which
prevents us from being merely passive, simply material causes; meanwhile freedom is that
which 'protects us from being at the mercy of the moment."
[Our] choices consist in limiting an indeterminate range of possibilities by ordering
them in accordance with [our] intentions. To be free is to set a course through the
multitude of possibilities that confront us and so impose order on the world and
ourse/ves.67
Being free means claiming that what was done was one's own, that what took
place was not just an event but was one's action. Freedom thus resembles power rather
than choice: the 'power of self-possession necessary to avoid the parameters of life that
others would impose 1 . 68 Hauerwas quotes with approval Frithjof Bergmann's compelling
63 Stanley Hauerwas Character and the Christian Life pp. 116-117.
64Hauerwas accuses situation ethics of 'working with a very passive model of the self The self is always
lost amid the contingencies of the particular situation. For men to have autonomy in any meaningful
sense, they must be able to meet "the situation" on grounds other than those which the situation itself
provides. Such grounds must be based on their character. Situation ethics seem hit a secular restatement
of the passive view of man associated with the traditional protestant insistence on justification by faith.'
Stanley Hauerwas Vision and Virtue p. 54 n. 16.
65The phrase 'transform fate into destiny comes from Stanley Hauerwas A Community of Character p.
10; I consider it in detail in chapter five below.
66Stanley Hauerwas Vision and Virtue p. 65.
61Character and the Christian Lift p. 114.
68 Stax1ey Hauerwas, A Community of Character p. 125. Mirka* makes a similar claim: 'in the
Christian understanding, virtue ... means a power that constantly generates its own field of operation,
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argument which begins to show how freedom understood in the light of virtue opens the
door to providence and the Christian narrative.
If it is now understood that the making of a choice gives rise to freedom only if! identify
with the agency that does the choosing (i.e. if I regard the thought-process that makes
the decision as truly mine, despite its being conditioned, or influenced, or so forth), then
it should be clear that freedom can also result from my identifying with an agency other
than those processes of thought - and this means that I may be free even if the decisive
difference between two alternatives was not made by my own choice, as long as I
identify with (i.e. regard as myself) the agency that did tip the scales.69
Hauerwas is not interested in some ideal state in which we might have absolute
control over our lives. Freedom means being able to go from saying 'it happened' to 'I did
it'. If we are to face our lives without illusion or deception, we need courage. Courage
teaches us to face our own death not with denial or illusion but with hope. No ideal
freedom could enable us to do this. Virtue is therefore a condition of freedom.
'Virtue as its own reward' is a reminder that we choose to be virtuous for no other reason
than that to be so is the only condition under which we would desire to survive. Only by:
so embodying the virtues have we the power to make our lives our own."
If we see character as the formal cause of our agency, it becomes easier to see
what is meant by saying decisions are part of our character. The kinds of decisions we
face - the kinds of circumstances in which we sense a decision is required - are the result
of the kinds of people we are. One kind of person will face moral difficulties and obstacles
of which another kind of person might be unaware. To an observer, such decisions might
seem momentous or heroic: to the agent, they might simply seem an inescapable result of
being true to his or her own character.
Character emerges as that which provides a proper bridge between our past and
our future. This is what opens the door for Hauerwas to enter the world of narrative. It
does not imply the limiting of actions to a protective routine which escapes the novelty of
the unknown. It anticipates responsible reaction to new circumstances. But novelty
sometimes denies the good of the past; character therefore does not accept the future
which is no longer something to be formed, dominated or inhibited, but instead liberated as a new power
and a new freedom' (Theology and Social Theory p. 362-3).
69Frithjof Bergmann On Being Free Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 1977 p. 65 quoted in
Stanley Hauerwas A Community of Character pp. 115-116.
"Stanley Hauerwas A Community of Character p. 125. Charles Dickens provides a ghastly parody of
this notion of virtue in the character of Mr Pecksniff in Martin Chuzzlewit
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unconditionally, it does not passively accommodate to. circumstance: it changes
circumstance and forms the future. The kind of person we are determines the kind of
future we will face'.71
Where does this leave the final cause? The answer to this question is what takes
the discussion away from pure philosophy into theological approaches. A community of
character is not a means to an end, it is an end in itself The final cause is therefore not to
be construed individually: it is the production and maintenance of a community made up
of people of character - the communio sanctorum. This approach is evident in Hauerwas'
discussions of matters such as sexual intercourse and in vitro fertilization. Whereas the
discussion of such issues generally concerns the inherent (and objectively-judged)
tightness or wrongness of certain acts, Hauerwas does not discuss these issues in such
terms. He is primarily concerned with what will form, maintain, and express the quality of
a community of character. This is not narcissistic, because it is a quality of such a people
to serve the wider society. Final causes are therefore incomprehensible when separated
from the other three causes. There is nothing 'given' about the final cause: its very nature
changes by the practices undertaken to shape it.
I trust that this discussion of Hauerwas' ethics in terms of causality has clarified
what is at stake in the debate about the self I am aware that Hauerwas himself believes
that the language of causality can be replaced by the language of description. 72 I hope to
have shown why I believe Hauerwas is mistaken in laying causes aside, and how in fact
Aristotelian categories clarify various aspects of his conception of character.
To sum up my argument about causality I have developed 11/filbank's claim that
Aristotle subverts final causality by his emphasis on formal causality. In Hauerwas'
language, this means insisting on character (the formal cause) in place of decision (the final
cause). I have pointed to an answer to Muray's enquiry about the relationship between
efficient and final causality. These two should not be detached as forcibly from material
71 Stan1ey Hauerwas, sion and Virtue p. 64.
721 am not an agent because I can "cause" certain things to happen, but because certain things that
happen, whether through the result of my decision or not, can be made mine through my power of
attention and intention. The "causation" proper to agents and their actions is not rendered by cause and
effect, but by the agent's power of description.' The Peaceable Kingdom p. 42. It is possible that the
language of &-sciiption may be construed causally - that is, description focuses attention on material and
formal causes. I have assumed this in the titles of my chapters.
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and formal causes: when all four causes are restored to a place in the understanding of the
self Hauerwas' argument becomes simple and clear: the self is not just a (passive,
determined) material cause, or just an (indeterminate, active) efficient cause, but is enabled
to be both by its character, the formal cause of its agency and the form of its material.
Character is that which enables the self to be both a material cause and an efficient cause.
The purpose or final cause of the self is to be in a community of character. It is when all
four causes are in harmony that one can talk in terms of the 'unity of the self. An action is
good if it leads to the formation of a good agent; it is bad, not because it is bad in itself
but if it does not lead to the formation of agents of character. That certain actions are
always wrong is but a way of saying that no virtuous person could ever envision so acting'
- because 'such actions injure the practices of the community necessary for sustaining
virtuous people'.73
1.6. Narrative
One problem with seeing ethics from the agent's perspective is that it leaves
unclear the relationship between God, the world, and the self These are among the issues
left unresolved by Character and the Christian Life. If character forms the self what
forms character? How does the agent relate to other beings, past and present? How does
the concept of self-agency relate to grace, providence, and the priority of God's activity?
Hauerwas' solution to these problems is through his understanding of narrative.
The resource from which we derive our character is a truthful narrative. The only
way to know ourselves is through our history, and we come to know the world and God
in the same way. As soon as we begin to use the language of change, growth, and
"Stanley Hauerwas, The Difference of Virtue and the Difference it Makes: Courage Exemplified' in
Modern Theology 913 July 1993 p.263 n. 5. See also Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue pp. 149-152.
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development, we enter the world of narrative. If we are to make our experience coherent,
we must see it as an incipient story. Narrative arises from our need for coherence, our
resistance to the random. flauerwas stresses that
ethics must be concerned with retrospective judgements, as we seek the means to make
what we 'have done' and what has happened to us our own. Moral 'principles' cannot do
that what is required is a narrative that gives us the ability to be what we are and yet go
on.
74
Narrative is required in order that we may understand how persons grow morally without
losing their integrity. A coherent story can explain how persons can develop while still
remaining faithful to their 'true self.
1.6.1. Narrative from above or narrative from below?
In the second chapter of The Peaceable Kingdom, Hauerwas acknowledges three
crucial claims made for narrative.75
First, it is indispensable for disclosing the contingent nature of the self. If we
ignore our narrative quality, we are in danger of forgetting that we are creatures and
assuming that we exist by necessity. For instance, if one simply asks, 'What should I do?'
one may miss the insights of 'Who am IT and thus the more obviously narrative-based
1-low have I come to be here?'.
Second, it discloses the historical nature of existence in society. A person who can
thread together separate events and realities in his or her life has established an identity; a
community which can do the same has established a tradition. The latter is necessary for
the former to be possible. 'Objective' ethics, ethics without community, therefore consider
the self outside its setting. They might as well consider fish outside the sea.
Third, narrative is the form of God's salvation: 'Scripture as a whole tells the story
of the covenant with Israel, the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus, and the ongoing
74Stanley Hauerwas A Community ofCharacter p. 271 n. 14.
75Stanley Hauerwas The Peaceable Kingdom p. 28.
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history of the Church as the recapitulation of that life.' 76 If God reveals himself in
narrative, the (revealed) Christian life should respond in kind.
At least one writer has identified a discontinuity between the third of these claims
and those that precede it. 77 The first and second claims could be described as 'narrative
from below. They describe human experience in general, rather than Christian experience
in particular. 78 Though they point out the story-formed nature of human existence, they
offer no prescriptive or metaphysical considerations. By contrast, the third claim is not
grounded in human experience. It derives from revelation, and is thus 'narrative from
above 1 . 79 It is concerned to show that the biblical narrative manifests God's character, that
narratives display character in the way they link intentional action, and thus that the
Christian community's tradition of stories shapes the character of Christians." Thus the
first two claims are experiential and descriptive, while the third is revelatory and
prescriptive.
The discontinuity is visible in the development of Hauerwas' thought. Character
and the Christian Life is concerned largely with the individual self The category of
narrative emerges as Hauerwas considers the unresolved issues arising from that book. As
he himself says, 'it is a mistake to assume that my emphasis on narrative is the central
focus of my position ... Narrative is but a concept that helps clarify the various themes I
have sought to develop _ 1 . 81 'Narrative from below can be seen as Hauerwas' attempt to
' 6 ibid p. 29.
77Pau1 Nelson, Narrative and Morality: A Theological Enquiry Pennsylvania State UP 1987 p. 112-
113. Thomas Ogletree CCharacter and Narrative' p. 28) makes a similar point in describing Hauerwas'
discussion of narrative as overgeneralised Autobiography, short story, novel, parable, the story of a people
(including history and legend) and myth are all thrown together in Hauerwas' early work, complains
Ogletree.
78This 'narrative from below position is well expressed by Stephen Crites. See The Narrative Qlity
of Experience' Journal of the American Academy of Religion 393 1971 pp 291-311, and 'Myth, Story.
History' in Tony Stoneburger ed Parable, Myth and Language Cambridge, Mass: Church Society for
College Work 1968.
79Here Hauerwas' principal forebear is Hans Frei.
8°Ne1son points out that such claims are not assisted, and may even be undermined by the general
anthropological claims.
81 Stanley Hauenvas The Peaceable Kingdom p iocv. Hauervvas is really criticising his own earlier work
when he complains of The general tendency of action theory to isolate and abstract "action" from the
narrative contexts that make an action intelligible.' A Community of Character p. 262 n. 11.
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save the agent's perspective from death by a thousand qualifications. It arises chiefly from
Hauerwas' concern to avoid a substantialist understanding of the self In his stress on the
agent's perspective, he is in danger of implying a new internality - that of intention - to
replace old and rejected internalities such as 'free will'. In Milbank's more radical view, the
problem begins in trying to separate a discrete sphere of 'action'.
To hang on to 'action' as a special ethical sphere is still to cling to certain notions of
internality. Hence many current proponents of an 'ethics of virtue' began by insisting on
The agent's perspective' to distinguish intentionally informed action (although not a
Cartesian intention posited before' an action) from mere natural causation, which can
be fully comprehended from 'outside'. However, they have quickly realised that post-
Wittgensteinian considerations force one to see that if an intention is situated within an
action, then it is also constituted through language, and so is in principle as
comprehensible to an outside observer as to the agent herself.82
Hauerwas himself acknowledges the importance of Wittgenstein: Wittgenstein
ended forever any attempt on my part to anchor theology in some general account of
"human experience" and taught him to look instead to the grammar of the language used
by believers'." He also clarifies the agent's perspective by invoking the agent's community
in the role that he previously (in Character and the Christian Life) assigned to the agent
and Milbank earmarks for the 'observe?. In doing so, he remains consistent with the
second (historical') claim for narrative as discussed above. He is concerned to find
an account of how my way of appropriating the convictions of my community
contributes to the story of that people. ... It is useful to think of such an account as a
narrative that is more basic than either the agent's or observer's standpoint."
This clarification of the agent's perspective ensures that Hauerwas avoids
criticisms of a substantialist view of the internal self What replaces the internal self is the
'internal' community. To talk of an internal community simply means that the community is
ethically prior to the individual self. This has implications for the way the community is
perceived to relate to the outside world: for a substantialist view of community is
intolerable to many."
82John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory p. 358. Milbank believes, against Aristotle, that 'there is
no universal, special sphere of "action", and therefore no distinct sutject called "ethics". Questions of "the
moral" rather intrude evervwhere.'
83Stanley Hauerwas The Peaceable Kingdom p
84A Community of Character p. 135.
851 shall return to these views in chapter three below.
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What really saves Hauerwas from charges of internality is his identification of one
particular narrative as normative for ethics: 'Narrative provides the conceptual means to
suggest how the stories of Israel and Jesus are a "morality" for the formation of the
Christian community and character'." It is his third claim, the nonfoundational assertion
that narrative is the form of God's salvation, that resolves the foundational first and second
claims. 87 We are "storied people" because the God that sustains us is a "storied God"
whom we come to know only by having our character formed appropriate to God's
character. The formation of such character is not an isolated event but requires the
existence of a corresponding society - a "storied society" , .88
What emerges is the unique importance and pivotal role of the Church. It is the
Church that enables Hauerwas to hold onto all three claims about narrative made in The
Peaceable Kingdom. For the Church concerns the character of the individual (that
community where we as individuals continue to test and are tested by the particular way
those stories live through us') as well as the character of God (The earnest of God's
kingdom'99 , the 'recapitulation' of the life of Jesus'') and the character of the world (The ...
space for us to ... understand the disobedient, sinful, but still God-created character of the
world'92). It is Hauerwas' concept of Church, absent from Character and the Christian
Life, and derived from his understanding of the ongoing nature of God's story, that finally
saves ethics from the clutches of agent or observer, and demonstrates the compatibility of
contingent, historical, and community-dependent ethics with antifoundational claims about
the nature of revelation.
86Stanley Hauerwas A Community of Character p. 95.
87For a discussion of foundationalism and antifoundationalism, see chapter two.
88 Stanley Hauerwas A Community of Character p. 91.
89ibid p. 96.
wibid p. 92
91 Stanley Hauerwas The Peaceable Kingdom p. 29.
92Stanley Hauerwas A Community of Character p. 92.
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1.7. The Communio Sanctorum
This first chapter has set out to show the centrality of the Church in Hauerwas'
proposal for Christian ethics. First we saw the shortcomings in 'decisionist' ethics. An
ethics of character and narrative better describes the moral life, moving the emphasis away
from final causality - the end in view - toward formal causality - the who and how of the
agent. I suggested that if we restore the notions of Aristotle's description of causality, we
can identify the self as both the material cause (the 'passive' matter acted upon) and the
effective cause (the 'active' agent). This prevents us from having to see the self as primarily
either active or passive. 93 We can go on to see character as the formal cause - The form of
our agency'. It is a mistake to see the final cause in isolation from the other three causes -
this is the error made by the 'standard account'. Yet how are we to think of the final cause?
My suggestion is that the final cause is the Church. If we return to Milbank's
criticism of MacIntyre and Hauerwas, we can see that his concern is on exactly this point,
the final cause or telos.
What makes an action is not the presence of a 'human' or 'cultural' motive or `internal'
reason: all this is still Cartesian and ICantian. What matters is the objective surface
presence of a teleological ordering where intention of a goal shows up in visible
structure.94
In Christian theology there is a tension between what might be called a creation/
incarnational approach (largely corresponding to 'nature') and an eschatological/
soteriological approach (largely corresponding to 'grace). One can discern a tendency of
foundational enterprises toward the former approach, affirming the value of human reason
and experience, while nonfoundational enterprises lean toward the latter approach, aware
of human shortcomings and the otherness of God. A tendency of Christian ethics of the
former kind is to ask of a material 'What is it for?, while the latter ethics will be more
likely to ask 'What might it become in God's kingdom?.
93Milbank still feels he has to make a choice: Narrative is our primary mode of inhabiting the world,
and it characterises the way the world happens to us, not, primarily, the cultural world humans happen to
make' (Theology and Social Theory p. 359).
94John Milbank Theology and Social Theory p. 359.
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These are all generalisations, but they help us to see that Hauerwas' approach is
largely of the latter kind. As such, it has a central implicit role for eschatology. The world
has an End. Hence Hauerwas' view that the moral life be lived not prospectively (the
possibilities created by each new choice) but retrospectively. The Church is a body of
people whose vision of the world is retrospective from the end. In short, Christian ethics
are not teleological but eschatological. The telos of the church is the eschaton. But the
crucial fact in the life of the Church is that unlike the secular telos, the eschaton has in
some sense already been achieved in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. The
Church trusts that what it will discover of God at the eschaton will be consistent with
what has already been revealed in Christ. The Church is therefore delivered from
structuring its ethics around an incomplete telos which it is obliged somehow to bring
about. It need not make the mistake of consequential ethics in assuming a responsibility to
make the story end correctly. The story has ended correctly. Faithful witness therefore
means trusting that this is so - this is the witness of the Church. The Church can therefore
be seen in some sense as the proleptic presence of the eschaton. It is therefore the final
cause of Christian ethics. In its 'visible structure' is what Milbank describes as The objective
surface presence of a teleological ordering'. The Church's vision of the world from an
eschatological point of view is what enables it, through narrative, to form its character by
claiming its actions as its own.95
Sanctification is a dynamic process, not a static condition. It is a collective
movement, not an individual attribute. It concerns the gradual conformity of the
community to the description of life offered by Jesus Christ. Christians develop by
attending to certain descriptions and forming actions in accordance with them. This
attention forms Christian character. Once we have fixed our attention on these
descriptions, our continuing action reveals to us surprising and unforeseen new aspects
and implications of our descriptions.
Thus we may find that we cannot wish to gain as much money as we can and at the
same time treat all men fairly. Al some point, in relation to a particular situation, we
discover that though our agency can be determined by either one of these descriptions,
95For an emended discussion of eschatological ethics, see chapter four below.
96See Stanley Hauerwas Vision and Virtue p. 58.
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they cannot both be harmonized in the same act. We must choose one or the other, and
thereby become as we have chosen.97
This illustrates the interrelationship between character, agent, and action. For
Christians, it is the Church that offers the particular description of the world. Sustained
attention to this description informs and forms the life of the Christian. 'Sanctification is
thus the formation of the Christian's character that is the result of his [or her] intention to
see the world as redeemed in Jesus Christ.'"
In the Introduction to the third printing of Character and the Christian Life
Hauerwas adopts the metaphor of the moral life as a journey. 99 He is concerned that
sanctification should not be descriptive of a status: it is in danger of becoming an abstract
condition. m He therefore retains the meaning of the term but plays down its significance:
sanctification simply reminds Christians of the kind of journey they must undertake if they
adopt and attend to the Church's description of the world.101
Part of the problem is that sanctification seems to imply a normative description of
the virtues of the Christian life. But a glance at the diversity of virtues recommended by
different societies and thinkers reveals a disarming lack of consensus, even upon a
principle for determining the key virtues. This leaves the notion of sanctification vulnerable
to historical disputes and enquiry: hence the temptation toward abstraction. Hauerwas is
anxious to maintain the historical character of virtue, and therefore begins to steer away
from the term sanctification toward language that speaks more concretely about
participation in the Church. Nonetheless sanctification as a theme remains crucial to
Hauerwas, as we shall see elsewhere, because it concerns performance and is thus crucial
to assessing the truth of Christian convictions. It is also a collective thing: the communion
97 ibid p. 63.
"ibid p. 67.
99p accvii. He derives the metaphor from Meilaender, who distinguishes between dialogue (a continual
back-and-forth between law and gospel) and journey ('becorning ._the sort of person God wants us to be').
See G. Meilaender, The Place of Ethics in the Theological Task', Currents in Theology and Mission 6
1979 p. 199.
mtor this reason it drops out of his more recent work almost entirely, and is replaced by particular
narratives of individuals and communities.
101 See The Peaceable Kingdom p. 94.
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of saints, just as much as the community of character, represents the final cause of
Christian ethics.'"
1.8. Virtue
Even among those who still regard the virtues as worthy of attention there is no
consensus on how they are to be understood. Are the virtues one or are they many? Is
there a definitive list of virtues and which are primary? Can the virtues conflict? How are
they acquired? In what do they reside?
Hauerwas is committed to a view of human existence as historical, bounded by
creation and eschaton, embedded in particularities and contingencies, far removed from
ideals and abstractions. He goes back to the pre-Christian era and finds that Aristotle's
account of the virtues is well suited to the temporal character of life. It is as if Aristotle is
all dressed up for a strenuous journey yet requires the medieval theologians to provide
somewhere to go. What Aristotle lacked was a narrative context for the development of
virtues. His account 'begs for a narrative display'. Here Hauerwas sees through the eyes of
MacIntyre:
The medieval vision is historical in a way that Aristotle's could not be. It situates OUT
aiming at the good not just in specific contexts ... bin in contexts which themselves have
wHanerwas would no doubt heartily concur with Karl Barth's discussion of whether communio
SCUICtorum refers to sacred things (sancta) or sacred people (sancti). Barth commends both. 'Sancti means
not specially fine people, but, for example, people Like The saints of Corinth', who were very queer saints.
But these queer folk, to whom we too may belong, are sancti, that is, men set apart - for holy gifts and
works, for sancta.' (Karl Barth Dogmatics in Outline translated by G.T. Thomson London: S.C.M. 1949.)
For a more .tailed discussion of holiness, see chapter three below.
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a history. To move towards the good is to move in time and that movement may itself
involve new understandings of what it is to move towards the good I °3
Hauerwas confesses that Aristotle's list of the virtues is chaotic and arbitrary. But
underlying Aristotle's account is a sense of unity expressed in terms of self-possession.
This is the notion of integrity, constancy, steadfastness of character - The kind of character
necessary to be able to feel the right things rightly as well as act at the right time, in the
right way and toward the right people.'" Both Hauerwas and MacIntyre identify the
importance of the novel in portraying constancy. Constancy unites commitments and
obligations, past and future, and demands narrative display.'" In Jane Austen's Mansfield
Park Fanny Price refuses marriage to Henry Crawford and thereby 'places the danger of
losing her soul before the reward of gaining what for her would be a whole world. She
pursues virtue for the sake of a certain kind of happiness and not for its utility'!"
If constancy is one aspect of the historical character of virtue, perhaps the
definitive aspect is habit. Hauerwas sees habit as the key, and he identifies this as a
difference between foundational and nonfoundational accounts of ethics. Both Plato and
Kant try to establish a foundation for morality that makes habits and their acquisition
secondary. Aristotle's insistence that morality begins with the acquisition of habits
indicates that there is no foundation for morality apart from historic communities!"
The discussion of habit concerns the way character is developed through
behaviour. Training and repetition enable people to learn simple habits early in life. The
1 03Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue p, 176. See also Stanley Hauerwas, 'Happiness, the Life of Virtue
and Friendship: Theological Reflections on Aristotelian Themes' Asbury Theological Journal 45/1 1990 p.
29.
I Cvl Stanley Hauerwas 'Happiness...' p. 24. See Aristotle Mcomachean Ethics 1105a26-35 and 1105b7-9.
°51The virtues and the harms and evils which the virtues alone will overoome provide the structure both
of a life in which the telos can be achieved and of a narrative in which the story of such a life can be
unfolded.' Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue p. 243.
1 °6Alasdair Maclntyre After Virtue p. 242. If Austen is MacIntyre's (and Gilbert Ryle's) heroine,
Hauerwas' hem is Trollope - to whom none is the equal for characterisatim Reading novels is moral
training: 'we are stretched through a narrative world that gives us the skills to make something of our own
lives.' See Hauerwas, 'Constancy and Forgiveness: The Novel as a School for Virtue' Notre Dame English
Journal Summer 1983 p. 46. See also Hauerwas' admiration for the Aristotelian Martha Nussbaum in his
'Can Aristotle be a Liberal? Nussbaum on Luck' Soundings 7214 Winter 1989 675-691.
1 °' Stanley Hauerwas A Community of Character p. 273 a 20.
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actions which people perform in turn shape the performer. The vast majority of actions are
performed not by rational decision but by habit. The implications of this are not fully
worked out in Character and the Christian Lift, where the fact that habit appears to
describe automatic or mechanical response causes Hauerwas some anxiety.'" At this
stage Hauerwas is concerned to protect the agent as decision-maker, and is concerned lest
habit make virtue seem mechanical. In later works - particularly after his contact with
people with a mental handicap has qualified his understanding of moral rationality - habit
comes increasingly to take the role in Hauerwas' thought that MacIntyre reserves for
practic,e. 1 °9
 Habit offers a dimension that the term 'practice' lacks: the dimension of non-
It iscognitive yet learned behaviour - a level open to people with a mental handicap. 110
habit that preserves Hauerwas' ethic of virtue from charges of elitism.
More important than the specific virtues commended by Hauerwas is where he
goes looking for them. The key to understanding how his concept of character develops
into a call for specific virtues lies within the foregoing discussion of narrative. For the twin
aspects of virtue correspond to the twin aspects of narrative. On the one hand narrative
conveys the particular, historical, temporal, contingent nature of human existence, and
thus virtue correspondingly engages with the questions of the unity of our lives and the
extent to which we can be held accountable for our character. Constancy and habit are
among Hauerwas' concerns in this broad understanding of virtue. On the other hand every
story has an End, and the virtues particularly commended by Hauerwas - especially
faithfulness, hope, patience, peacemaking and courage - are those appropriate to an
eschatological view of the world." In The Peaceable Kingdom he identifies patience and
hope as the central Christian virtues, and he emphasises that love should not be separated
from hope and patience, lest the eschatological and political aspects of Christian existence
be neglected. 112
1 °8Stanley Hauerwas Character and the Christian Lift pp. 69-70.
1 °9Hauerwas acknowledges in Character and the Christian Life that some have come to understand
habit as involving imagination, intellect, and will (p. 69).
11 °The ethical significance of mental handicap and the way retarded people challenge assumptions of
moral rationality is very important in Hauerwas' work. I return to it in chapter five below.
I 11 Hauerwas suggests this in 'Happiness, the Life of Virtue and Friendship' p. 29.
112see Stanleyam Hauerwas A Community of Character p.268 n. 66.
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We may continue the distinction between the broad notion of telos and the
specifically Christian anticipation of eschaton, and extend this distinction into the area of
virtue. For the cardinal virtues are those suited to the notion of telos, and the theological
virtues - to which Hauerwas adds a few of his own, notably peacemaking - are those
which anticipate the eschaton. This accords with the thrust of the most significant criticism
of the way Hauerwas adapts Aristotle's discussion of virtue and the virtues, which comes
from John Milbank. It is the most significant because its concern is one even closer to
Hauerwas' heart than virtue - nonviolence. Hauerwas himself describes how in the absence
of virtues sufficient to structure self-possession we seek security through power and
violence. 113 Milbank questions whether any notion of virtue can be founded on antiquity.
Just as Augustine charged the Romans with having no real virtue, because they had no
real peace, so Milbank extends this charge, on both a practical and an ontological level, to
the whole of antiquity. Antique virtue, says Milbank, assumed violence, and thus was
concerned with control - of self; soul or city. Milbank considers that the ontological
priority of peace is more important than virtue. 114 A distinction between telos and
eschaton, and its extension into a distinction between theological and antique virtue,
enables Hauerwas to withstand Milbank's criticisms on this point.
1.9. Summary of Chapter One
Hauerwas began his career by exposing the flaws in the conventional way of doing
ethics. I have begun by explaining what these shortcomings are, notably the emphasis on
the neutral observer and on decisions. I have also drawn out an underlying suspicion that
conventional ethics presupposes violence. In place of the 'standard account of moral
113See A Community of Character p. 126 and 267 n. 58.
I ' 4John Milbank Theology and Social Theory chapter 11 especially pp. 363-364. I shall return to
Hauerwas' eschatological emphasis in chapter four below.
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rationality', Hauerwas proposes an ethic of character and an attention to particular
narratives. Character is Hauerwas' way of explaining how we are not simply passive
beings at the mercy of circumstance, yet neither are we entirely independent. Hauerwas'
account of character is incomplete. By restoring Aristotle's notion of causality I explained
that what Hauerwas is doing in asserting character over decision is to say that ethics is
about how things are done and who does them, rather than solely about the anticipated
end-products of these actions. Actions only have significance because of who is doing
them and how they are being done.
A frequently-aired criticism of Hauerwas is that narrative and character are helpful
themes, but that one cannot do away with principles altogether. Hauerwas never supposes
that one can do away with principles altogether. He simply suggests that the reduction of
ethics to principles alone is a method which implies a story of its own - and a sinister one
at that. My discussion of tragedy and violence in this chapter makes this point. By
displaying the issues in terms of causality I have demonstrated that the whole thrust of
Hauerwas' approach is away from the action toward the agent; but principles remain
useful for intermediate interpretations of the story, as we shall see in the next chapter.115
In my preliminary discussion of narrative I noted that narrative discloses the
formation of character, particularly in its historical and contingent nature. A truthful
narrative lies not with the agent or the observer, but with the community - the Church.
The Church maintains that the end (or conclusion) of all action, the eschaton, has its
character revealed by the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Therefore any other
intended end (or telos) of action is secondary to the building-up of the Church, which is
the true final cause of Christian ethics. This communion of saints unites Hauerwas's
notions of character, narrative and virtue.
I I 5 See 2.4.5. below
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The Description of God: Narrative
2.1. Introduction: Hauerwas"Second Period'
The first period of Stanley Hauerwas' work established his reputation as one who
sees ethics as requiring an emphasis on virtue and character. This emphasis is examined in
relation to a series of contemporary concerns, largely from the field of medicine. With the
publication in 1977 of Truthfidness and Tragedy, Hauerwas' work begins to incorporate
the key role of narrative. Narrative becomes the dominant theme of his next book, A
Community of Character, and is a theme running through The Peaceable Kingdom
(1983). In the latter work, however, a new theme emerges, that of peace. Peace, along
with the relationship of Church to world and the internal upbuilding of the Church, is the
primary theme of most of his subsequent works.'" Thus narrative is the definitive theme
of Hauerwas"second period', but is not such a significant element of his more recent
work. However it remains important for a number of reasons, and these reasons will form
the outline of this chapter.
First, Hauerwas' emphasis on narrative is perhaps the closest he comes to being a
member of a theological 'school'. Many of the criticisms of this 'school' of 'postliberal'
theologians have been applied to Hauerwas himself I shall therefore examine the
distinctive features of postliberalistn, particularly as represented by George Lindbeck and
Hans Frei.
Second, there have been a great number of criticisms of postliberalism. I shall
discuss the work Lindbeck in particular still has to do to render his project consistent, and
the areas on which he is relatively quiet, notably the justification of Christian truth-claims.
116 This categorisation should not be exaggerated, since Hauerwas has continued to publish on earlier
themes, particularly medicine and character, in Suffering Presence, Naming the Silences, and Dispatches
from the Front.
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Third, I shall look at Stanley Hauerwas' own presentation of the issues of narrative
and truth, and discuss in particular his understanding of truth as performance.
Fourth, I shall examine the criticisms that have been made of Hauerwas'
understanding of narrative and performance, and alternative responses that can be made to
these criticisms.
Fifth and finally I shall propose a resolution of many of the arguments and
criticisms that have been discussed. The resolution is intended to be fully intratextual and
faithful to Hauerwas' approach, yet expanding on areas he does not sufficiently develop.
2.2 The Postliberal World
In introducing his Against the Nations: War and Survival in a Liberal Society117 ,
Hauerwas allies himself with those referred to by George Lindbeck as concerned to 'renew
in a posttraditional and postliberal mode the ancient practice of absorbing the universe into
the biblical world'." 8
 He thus recognises both his place alongside such theologians as Hans
Frei, George Lindbeck and David Kelsey, and his debt to Karl Barth. This loose grouping
has been given a variety of names. They have been described as 'nonfoundationalists'
because they start theological reflection with God's self-revelation rather than with an a
priori philosophical understanding of the nature of odstence. 119 They have been thought of
as a new theological school, the New Yale Theologians', since they all have a connection
11 'San Francisco: Harper and Row 1985
118George Lindbeck The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age PhiLacklphia:
Westminster 1984 p. 135.
I I9Ronald F. Thiemaim Revelation and Theology: The Gospel as Narrated Promise Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press 1985 chapter 4.
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with Yale as opposed to Chicago or Berkeley, the other chief centres of narrative
theology.'" Following Lindbeck's designation they have been called 'cultural-linguistic
th col ogi ans' 12 (inspired by Wittgenstein and by Clifford Geertz' notion of 'thick
description' 122) . More sophisticated descriptions include Wittgenstean-inspired
descriptivists' (since they see the theologian's primary task as to describe - rather than to
explain or to justify - the way the faith works, somewhat like a Wittgensteinian 'language-
game), and 'pure narrativists'. 123 Each of these descriptions has its strengths and
weaknesses: I shall generally use the term 'postliberal' since it seems to be the one most
widely understood in the current debate.
The broad thrust of the postliberal alternative is to return the Christian community
to a distinctive vision of the world narrated in the Bible. The common features of
postliberalism can be gathered under three headings: hermeneutics, doctrine and
apologetics.
2.2.1. Frei, Hermeneutics and Narrative
The first common area for postliberalism is an intratextual method. For postliberal
theologians, theology reflects on the Biblical narratives primarily as narratives, rather than
sources for historical investigation, or expressions of common human experience, or truths
which could equally well (or better) be expressed non-narratively. This form of
hermeneutics is described as intratextual. Extratextual theology reinterprets the scriptural
world according to a variety of concepts and approaches from other disciplines in order to
I20The phrase is first used by Brevarrl Childs in The Canonical Approach and the "New Yale
Theology"' in The New Testament as Canon: An Introduction Philadelphia: Fortress Press 1984 pp. 541-
546, and is used extensively by Mark I. Wallace The Second Naivete: Barth, Ricoeur and the New Yale
Theology Macon GA: Meicer University Press 1990.
121 George Lindbeck The Nature of Doctrine pp. 32-41.
1 22 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures Basic Books 1973.
123The last two descriptions come from Gary L. Comstock in what is the best introductory and
classificatory article in the field. See Gary L. Comstock Two Types of Narrative Theology' Journal of the
American Academy ofReligion 55/4 Winter 1987 pp. 687-717.
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'help' the Bible speak to contemporary concerns and clarify its 'message'. By contrast,
intratextual theology
does not make scriptural contents into metaphors for extra-scriptural realities, but the
other way around. It does not suggest ... that believers find their stories in the Bible, hit
rather that they make the story of the Bible their story. ... It is the religion instantiated in
scripture which defines being, truth, goodness, and beauty, and the non-scriptural
exemplifications of those realities need to be transformed into figures ... of the scriptural
ones. Intratextual theology redescnbes theology within the scriptural framework rather
than translating scripture into extrascriptural categories. It is the text, so to speak, which
absorbs the world, rather than the world the text. 24
This intratextual method is developed by Hans Frei. Frei describes how
theologians of the early Church and the Reformation period derived their theological
method from the narrated world of the scripture. The great change came in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Since the Enlightenment, Frei argues, biblical
scholars have looked to general, extratextual categories to determine the validity of the
theological claims of scripture. In other words, the rules of interpretation were set not by
the text itself, or even by the worshipping community formed by the text, but by the
historian, social scientist, or philosopher. This change is what Frei calls The great reversal':
interpretation was a matter of fitting the biblical story into another world with another
story rather than incorporating that world into the biblical story.125
Thereafter the touchstone was human experience: the truth of the biblical narrative
could, it seemed, only be preserved by reinterpreting its meaning so that it conveyed a
moral lesson or a way of being-in-the-world. Deism, historical criticism, and Hume's
scepticism about historical claims undermined confidence in the veracity of the Biblical
narratives. The result was the separation of the meaning of the text (what it literally says)
from its reference (what historical events it describes). For Frei, the Bible is 'literally',
though not always 'historically' true.
We move on to Frei's concept of narrative. Frei draws on the description by the
French literary critic Eric Auerbach of the method of the 'realistic novel' I26 . The interplay
124George Lindbeck The Nature of Doctrine p. 118.
125Hans Frei The Eclipse ofBiblical Narrative p. 130.
126 Erich Auerbach Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature Princeton: Princeton
University Press 1953.
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of plot and character in a realistic novel renders its vision of reality. Theologians, in Frei's
view, should cease to be distracted by the 'failure' of the Bible to refer to objective history,
and recognise that it is history/ace - that is, that the genre of narrative is indispensable for
grasping the meaning of the greater part of scripture. What Frei intends by the term
'narrative' here is that we understand the story's meaning not as
illustrated (as though it were an intellectually pre-subsisting or preconceived archetype
or ideal essence), but constituted through the mtruial, specific determination of agents,
speech, social context and circumstances that form the indispensable narrative web.' 27
In The Identity of Jesus Christ Frei develops this intratextual method of
interpretation. He traces how the gospels provide normative patterns of Jesus' identity and
thus offer a way of redescribing the reality of Jesus within the world of the Bible, rather
than translating this reality into abstraction or timeless typological or mythological
universals.
Despite using an extratheological source - Erich Auerbach - Frei is anxious to
stress that narrative is important because it is what we find in the Bible, and not vice versa.
I am not proposing or arguing a general anthropology. I am precisely not claiming that
narrative sequence is the built-in constitution of human being phenomenologically
uncovered. That may or may not be the case. ... If there is a 'narrative theoloe, the
meaning of that term in the context of the self-description of the Christian community is
that we are specified by relation to its particular narrative and by our conceptual
=description of it in belief and life, not by a quality of 'narrativity' inherent in our
picture of self and world at large.' 28
Frei's belief in the perspicuity of scripture - the transparency and accessibility of
the 'literal sense' - seems to be in conflict with other concerns of postliberal theology. It
seems inconsistent with Lindbeck's emphasis on the alien-ness of the text to the modern
mind and the need for catechesis. It is also out of step with the whole thrust of Hauerwas'
book Unleashing the Scripture, which denies that 'America knows how to read the
Bible1 . 129 Frei talks of the 'plain sense' and the 'literal sense': but his assumption that there is
one such sense and that it is the one he identifies seems to put him on the very context-
invariant henneneutical neutral high ground that Lindbeck - in common with several
12 'Hans Frei The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative p. 280.
128 Quoted by Paul Nelson Narrative and Morality p. 77.
129Stanley Hauerwas Unleashing the Scripture: Freeing the Bible from Captivity to America Nashville:
Abingdon 1993. For further discussion of this point, see 2.3.2. below.
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schools of suspicion from Marx onwards - disavows. Frei amends his position in a later
article, where he recognises that the reader is part of an interpretative community, and that
the literal' reading is specific to this community.'" I shall return to the 'henneneutical
community' in considering Hauerwas' approach later in this chapter.
2.2.2. Lindbeck and Doctrine
A further common area for postliberalism is its antifoundationalism.
Foundationalism, in this sense, is the principle that it is possible to step outside a tradition
(a culture and language) and express doctrine in a universalisable way. It is this view that
the postliberals reject. In chapter one above we saw how Hauerwas rejects
foundationalism in ethics - the idea that a neutral observer is best placed to adjudicate
objectively on the basis of impersonal rationality. Hauerwas argues that this exaggerates
the distinction between fact and value; but the crucial point is that not even God is a
neutral observer, because God is revealed through a particular narrative. This argument
takes Hauerwas into the area of theological antifoundationalism. Hauerwas bases his
Against the Nations on the premise that theological convictions have lost their
intelligibility1 , 131 That is to say, the universal rational principles, that are the sine qua non
of foundationalistn, simply no longer exist - if they ever did. There must therefore be
another criterion for judging the truth or falsity of Christian convictions. For Lindbeck this
criterion is internal coherence, measured by performance.
Preliberals (whom Lindbeck also calls 'cognitive-propositionalists) have a very
different method for judging truth-claims. Using Frei's analysis, Lindbeck identifies how
preliberals separate the reference of the Biblical text from its meaning, and take religious
utterances to refer to objective facts conveying information, after the manner of empirical
13° The "Literal Reading" of Biblical Narrative in the Christian Tradition: Does it Stretch or Will it
Brealer in Frank McConnell ed The Bible and the Narrative Tracbtion New Yorlc: Oxford University
Press 1986 pp. 36-77.
'Stanley Hatterwas Against the Nations: War and Survival in a Liberal Society Minneapolis: Harper
and Row 1985 p. 6.
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science. Thus some positions are true and others are false. In this preliberal view there is a
permanent and simple correspondence between what is known and the way it is known -
between proposition and reality. There is an assumption here of the universalisability of
certain facts and information. As Frei also shows, the onslaught made by Hume, Lessing
and their contemporaries against religious truth-claims left this precritical method in
retreat.
The issue between foundationalists and antifoundationalists is primarily one of
rationality. The foundational task in religion is committed to showing that particularistic
convictions are the surface beneath which lie universal principles or structures.
Intelligibility and credibility - for believer and unbeliever alike - rest on such universals.
The problem is this:
If there are no universal or foundational structures and standards of judgement by which
one can decide between different religious and non-religious options, the choice of any
one of them becomes, it would seem, purely irrational, a matter of arbitrary whim or
blind faiib.132
Thus the key problem for the intelligibility of Lindbeck's project - and for most
postliberals - is that antifoundationalism seems to be purely irrational, since it undermines
the acceptance of universal foundations of reasonableness. It thereby gives itself no visible
means of support. Lindbeck's response is as follows:
Antifoundationalism ... is not to be equated with irrationalism. The issue is not whether
there are universal norms of reasonableness, but whether these can be formulated in
some neutral, framework-independent language. Increasing awareness of how standards
of rationality vary from field to field and age to age makes the discovery of such a
language more and more unlikely and the possibility of foundational disciplines
doubtful.'"
This sounds to many foundationalists like a surrender to postmodernism and a
counsel of despair. It puts the whole foundational project at risk. How then is it possible
for Lindbeck's project to be rational and intelligible, when criteria for judgement are not
available?
Lindbeck meets this need for reasonableness by appealing to Aristotle's notion of
rationality as a matter more of skill than of universal principle. In Aristotle's view,
132 George Lindbeck The Nature of Doctrine p. 130.
133 ibid.
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rationality is not innate but acquired; it lies not in the mind but in intelligible practices,
which must be learnt.
Reasonableness in religion and theology, as in other domains, has something of that
aesthetic character, that quality of unfonnalizable skill, which we usually associate with
the artist or the linguistically competent. ... Intelligibility comes from skill, not theory,
and credibility comes from good performance, not adherence to independent137
formulated criteria.I34
Since there is no neutral high ground from which to adjudicate truth, the only
criteria for assessment come from within theology itself A sentence has truth within its
appropriate context; but abstracted from that context it is neither true nor untrue: it is
simply meaningless.
The sentence This car is red' ... cannot be a proposition, for it specifies no particular auto
and no particular time before or after which the vehicle might be of a different color: it
can be neither true nor false. The same point holds mutatis mutanclis for religious
sentences: they acquire enough referential specificity to have first-order or ontological
truth or falsity only in determinate settings, and this rarely if ever happens on the pages
of theological treatises or in the course of doctrinal discussions.135
The point is not that there is no such thing as propositional truth 136 : the point is
that theological truth demands response and participation, and its merits cannot be
investigated any other way. For Lindbeck, the proposition 'Jesus is Lord' is true, but the
only way to assert its truth is to act accordingly. Lindbeck cites St Paul and Luther as two
theologians who believed in the objective reality of the lordship of Christ - but both
insisted
that the only way to assert this truth is to do something about it, i.e. to commit oneself to
a Nvay of life; and this concern, it WOUld seem, is wholly congruent with the suggestion
that it is only through the perforrnatory use of religious utterances that they acquire
propositional force.I37
The sentence 'Christ is Lord' becomes, for Lindbeck, a proposition capable of
making ontological truth claims only when it is used by individuals and communities acting
134 ibid p. 130, 131.
135 ibid p. 68.
136 Note especially There is nothing in the cultural-linguistic approach that requires the rejection (or the
acceptance) of the epistemological realism and correspondence theory of truth' ibid p. 68-69. Several
critics of Lindbeck choose to ignore his abiding realism.
137 ibid p. 66
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in accordance with the truth of such a statement - that is, in 'the activities of adoration,
proclamation, promise-hearing, and promise-keeping', activities which affirm Christ's
lordship."'
The result of Lindbeck's understanding of truth claims is a new hierarchy of
disciplines. Whereas the preliberal approach to truth is in danger of ceding decisive
authority to history and science, Lindbeck's 'first division' comprises liturgy, preaching, and
ethics. It is in these latter activities that one aligns oneself performatively with what one
takes to be most important in the universe - and thus claims the truth.
2.2.3. Apologetics
Lindbeck's new hierarchy of disciplines apparently leaves metaphysics and
ontology in the second division. He never disavows these disciplines: it is simply that the
cultural-linguistic model he advocates leave them an open question. Justification of
Christianity for Lindbeck lies primarily with narrative description accompanied by
performance of the implications of the story. Wittgenstein offers a discussion of the
difficulty of recognising this kind ofjustification for what it is:
The difficulty ... is not that of finding the solution but of recognizing as the solution
something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it We have already said
everything. - Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution!' This is
connected, I believe, with our wrong)). expecting an explanation, whereas the solution of
the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our considerations. If we
dwell upon it and do not try to get beyond it The difficulty here is: to stop.' 39
If the temptation to move from description to explanation is one that should, in
general, be resisted, what form of apologetics is perrnissable? Lindbeck looks back to
Aquinas and Luther, and perceives that for both,
revelation dominates all aspects of the theological enterprise, but without excluding a
subsidiary use of philosophical and experiential considerations in the explication and
138 ibid p. 68.
139 This passage is quoted by D.Z. Phillips Wittgenstein's Full Stop' in Irving Block ed Perspectives
on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein Cambridge: M.I.T. Press pp. 179-200 and subsequently highlighted by
Gary L. Comstock 'Two Types of Narrative Theology' Journal of the American Academy of Religion LV/4
Winter 1987 p. 705.
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defense of the faith. Similarly, a postliberal approach need not exclude an ad hoc
apologetics, but only one that is systematically prior and controlling in the fashion of
post-Cartesian natural theology and of later liberalism."°
Reason is not used to shore up faith with general non-theological foundations: its
role is to advance the intelligibility of nonfoundational claims that have already been made.
Argument is something that one engages in within the 'language of faith': it does not lead
one to faith. Thus postliberal theologians all derive insights from extratheological sources
to make their own claims more intelligible. Frei employs Auerbach, Lindbeck makes
considerable use of Wittgenstein, Geertz and Kuhn, and Hauerwas often cites MacIntyre,
Bernard Williams and Iris Murdoch. The important point is that this is done in an ad hoc
manner: what postliberals are anxious to avoid is the extratheological models materially
framing the theology, in the way one might see the relation between for example
Heidegger and Bultrnann.
Frei shares with Lindbeck a belief in ad hoc apologetics, but rather than tending in
a Wittgensteinian direction his stake is more along the lines of Anselm's ontological
argument. Frei notes that hermeneutics has often been dominated by an apologetic thrust:
it becomes more important that the Bible is relevant than that it is historically true. Those
concerned with relevance insist on settling questions of how Christ is present to us and
how we can know it. This leads to the search for foundations, either in historical evidence
for Jesus' resurrection or in his symbolic presence in universal human concerns."' Instead
of anxieties about Jesus' presence, Frei recommends that we follow the gospels and
concentrate on Jesus' identity. This identity is most fully revealed in his resurrection. If his
identity is that of the resurrection and the life, he must accordingly be resurrected." 2 This
apparently circular argument corresponds to Anselm's ontological argument for the
140 George Lindbeck The Nature of Doctrine p. 131-132.
141 Hans Frei The Identity ofJesus Christ chapter 1. See also William C. %cher llostliberal Theology'
in David F. Ford ed. The Modern Theologians volume 2 pp. 118-119.
142 •-• • •  p. 14.6. We may choose between thinking of Jesus as fictional, or as alive and present with us
now: we may not think of him as dead and gone. Issues such as the place of his birth are but details; but lo
think of him as not raised ... is such a fundamental distortion of the character depicted that it cannot be said
to be Jesus.' I owe this to Mike Higton, 'Frei's Christology and Lindbeck's Cultural-Linguistic Theory',
paper read at the Society for the Study of Theology, April 1995. Higton draws out helpful distinctions
between Frei and Lindbeck, concluding that while Lindbeck is over-reliant on his (non-theological)
cultural-linguistic theory, Frei's mature position is more thoroughly christological.
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existence of God. Though other postliberals are more reluctant to commit themselves to
this style of argument, their reluctance to treat apologetics and their emphasis on the
descriptive role of Christian theology incline them towards either circularity or silence on
the question of God's existence (or presence).'
2.3. Critique of Postliberalism
2.3.1. Internal problems within the antifoundationalist position
Given Lindbeck's emphasis on assessment being made from within the tradition,
rather than from some framework-independent neutral high ground, it is appropriate to
begin a survey of criticisms made of the general postliberal position by discussing the ways
it falls short of its own demands. There are three main areas, and I shall discuss each in
turn.
First, Mark I. Wallace identifies confusion over the term 'foundationalisd, which
is understood in two senses. The stronger sense grounds theological claims on general
philosophical foundations that materially control the substance of faith. This is the search
for universal invariable standards of rationality. The weaker sense relates to the apologetic
impulse to find common ground or experiential structures in order to make the Church's
teaching more intelligible to a modem mind.'" In Wallace's view, the stronger form of
foundationalism does not apply to most of the theologians suspected of it (Frei lists
143Rona1d Thiemann's Revelation and Theology can be seen as in part an attempt to deal with this
problem.
144 Mark I. Wallace The Second Naivete p. 97.
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Locke, Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Ebeling, Pannenberg, Rahner, Moltmann); 14
 while the
weaker form applies just as much to the postliberals themselves.
The latter accusation is overstated. Wallace overstates his case because his
concern is to show that Ricoeur is no more a foundationalist than the postliberals are.
Wallace demonstrates that Ricoeur has no general theory to found his hermeneutics, and is
more similar to Barth than Frei and others had supposed, since he has an understanding of
revelation as 'standing under the free object of the biblical witness'. It seems wiser to
suggest that Ricoeur is closer to Frei and Lindbeck than had previously been argued, than
to suggest that the postliberals are in fact foundationalists after all, simply because they
refer to Auerbach, Wittgenstein and others. The more important general point that
emerges from Wallace's discussion, however, is that some of the postliberals' criticism of
other theologians is ill-directed and reductionist, and that one must be wary of a new
foundationalism grounded on the shortcomings of other approaches. The slogan
'explanation is always a form of reduction' is itself,after all, a form of reduction.
Second, a more complex and ultimately much more damaging criticism is made by
Terrence W. Tilley, and concerns the plurality of the Christian tradition. Lindbeck asserts
that concepts acquire meaning from how they operate in a system of signs, symbols and
actions. Religions are among such systems. The 'scriptural world' is such a system: it
'absorbs the universe". They points out that while Lindbeck makes a point of the
difficulty of transferring meaning from one system to another, he ignores this problem
when addressing the history of the Church. For example, Augustine, Thomas, Luther and
Lindbeck do not share the same canon or understanding of it, nor do they share the same
social location or 'native language'. Can they therefore be said to live in the same cultural-
linguistic framework?
Lindbeck's view presumes a normality, a stability, of a religious framework,
independent of its actual instantiations in multiple cultural contexts. But this contradicts
the basic insight of a cultural-linguistic model of religion, that the meanings of concepts
are determined by their place in the semiotic system which the community uses) 47
145The air has been loud with those who resist the designation 'experiential-expressive' - notably Tracy
and Ricoeur and their advocates. See especially David Tracy 'Lindbedc's New Program for Theology: A
Reflection' The Thomist 49 1985 pp. 460-472.
146 George Lindbedc The Nature of Doctrine pp. 114-120.
147 Terrence W. Tilley 'Incommensurability, IntertexUality and Fideisin' Modern Theology 5:2 January
1989 pp. 87-111, my italics.
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Given the extraordinary importance Lindbeck places on the biblical text, it is
difficult to see how he reconciles the fact that Catholics, Protestants and Jews do not
recognise the same scriptures. Do the identity-descriptions 'render' different identities (to
use Frei's terminology)? 148
 Tilley enforces his point by examining the concept of divine
providence. The term appears only in the Apocrypha. Intratextualists must therefore either
recognise a larger canon, or recognise that extra-biblical texts have partially determined
the 'grammar of God'; the only alternatives are to reduce providence to references in the
Hebrew Bible and the New Testament, or to read providence into those texts."9 Thus
does intratextuality appear neither possible nor desirable, nor true to the practice of the
Church through the centuries.
Third comes a criticism which arises out of the first two. Anxious to avoid
systems, the postliberals are in danger of being caught in another system, and one that is
difficult to break out of, since postliberals are adept at denying validity to opposing
proposals. Again, Lindbeck is accused of the ironic step of breaking one of his own
principles. John Milbank accuses Lindbeck of absti	 acting narrative from history. Despite
his attention to the context of concepts, Lindbeck's narratives are 'hypostasized',
atemporal, and 'dangerously &historical', functioning with an 'essentially unproblematic
code' which 'has artificially insulated the Christian narrative from its historical genesis'.
Milbank calls Lindbeck's metanarrative realism 'a new narratological foundationalism'
which is 'more rigid, and less open to revision' than the doctrine it replaces. Thus narrative
has lost its temporal, historical character, and become a rigid system.' Milbank's
suggestion is to extend the narrative to embrace the Church - a point I shall return to later
in my examination of Hauerwas.
148 See Michael Goldbrg 'God, Action and Narrative: Pihich Narrative? Which Action? Pilch God?
Journal of Religion 68:1 January 1988 pp. 39-56.
149 Terrence W. Tilley 'Inconunensurability, 1nterteximlity and Fideism' p. 102.
150 John Milbank Theology and Social Theory Oxford: Blackwell 1990 pp. 386-387. Milbank even
calls Lindbeck Kantian on this point.
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2.3.2. External Problems with Lindbeck's Argument
Criticisms of Lindbeck's proposal thus begin by demonstrating his occasional
inconsistency in living up to his own principles. However the most vehement criticisms
concern not what Lindbeck says inconsistently, but what he does not say at all. It is the
two areas where Lindbeck remains notably silent that have caused most anxiety to his
external critics. These areas are ontology and revelation.
The logic of Lindbeck's proposal appears to lead to a relativist notion of truth. It is
not that Lindbeck believes all religions to be equally true, but that he is sceptical about
attempts to compare them. In discussing the relationship of Christianity with other faiths,
Lindbeck is
open to the possibility that different religions and/or philosophies may have
incommensurable notions of truth of experience, and of categorial adequacy ... [since
there is] no common framework such as ... truth or ... experience within which to
compare religions.151
Despite the logic of his approach, Lindbeck still wants to maintain a realist
approach to truth. But can he really have it both ways? Realism refers to the notion that
there is some sort of objective order that theological claims conform to, whether we
recognise these claims as true or not. Lindbeck's cultural-linguistic approach never
disallows realism, but neither does it specifically include it as a necessity, and this is where
the problem lies. Since realism is not built into Lindbeck's approach, his desire to hang
onto realism looks like fideisrn, that is, belief without rational grounds.
So which is Lindbeck, a realist or a relativist fideist? His acknowledged debt to
Barth would suggest that realist assumptions lie not too far beneath the surface. On the
one hand Barth is committed to intratextualism. One of his chief concerns is to render
Christian theology in scriptural language. On the other hand he is a thoroughgoing realist.
For Barth, theological language does make assertions and not just descriptions since God,
by disclosing reality in Christ, has given us the language to render his word. Theology
addresses
the very definite order of being which holy scripture makes manifest, when in its
witness to God's revelation it confronts and relates God and man, divine facts and
human attitudes, [which] enforces an order of knowing conforming to it.152
151 George Lindbeck The Nature of Doctrine p. 49.
152 Karl Barth Church Dogmatics 1:2,5 quoted in Mark I. Wallacv The Second Naivete p. 109.
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Thus Christian religious language, for Barth, does more than describe the internal
relationships between doctrines. It conforms to a revealed reality.
George Hunsinger provides a way out of the confusion that tends to cloud the
truth-claims debate at this point. He offers a helpful comparison between Lindbeck and
Barth by distinguishing four different dimensions of validity claims - intelligibility, truth,
rightness and truthfulness - which represent different media of reality - linguistic, external,
social and internal respectively:
1.Claims of intelligibility ... relate to the domain of language; they would
pertain to formal matters of logic, internal consistency, and sense.
2. Claims of truth relate to the domain of external reality; they would
pertain to matters of cognitive content, predication, and reference.
3. Claims of rightness relate to the domain of social reality; they would
pertain to performative content, patterns of behaviour, and
communal norms and values.
4. Claims of truthfillness relate to the domain of internal teality, they
would pertain to matters of intention, sincerity, and aptness of
emotive expression. 153
For Lindbeck, the hierarchy runs roughly as follows: rightness, inteltigibifity,
truthfulness, truth. This is because Lindbeck places social reality at 'n-ie head of
understanding, mediating first of all linguistic reality, and subsequently all external reality.
One consequence of this is that rightness (social performance) becomes a necessary
condition for the possibility of truth.'54
153 George Hunsinger How to Read Karl Barth p.167. It is very important to note that Himsinger uses
the term 'truthfulness' in a different sense to that used by Hauerwas, for example in Hauerwas' debate with
Julian Hartt and Stephen Crites (recorded in Stanley Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones eds Wry Narrative?
pp. 279-319). Hauerwas' use of the term 'truthfulness' corresponds more to Hunsinger's term 'rightness'.
154Lindbeck illustrates this by referring to the nadir of Christian performance in the Crusades. The
crusader's battle cry "Christus est Dominus," for example, is faLse when used to authorise cleaving the skull
of the infidel (even though the same words in other contexts may be a true utterance): George Lindbeck
The Nature of Doctrine p. 64.
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For Barth, truth and intelligibility never depend as fully as for Lindbeck on
rightness and truthfulness - in fact external reality and language are logically independent
of social and internal reality. Frei retains this strain in Barth's thought when he claims that
the 'plain sense' of scripture is intelligible to any reader, regardless of the social reality. This
is why Frei seems to conflict with Lindbeck on this point.
Hunsinger's four dimensions of validity and reality demonstrate why there is a
conflict between Lindbeck and his critics over truth, and why some see Lindbeck as a
fideist while Lindbeck resists the charge. The question resolves into this: To what extent is
there a logical and sequential relation between these four domains of truth? If there is
little or no logical connection between the four, it is quite reasonable to wonder why
Lindbeck should apparently fail to address one of them, external reality, while addressing
the other three. If on the other hand there is a logic connecting and a hierarchy between
them, it becomes easier to see why Lindbeck concentrates on social, internal and linguistic
reality and is sceptical of any attempts to jump straight to external reality without
proceeding through the three necessary hoops.'55
Who is right? Lindbecic, who believes we get to external reality only through
social, linguistic and internal reality, or his 'cultured despisers', who sense a more direct
route is possible and desirable? This question leads us into the area of revelation.
Revelation is significant because Lindbeck's main problem in reaching external
reality through social, linguistic and internal reality is a tendency to ant-Impact-ma-ism.
Lindbeck has been accused several times of being weak in his understanding of
revelation." 6 His emphasis on narrative concentrates on the way God chooses to reveal
himself through the story of Israel, Jesus and subsequently the Church. To a large extent
the controversy over revelation resolves itself into a matter of emphasis. Those who, like
Lindbeck, stress narrative as the definitive form of revelation are analogous to those who
in other debates have concentrated on the particularity and humanity of Christ; meanwhile
155Hauerwas has a stake in Lincteck's side of this argument. As I suggested in chapter one, it is the
social reality (rightness), or Church, that is the primary form of reality for Hauervtas. It is this emphasis on
the 'internal' community that enables Hauerwas to avoid criticisms of having a Isubstantialisf view of the
internal self. See 1.6.1. above.
156 See Alister E. McGrath The Genesis of Doctrine chapter 1, and John Sykes Narrative Accounts of
Biblical Authority: The Need for a Doctrine of Revelation' Modern Theology 5/4 July 1989 p. 329-342.
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those who stress God's sovereign ability to communicate in a variety of ways are
analogous to those who in other debates have concentrated on the universality and divinity
of Christ.
Hunsinger insists that the total context of truth is determined by God, rather than
by culture or language. In his view Lindbeck seems to underestimate the 'miracle of grace'.
Meanwhile Lindbeck's understanding of revelation corresponds with his
antifoundationalist epistemology. Resisting all temptation to found revelation on a prior
phenomenology of existence, Lindbeck understands that the role of revelation is defined
by scripture (and is therefore narrative in character) rather than that the role of scripture is
defined by revelation. The danger of this is that it retains God's prevenience as its starting
point, but thereafter appears anthropocentric, since it concentrates on human language and
society.
The ironic conclusion is that both foundationalist and antifoundationalist
epistemologies involve anthropocentrism: the former in (philosophical, experiential)
theory, the latter in (cultural-linguistic) practice. To a postliberal mind an effort to reassert
God's grace and prevenience (and meanwhile bypass human culture and language en route
to external truth) will fall into the hands of foundationalism. However, in an effort to avoid
foundationalism, postliberals can get so involved in the social and linguistic media of
revelation that the sovereign power of the Revealer is neglected.
2.4. Stanley Hauerwas and the Communio Sanctorum
2.4.1. 'Narrative from below'
Stanley Hauerwas' use of the term narrative develops from the formal, general
understanding of human experience found largely in his earlier work, to an understanding
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based on the scriptural narrative, found more in his later work. In the last chapter I
described the former understanding as 'narrative from below' and the latter as 'narrative
from above'.
Here is Hauerwas in his 'narrative from below' vein:
All significant moral claims are historically derived and require narrative cfisplay.
Appeal to the narrative dependence and structure of moral rationality is ... an attempt to
illuminate, in a formal manner, the character of our moral existence as historic
beings. I 57
Hauerwas establishes that the reality in which people think, speak and act derives
from the specific community in which they live and that community is a historical entity
which is formed by a narrative. It is this narrative which forms the convictions of the
community, and any attempt to abstract rationality and ethics from this etnbeddedness fails
to do justice to the historical dimension of human existence. Narrative ethics simply start
from a different place from foundational ethics. We do not begin by asking what we
should do; rather, 'Our first moral question must be, Of what history am I a part and how
can I best understand itT.158
Hauerwas allies narrative to his previously-established notion of character. It is
character that enables us to talk of the moral life as a coherent whole:
The growth of character, and the corresponding ability to claim our actions as our own,
is a correlative of our being initiated into a determinative story. For it is ordy through a
narrative which we learn to 'live into' that we acquire a character sufficient to make our
history our own.'"
What is therefore crucial is that we have the right story: for a truthful story forms
a truthful community and truthful people. For Hauerwas, Christianity is the truthful story
and the Church is that which it (and he) seeks to make a truthful people. Thus does
'narrative from below' arrive at the Christian story, or set of stories and tradition.
157 Stanley Hauerwas A Community of Character p. 99.
158 ibid p. 100.
159 ibid p. 151.
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2.4.2. 'Narrative from above'
Turning to 'narrative from above', Hauerwas develops his understanding of the
role of scripture in forming Christian doctrine and life in three key essays, 'The Moral
Authority of Scripture: The Politics and Ethics of Remembering', The Church in a Divided
World: The Interpretative Power of the Christian Story and 'The Church as God's New
Language'. 16° In these essays, particularly the last of them, Hauerwas clarifies the
relationship between narrative as a formal claim and narrative as the definitive form of
Christian understanding.
The emphasis on narrative, therefore, is not first a claim about the narrative quality of
experience from some unspecified standpoint, but rather is an attempt to draw our
attention to where the story is told, namely, in the church; how the story is told, namely,
in faithfulness to Scripture; and who tells the story, namely, the whole church through
the office of the preacher. For ... the story is not self-referential ha creates a people
capable of being the continuation of the narrative by witnessing to the world that all
creation is ordered to God's good end. ,.. The church is ... at once the storyteller as well
as a character in the story.161
The development from the general thrust of Frei's thought is a development from
text to people as the bearer of narrative. 162 In Hauerwas' words, The text does not refer,
people do' 163 . The point is well expressed by Nicholas Lash:
The poles of Christian interpretation are not ... written texts ... but patterns of human
action: what vras said and done and suffered, then, by Jesus and his disciples, and what
is said and done and suffered, now, by those who seek to share his obedience and his
hope. We talk of 'holy' scripture, and for good reason. And yet it is not, in fact, the script
that is 'holy'. but the people: the company who perform the script. ... The fundamental
form of the Christian interpretation of scripture is the life, activity and organization of
the believing community.164
This makes clear how Christian ethics, for Hauerwas, is inseparable from
narrative, and inseparable from the Church. Each is the context for the other two. In terms
160 A Community of Character pp. 53-71 and 89-110, Christian Existence Today pp. 47-66,
respectively.
161 The Church as God's New Language' p. 61.
162 Hauenvas is, nonetheless, anxious to point out that Frei occasionally refers to the henneneutical
indispensability of the Church. See The Church as God's New Language' p. 59 and Hans Frei The Identity
offesus Christ p. 157.
163 'The Church as God's New Language' p. 59.
164 Nicholas Lash Theology on the Way to Enmaus London: SCM 1986 pp. 42-43.
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of Hunsinger's four domains of reality detailed above, this is a claim for the priority of the
domain of social reality. Hauerwas underlines this understanding by describing the
authority of scripture as a political claim. The term 'political', for Hauerwas, means much
the same as 'social reality' does for Hunsinger. In 'The Moral Authority of Scripture',
Hauerwas argues that scripture shapes a community of people who respond to it. Without
such a community, the idea of a canon of scripture makes no sense. This community aims,
through its hearing and performance of scripture, to be true to the character of God.
Christian social ethics should begin ... with the formation of a society shaped and
informed by the truthful character of the God we find revealed in the stories of Israel
and Jesus. The remarkable richness of these stories of God requires that the church be a
community of discourse and interpretation that endeavours to tell these stories and form
its life in accordance with thern.165
Like Lindbecic, Hauerwas denies that one can get to the external reality (in this
case the character of God and the authority of scripture) without beginning with the
social, or 'political' reality. Hauerwas is making a hermeneutical point: there is a spiralling
relationship (though Hauerwas does not use the term) between the text and the extent to
which a community puts it into practice. Since the text creates a world and demands that
the readers inhabit that world, one cannot step out of that world in an effort to read the
text 'truthfully'. Inhabiting the world that the text demands constitutes accepting scriptural
authority. The text is read truthfully by a community which seeks to establish its form of
life in accordance with the text; reading theoretically, outside the context of the practising
community, is not reading 'objectively' but reading unfaithfully.'
Ronald Grimes makes a suggestion in accord with Hauerwas' understanding of
narrative and community when he asks What would happen if the road from narrative to
ethics passed through ritual?'. He goes on, in a manner reminiscent of Hauerwas'
discussion of the ethical value of the novel:
Ritual can contain rich dramatic possibilities that allow us trial runs and explorations
not possible in the ethically framed world ... Without a ritual-dramatic stage between
the narrative experience and the ethical judgement we are extremely subject to self-
165 Stanley Hauerwas A Community of Character p. 92.
66Hauerwas agrees with his Duke colleague Stanley Fish that the meaning of a text lies not in the text
itself, nor in the reader, but in the interpretative community with its particular interests. This icieruifies a
common flaw in both historical criticism of the bible and fundamentalism: both assume that there is a clear
meaning of the text which anyone can perceive, whether trained and faithful or not Once again we see
Hauerwas rejecting the perspective of the neutral observer. See Stanley Hauerwas Unleashing the
Scripture chapters 2 and 3.
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deception [one of Hauerwas' emphases] concerning the degree to which we have
embodied our ethics. Without a keenly developed ritual-dramatic sense our narratives
are at best intellectual ideals and at worst sources of heteronomously imposed,
introjected images.167
Grimes also helpfully points out the difference, underestimated by most
theological treatments of narrative, between reading (or hearing) for the first time and re-
reading (or hearing again). 1" This perhaps, along with preaching, provides a bridge
between narrative and ritual. The activity of worship is the place where in word and
sacrament, through hearing and ritual, text is converted to deed and deed is informed and
challenged by text. The practice of reading and reinterpreting the same stories constitutes
Christian tradition: and tradition, which Hauerwas describes as the memory sustained over
time by ritual and habit', involves the incorporation of the history of the Church into the
narrative of Israel and Jesus.169
Finally, narrative is not simply the form of scripture or that which constitutes the
Christian tradition or that which presupposes the Church. The narrative of scripture forms
our understanding of God:
Scripture contains much material that is not narrative in character. But such material ...
gains its intelligibility by being a product of and contribution to a community that lives
through remembering. The narrative of scripture not only 'renders a character' but
renders a community capable of ordering its existence appropriate to such stories. Jews
and Christians believe this narrative does nothing less than render the character of God
and in doing so renders us to be the kind of people appropriate to that character. ... Our
understanding of God is not inferred from the stories but is the s-tories.170
As Hauerwas' own work has developed, these comments apply more and more to
him too. His non-narrative work relies for its power on the concrete display of character in
the stories he tells and the story he recalls.
'67 d Grimes Of Words the Speaker, of Deeds the Doer' Journal of Religion 1986 p. 6, 8. On the
novel, see Stanley Hauerwas A Community of Character pp. 9-35, and Dispatches from the Front:
Theological Engagements with the Secular Durham: Duke University Press 1994 pp. 31-79. On se/f-
deception, see Stanley Hauerwas Truthfulness and Tragedy pp. 82-98.
I 68 Ronald Grimes 'Of Words the Speaker, of Deeds the Doer' p. 16.
'69 F  Hauerwas' definition of tradition, see A Community of Character p. 92. For Hauerwas' VieW of
the place of the sermon, sec Christian Existence Today pp. 47-65, as well as Preaching to Strangers and
Unleashing the Scripture.
' 7° Stanley Hauerwas A Community of Character p. 67.
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2.4.3. Performance
The context of the believing community, so vital for understanding the role of
scripture, is equally significant for Hauerwas in assessing truth claims. Like Lindbeck,
Hauerwas sees the Christian community as performing the scripture, and thereby
providing the only means of testing its validity. The danger, in his view, in seeing ethics as
the performance of theology comes where it is assumed that one 'must begin with beliefs
about God, Jesus, sin and the like, and the moral implications of those beliefs'. 171 This
makes such beliefs look like a primitive metaphysics which the observer could analyse as a
system of belief detached from the Church. Hauerwas insists
Christian beliefs about God, Jesus, sin, the nature of human existence, and salvation are
intelligible only if they are seen against the background of the church - that is, a body of
people who stand apart from the 'world' because of the peculiar task of worshipping a
God whom the world lcnows not.172
Hauerwas' model for performance comes from the first Christians, whose
peculiarity came in 'their social inventiveness in creating a community whose like had not
been seen before':
They thought that their belief in God as they had encountered him in Jesus required the
formation of a community distinct from the world exactly because of the kind of God he
173
was.
Hauerwas addresses the justification of Christianity in pragmatic terms - since a
theoretical justification would almost inevitably be foundationalist. In order to avert the
charge of relativism or of fideistn, he needs to show how Christian claims can be assessed
as true or false. Given Hauerwas' reluctance to disembody truth and authority, he seeks an
actualised form of truth. Thus he speaks not so much of the truth of Christian doctrines
but more of the truthfulness of Christians' lives. Truth is not a virtue or attribute on its
own: it cannot be separated 'from other measures of value - from consistency,
righteousness, justice, happiness, satisfaction'. 174 One must ask, What forms of life issue
171 Stanley Hauerwas Against the Nations p. 42.
172 ibid.
ibid.
174 Stanley Hauerwas Truthfulness and Tragedy p.80, quoting James McClendon and James Smith
Understanding Religious Convictions Notre Dame: UNDP 1975 p. 15.
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from Christian convictions? Do the beliefs form communities, confer courage, patience
and hope, develop wisdom, discernment and honesty within the body, offer a spirituality
of tragedy that sustains nonviolence, free people from self-deception, sustain worship,
produce saints, and help people understand why they do what they do? For Hauerwas,
following Wittgenstein, the truth of a story is not just that it provides an accurate
description of the past, but that it helps us go on into the unknown - without a false
story. 175 Pragmatic tests of Christianity focus on Christian tradition and the 'richness of
moral character' it produces in much the same way that science judges its theories by the
fruitfulness of the activities they generate, and significant works of art become so in the
light of the interpretation and criticism that surround them.
Hauerwas constantly has to steer a path between on the one hand the objectivity
that supposes we can find a place to 'stick our heads above history' and judge all truth
claims from neutral territory, and on the other hand a relativism which suggests that any
assessment of truth claims is circular at best and impossible at worst, because there is no
neutral ground from which to begin. His path is to see the assessment of truth claims as
itself a skill. We learn how to judge between stories by ourselves living truthfully within a
story. Who is the person who says Christian claims are false? What story has taught such a
person what is good and right and true? Is this person criticising Christianity for being
something it never set out to be - perspicuous, context-independent, objectively
justifiable? Hauerwas summarises his position in concluding his essay 'Story and Theology'
The true stories that %IV learn of God are those that help us best to know what story we
are and should be, that is, which gives us the courage to go on. Namely, the story that is
necessary to know God is the story that is also necessary to know the self hit such
knowing is not passive acconunodation to an external object Rather such knowing is
more like a skill that gives us the ability to know the world as it is and should be - it is a
knowing that changes the self."6
It is thus the story of God which forms communities of character whose practice
of virtue develops people of the skill required to assess the truthfulness of the story.
175 Stanley Hauerwas Truthfulness and Tragedy p. 80.
176 ibid p. 81.
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2.4.4. Truth as Performance: The Example of Jonestown
One of the key questions that Hauerwas has to face is that of how one knows a
narrative is false. Many grotesque evils have been done in the name of Christianity
throughout the history of the Church. What criteria may the Christian community use to
criticise its own practice?
The mass suicide of nine hundred members of the Peoples Temple at Jonestown,
Guyana is an extreme case of the practice of a false story. Hauerwas' response to
Jonestown illustrates his assessment of truth as performance.'
Hauerwas begins by insisting that Tim Jones was not wrong to make great
demands on his followers. What happened at Jonestown was an act of revolutionary
suicide - and one that should be respected. The participants felt that to lose Jones
amounted to the dissolution of the community; losing the community was tantamount to
losing their life: 'so, like the martyrs, they chose spiritual life rather than spiritual death'.178
And in several respects, Jones' community exhibited the features of spiritual life: blacks
and whites found they could be brothers, the dispossessed found they could be responsible
for one another, people experienced the joy of being loved and of loving in return. This
gave the people a vision and a sense of mission - a mission to offer this equality and love
to wider society: a mission worthy of making sacrifices.
It is important to note the features that Jones shared with Christianity. Like the
early Church, the People's Temple thought in terms of a cosmic struggle between good
and evil, a struggle that required of the disciple a complete sacrifice both privately and
publicly - wealth, status, money, health, family, even life itself The Christian community
took precedence over one's own family. Thus it is not for the Church to follow secular
critics and attack the People's temple for interfering with individual autonomy the church
should have no stake in underwriting the notion that religion belongs only to the private
realm.
"'Stanley Hauerwas 'On Taking Religion Seriously: The Challenge of Jonestown' in Against the
Nations pp. 91-106.
118 ibid p. 100.
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The tragedy of Jonestown is twofold. In the first place, the tragedy is that Jones'
beliefs were false. The participants died because they believed that Jones told the truth: but
they were wrong. They were not wrong to give their lives for their beliefs: they were
wrong because the cause of the sacrifice was not worthy. The clue to the falsity of Jones'
claims was the command to suicide itself This command exposed the emptiness of the
whole of Jones' project - a project based on himself not on the character of God:
The willingness to take their lives, and the lives of others, manifests the assumption that
they must insure their own existence. The Jewish and Christian prohibition against
suicide is not based on the inherent sacredness of life hut rather on God's sovereignty
over all life. Our life is not for us to do with as we please, hit rather we must learn to
look on our life as a gift that is not ours to dispose of. ... Those ... who would
contemplate and indeed even practice ancide as did those at Jonestown must be judged
worshippers of a false god179
For Hauerwas, the fact that the community had already resorted to violence in
killing a congressman and some reporters ought already to have demonstrated the falsity
of its performance. For any community that feels the need to use violence of this kind is
unlikely to be a community grounded in the truth.
Anytime a religion must resort to violence to secure its beliefs that is a sure sign that
something has gone wrong with its claim to worship the God of truth and peace.
Unfortunately Christianity provided Jones with many pest precedents for the Nide/tee
he used to protect his community. The use of violence is a sure sign that the community
trusts not God, but themselves. 80
In this summary passage Hauerwas unites the themes of narrative, truth,
performance and nonviolence. A point he does not develop, but one which will be the
focus of my fourth chapter, is that suicide denies the Christian story by prematurely
foreclosing it. A correct perception of the narrative involves an awareness of its ending -
that is, it demands eschatology. Violence in general and suicide in particular exhibit a
rejection of the ending of the Christian story as portrayed by Jesus. Just as it is the ending
of the Jonestown story that exposes its falsity, so it is by confidence in the ending of their
narrative that Christians display their faithfulness.
The second dimension of the tragedy of Jonestown is that the Church's
contemporary practice is so unused to matters of truth and falsity that no one was able to
79ibid pp. 101-2.
180ibid p. 106n. 13.
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recognise heresy when they saw it. Fearing themselves to violate people's autonomy, the
watchword of tolerance is so honoured by the Churches that they are reluctant to criticise
any but those who interfere with the same autonomy. The only sin seems to be to take
religion seriously. The moral, for Hauerwas, is a familiar one: the powers that reigned at
Jonestown can only be countered by the kind of convictions that can only be fostered by a
community of character. In the absence of such a community, Christians can only find
themselves assenting to secular dismay at how anyone could be so foolish as to be a
martyr.
2.4.5. Principles and Performance: Reflections on Jonestown
Hauerwas selects suicide and violence as clear indicators of the falsity of
Jonestown's performance of Christianity. It is important to recognise that he is here using
principles derived from the Christian narrative to criticise Christian performance. In other
words, he does not use the narrative directly: he applies what he takes to be the principles
implied by the narrative.
In practice this begins to look like some of the ethical reasoning from which
Hauerwas has wanted to distance himself It seems to suggest that performance can be
assessed by some form of abstr	 action - in this case, injunctions against suicide and
violence. But Hauerwas never states a desire to abandon principles altogether: he is simply
suspicious of attempts to bypass human community in practising and assessing those
principles. Jonestown is an appropriate case, because it is itself a human community: and
indeed it has many commendable features. The difference between Hauerwas and the
'ethics of principle' school is demonstrated by their differing criticisms of Jonestown.
Hence the title of Hauerwas' essay. He commends Jim Jones for taking religion seriously:
the problem with Jones lies with his resort to violence and suicide - what I shall in 5.3.1.
below describe as 'killing the story'.
Thus there is a danger in overstating the difference between 'narrative ethics' and
an 'ethics of principle'. For narrative ethics cannot do away with principles. But Hauerwas
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derives principles from the narrative, whereas those he opposes derive principles from
theories of human nature or elsewhere.
2.5. Problems with Stanley Hauerwas on Narrative
2.5.1. Plurality
Given Stanley Hauerwas' emphasis on performance as a crucial and indispensable
element in scriptural hermeneutics and the assessment of Christian truth, one of the biggest
problems for him lies in coming to terms with the plurality and variety of responses to the
gospel. The problem is this: if the performance of the Christian story requires specific
forms of behaviour, how can one account for the fact that neither today nor at any time in
its history has the Christian Church been united in most of the controversial areas of
behaviour? If on the other hand no specific forrns of behaviour are entailed, in what sense
can communities be said to be performing the story? Is there one tradition, or is there
simply a plurality of traditions?
This is, I believe, Hauerwas' weakest point. Paul Lauritzen demonstrates how
Hauerwas and Johannes Metz, for example, broadly concur in three respects in their
understanding of narrative. 181 Both see the self as located within the narratives of his or
her community; both see practice and theory as inseparable; and both have a functional or
pragmatic approach to justifying Christian convictions. Both connect narrative and
community; both draw out the implications of the memory of Jesus' crucifixion and
181 Paul Lauritzen 'Is "Narrative" Realty a Panacea? The Use of "Narrative" hi Metz and Hauerwas'
Journal of Religion 1987 pp, 322-339.
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resurrection; both talk of Christian social action in terms of the imitation of Christ. But
Metz believes in revolutionary social action, while Hauerwas is a pacifist. Metz is
committed to liberation from economic and social inequality, while Hauerwas maintains
that Christians need fear not even their oppressors since it is the cross, not the armies or
markets, which determines the meaning of history, and also that Christian stories help us
understand our life difficulties rather than necessarily change them.
When it comes to practical consequences, therefore, Hauerwas and Metz are
some way apart. But both appeal to narrative and both appeal to pragmatic tests for the
truthfulness of Christian convictions. There are two problems here. In the first place, do
Hauerwas and Metz share a common story? Coming from different denominations, they
hold to different texts, and may frequently read the same text in a different way. Hauerwas'
ambivalence about his own denomination is an illusti	 ation of this problem. The nature of
the sacraments and the status of the saints are among the issues at stake. Here as
elsewhere we see Hauerwas straining at the boundaries of his own Methodist
denomination. We have already seen the central place of the comnnmio sanctorum in his
theology. It seems that his natural home lies within the Catholic Church, yet, as we shall
see in chapter three below, its Constantinianism and resistance to pacifism seems a
perpetual barrier. Lindbeck's The Nature of Doctrine starts with a concern for ecumenical
dialogue, and it is clear that a greater understanding between the churches is a necessary
ingredient of Hauerwas' theology too. In the second place, even if Christians share a
common story they need not share a common praxis. And this undermines the truth of
Christian convictions if they are to be assessed pragmatically.
Hauerwas does say that
The church, the whole body of believers, ... cannot be limited to any one historical
paradigm or contained by any one institutional form. Rather the very character of the
stories of God requires a people who are willing to have their tmderstanding of the story
constantly challenged by what others have discovered in their attempt to live faithful to
that tradition.' 82
The question is, what is the extent of the variety of understandings that the
tradition can absorb before becoming incoherent? Hauerwas may well be right that non-
182 Stanley Hauerwas A Community of Character p. 92.
82
pragmatic criteria of truthfulness tend to try to bypass the Church - but pragmatic criteria
have here been shown to be difficult to assess.
Hauerwas acknowledges that Christians can often be found on nearly every side of
any issue.'" But he denies that this undermines the truth of their convictions. His job as a
theological ethicist is to elicit what Christians ought to think given their basic convictions
and practices, to enhance the 'political' process through which disagreement is adjudicated,
and remember that Christian convictions are represented as much by the manner of the
confrontation as by its resolution.
Hauerwas is correct in showing the significance of the context in which the
narrative is read and how the story forms communities capable, in turn, of understanding
the story. He is correct in demonstrating how a person or community attempting to live
out the story will read the story in a different way from a person scouring it for objective,
context-invariant truth. He is correct in showing how close attention to the Christian story
can deliver persons and communities from the self-deception that arises from adopting a
false story in times of anxiety and fear. But the principle that pragmatic justification is the
only way to assess the truth of the narrative is very difficult to sustain, not least because of
the variety of Christian responses within similar contexts evidenced by the tradition.
2.5.2. Donatism
The three further criticisms of Hauerwas all develop the theme identified as his
weakest area: the performative aspect of truth claims. To what extent does human
sinfulness reduce the effectiveness of Christian behaviour in demonstrating the truth of
Christian convictions? If sinfulness affects the ability of Christians to act truthfully, surely
it also affects their ability to speak and think truthfully as well. In Comstock 's assessment,
Hauerwas
seems to have a problem with weakness ofill. Can't Christians truly believe the story,
Want to live by it, and )rt fail to do so? But if we can only say that the story is accepted
183 ibid p. 108.
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as 'true' by those who actually practise pacifism, then we could not have Christian
pacifists who, through some flaw of character, fail to act on their convictions. Yet there
are such people.'"
Just as Lindbeck appears anthropocentric on the issue of revelation, since he
concentrates on the culture and language of the human community to the near exclusion
of God's prevenience, so Hauerwas here seems anthropocentric for much the same
reasons. He appears to be making truth a prisoner of the practice of the Christian
community. This certainly takes narrative, incarnation, particularity and embeddedness
seriously, but it does seem to underplay the otherness and the sovereign prevenience of
God. It seems that the truth of God's presence and action in the Christian community is
subject to the community, rather than vice versa. Hauerwas is concerned that Christian
belief in grace and the action of the Holy Spirit would be called into question if Christians
were never changed by the practice of their faith and the community failed to produce
saints. Once again the communio sanciorum emerges as the key doctrine. Hauerwas takes
seriously Nietzsche's protest - that Christians 'don't look redeemed' - as an appeal to
falsification.
Hauerwas perhaps slightly overstates his case here. Nietzsche's objection does not
restrict the sovereignty of God. There is a level of theological realism which is not entirely
subordinate to the social domain of reality. The Christian who lives unfaithfully yet says
'Jesus is the Son of God' does not thereby invalidate the doctrinal claim. The character of
the Trinity is not subject to the performance of the community.'"
In response to this Hauerwas points out that the enquiry into truth claims tends to
single out individual propositions or historical events as if they could be abstracted from
the whole picture. Theology cannot be separated from ethics and narrative in this way.
Again, like Lindbeck, Hauerwas insists that one cannot bypass the social and linguistic
reality and simply settle on individual external realities. The context of the Christian
community is indispensable if the question is to be rightly asked.
184	 _ ,
Ual) L. Comstock Two Types of Narrative Theology' p. 708 it. 19. It is interesting to note
Hauerwas' own comments in his introduction to the second edition of Character and the Christi= Life (p.
xxxii): 'I think this book was enough on the right track that its mistakes have proved fruitful. For finally I
think this is the best most of us can do: make interesting mistakes.'
185 Mark I. Wallace The Second Naivete p. 106 calls the Lincbeck/Hauemas position here
Donatistlike'.
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Questions like does God really exist or did Jesus rise from the grave are sometimes
taken as the central questions that determine the truth or falsity of religious convictions.
God's existence and Jesus' resurrection are not unimportant convictions for Christians,
but it is inappropriate to single them out as the issues of religious truth. For the prior
question is how the affirmations of God's existence and Jesus' resurrection fit into the
story of the kind of God we have come to know in the story of Israel and Jesus. The
emphasis on story as the grammatical setting for religious convictions is the attempt to
remind us that Christian convictions are not isolatable 'facts', but those 'facts' are part of
a story that helps locate what kind of 'fact' you have at all. 186
2.5.3. Relativism
If a religion is to be judged by its practical consequences, and a great variety of
religions appear to have very agreeable consequences, are a great number of religions
equally true? If a sacred story leads believers into lives without deception, lives of
selflessness and sacrifice, an awareness of tragedy and a spirituality of peace, is it thereby a
story about God? If it were, it would be hard to sustain the uniqueness of the Christian
story or the exclusivis-t claims the Bible makes for itself
In response to this there are two clear options. The first is the one unequivocally
adopted by John Milbank. In his book Theology and Social Theory he recognises that the
chief candidates to fill the role as judge over the plurality of stories are the social sciences.
But Christianity is not content to be just one story amongst many, one path to virtue
alongside several others. Milbank insists on the 'metanarrative realism' of Christianity, its
ability to out-narrate all other stories: and he insists that this applies in the social field as
much as the ontological and historical. Like Hauerwas, he holds up the social practice of
the Church as the visible test of the truth of its story:
A gigantic claim to be able to read, criticize, say what is going on in other human
societies, is absolutely integral to the Christian Church, which itself claims to exhibit the
exemplary form of human community. ... The logic of Christianity involves the claim
that the 'interruption' of history by Christ and his bride, the Church, is the most
fundamental of events, interpreting all other events. And it is most especially a social
event, able to interpret other social formations, because it compares them with its own
new social practice.I87
186 Truthfiilness and Tragedy p. 73. It is not clear whether or not Jesus' resurrection should be so
singled out Barth tends to treat it in this manner.
187 John Milbank Theology and Social Theory p. 388.
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By the metanarrative Milbank means not just the scriptural narrative, but the
continuing story of the Church, 'already realised in a finally exemplary way by Christ, yet
still to be realized universally, in harmony with Christ, and yet differently, by all
generations of Christians'. ' 88
To what extent does Hauerwas subscribe to Milbank's 'metanarrative realism'? In
his earlier work it would seem he does not:
There is no story of stories, i.e. an account that is literal and that thus provides a
criterion to say which stories are true or false. All we can do is compare stories to see
what they ask of us and the world we inhabit.189
However in his later work Hauerwas moves nearer to Milbank's Augustinian
approach, particularly on the question of the performance of good deeds by bad people.
Hauerwas concurs with the view that to say a bad person has done a good action is a
misuse of the notion of good. 19° This is because Hauerwas subscribes to a teleological,
rather than consequential, notion of ethics. What the bad person did might have had some
good results, but if it did not put them on the path towards being good, it cannot be called
a good action. For fundamentally, it is people that are good or bad, not actions. This
argument can be extended to the discussion of whether there can be more than one
truthful story. Hauerwas might say that a story might appear good and true if people who
believed in it performed good actions; but this would be only a semblance of virtue, since
teleologically their actions would not be good unless they contributed to the final cause:
the upbuilding of the Church.191
The alternative to Milbank, the second response to the problem of relativism,
involves a less ambitious but more nuanced attempt to show how the Christian community
lives alongside other stories. In an early essay, Hauerwas proposes four working criteria
for the evaluation of stories. These involve an emphasis on avoiding self-deception,
I " ibid p. 387, italics original.
189 Stanley Hauerwas Truthfulness and Tragedy pp. 78-79.
19° Character and the Christian Life p.
191 See chapter one. The teleological notion is best seen as an eschatological one, as I argue in chapters
one and four.
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violence, and false notions of power,' 92 However, Hauerwas is no innocent when it comes
to the use of heavily value-laden language, and there can be no question that the
terminology of these criteria - 'destructive', 'violence', 'tragic' - is governed by the particular
narrative he is representing. It is better to look to his 'Ten theses for the reform of
Christian social ethics' for a thoroughly contextual approach. 193 The third thesis runs: The
ability to provide an adequate account of our existence is the primary test of the
truthfulness of a social ethic'. There is no neutral ground for adjudicating this, of course,
but Christians believe that the cross and resurrection of Christ describe the world, its
history and future most adequately. The fourth thesis runs: 'Communities formed by a
truthful narrative must provide the skills for transforming fate into destiny so that the
unexpected, especially as it comes in the form of strangers, can be welcomed as a gift'.
Hauerwas explores the implications of this fourth thesis in a discussion that
resembles the ad hoc apologetics characteristic of Frei, Lindbeck, Werpehowski and
Ford. 194 Hauerwas adopts Bernard Williams' notion of a 'real option'.'95 The notion of a
real option excludes from the debate about truth those examples which, usually for
historical reasons, are not ways of life that we could possibly adopt. The 'real option'
approach does not underestimate the depth of division between those who hold different
commitments, or try to formulate a theory capable of defeating relativism. Instead, it deals
with confrontations one at a time. Again Hauerwas argues that what we need are not
proofs to destroy relativism but skills to live in a divided world.
The notion of the 'real option' enables Hauerwas to reconceive the command to
witness in a plural world.' 96 Again Hauerwas resists all attempts to substitute theory and
argument for personal encounter and practice. It is not that Christians possess 'a universal
truth which others must also implicitly possess or have sinfully rejected'; nor that they can
192 Truthfulness and Tragedy p. 35.
193 A Community of Character pp. 9-12.
194In addition to the works cited above, see William Werpehowski 'Ad Hoc Apologetics' The Journal of
Religion 66 1986 pp. 282-301; Dmid F. Ford The Best Apologetics is Good Systematics: A Proposal about
the Place of Narrative in Christian Systematic Theology' Anglican Theological Review 67/3 July 1985 pp.
232-254.
195 A Community of Character p. 103-4.
196 ibid p. 105-6.
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make a priori judgements about other faiths. For all are sinners and fall short: and all can
find redemption through participation in the life made possible by Christ's passion and
resurrection. So the Christian community's task is 'to be the sort of community that can
become a real option and provide a real confrontation for others', showing the unity in
diversity that judges 'the diversity of the world where most of our confrontations are either
notional or violent'.197
Once again, we see how a thoroughgoing commitment to the social embodiment
of truth enables Hauerwas to form a faithful ethic despite the charges of fideism and
relativism.
2.5.4. Hermeneutics
There still remain a host of hermeneutical questions - though by now it should be
clear that Hauerwas responds to most of them by directing attention to the historical,
embedded community rather than by addressing each one in theory.
Is there not much in scripture that is not narrative in character? Hauerwas replies
to this question in terms of the community's memory. The term 'narrative' incorporates the
Church as well as Israel and Jesus. 'Narrative' does not simply refer to the literary genre of
the text: it is in many ways a shorthand term to denote the ethical method of a tradition
that tries to regulate its character according to the character of God as found in scripture.
Does the Bible tell one story or several? Hauerwas is critical of efforts to render
the theology of Old or New Testaments in terms of a handful of abstract nouns such as
law, covenant or promise. He commends David Kelsey's view of the Bible as a long
loosely structured non-fiction novel'.'" The Bible abounds in sub-plots and minor
characters, representing the potential for a host of different ways of telling the story. It is
197 ibid p. 105.
198 David Kelsey The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology Philadelphia: Fortress 1975 p. 48. See A
Community
 of Character p. 67.
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important that the Church retains an awareness of these subplots, and countless others in
the subsequent tradition, so that it understands the narrative not as a single story that
tyrannises minor stories, but as a continuing conversation. Perhaps the most significant of
the subplots is the continuing history of the Jews: the relationship of Church to Jews is
analogous to the relationship of the two testaments. It is a sub-tradition with which
Hauerwas is anxious to maintain a conversation. The issue of subplots is significant, for it
relates to the issues discussed earlier under the heading of Donatism. 199 It is important to
note that subplots are less a matter of differing conceptions of truth than of the continuing
conversation - between evangelists, legislators, prophets, exiles, kings, prisoners and
generations of hearers - about what kind of a community we should be to follow this kind
of a God.
Are some texts more significant than others? There can be no question, despite
Hauerwas' enjoyment of Christian diversity, that he has something of a 'canon within the
canon'. There is a backbone of doctrine that seems to focus on the synoptic gospels as
central to his scriptural understanding. m Though he talks of faithfulness to the story of
Israel, it is to the story of Jesus, especially his passion, death and resurrection, and the
Sermon on the Mount, that he constantly turns. His justification for this seems to lie with
the practice of the early Church - the Christian community who took their Jewishness for
granted, did not dwell so much on more abstract doctrines such as revelation and
prevenience, but concentrated on the concrete - discipleship, faithfulness, memory,
community. This accords with Hauerwas' insistence that ethics and theology are but two
sides of the same coin.
Who tells the story? Several generations of the hermeneutics of suspicion have
increased the awareness of many modem hearers that the Bible was written by dead
Jewish males. The question of who tells the story is related to that of whether there is one
story or several - especially if one assumes that many have been suppressed. Hauerwas
again turns to the conversational character of the tradition, the incorporation of Church
'For the reincorporation of subplots as a mark of eschatological ethics, see chapter five below.
200 F  focuses on Mark, as does McClendon, and Thiemann concentrates on Matthew. Hans Frei The
Identity of Jesus Christ, James McClendon Ethics: Systematic Theology chapter 12, Ronald Thiemann
Revelation and Theology.
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history into the narrative, and the variety of the kinds of literature in the Bible to assert
that no conspiracy theory is sustainable:
One reason the church has had to be content with the notion of canon rather than some
more intellectually satisfying summary of the content of scripture is that only through
the means of a canon can the church adequately manifest the kind of tension with which
it must live.201
The canon makes no attempt to resolve the diversity of the texts it draws within
itself. Diversity and disagreement are therefore an integral part of the tradition.
Perhaps Hauerwas' weakest henneneutical question is again one of justification,
namely, Why these texts? Having established a method that understands the role of
narrative in the community's continuing discussion of what and how it should be, it is
difficult for Hauerwas to answer this last question satisfactorily. The tendency is either to
revert to foundationalism (These texts ... alone satisfy ... our craving for a perfect story
which we feel to be true') or simply to maintain a circlarit-y CF aith is Christian because it
relates itself to classically-expressed models').' The only consistent way Hauerwas can
answer this question is to say once again that Christians do not find themselves on neutral
territory, adjudicating over a plurality of competing claims. instead they are in mid-stream,
in a tradition that has taken this canon as authoritative. The questions therefore are rather,
Are these texts treated as authoritative in the community? (the descriptive question) and,
Should they continue to be? (the 'what kind of community?' question). The fact that these
texts are considered authoritative is an implied judgement on OtheT texts and practices
which contradict these texts: but that judgement is not made from a supposed neutral
standpoint.
201 A Community of Character p. 66.
202 ibid for both quotations.
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2.6. Summary and Resolution: The End of the
Story
I shall now summarise what has gone before. Frei and Lindbeck insist that the
scriptural world is the real world - indeed Lindbeck says that the scripture absorbs the
world rather than vice versa. The text makes such a demand on us that we cannot properly
read it unless we are performing it. We cannot step outside the world we inhabit in order
to justify that world.
Critics of this position question whether scripture creates one coherent world or
several; whether there is any reason to opt for this world in the first place; and in what
sense this world can be said to be 'revealed'. As my discussion showed, the question
becomes one of whether we can have any access to ontological truth except by stepping
through the contextual hoops of social practice, culture and language. Those who say we
can are accused of being foundationalists, since they suppose we can bypass human
community in search of truth; those who, like Lindbeck, are more sanguine, are challenged
to come up with some justification for entering the 'world' they propose.
Stanley Hauerwas develops the notion of narrative to incorporate the history and
tradition of the Church. This potentially eases some of the problems associated with the
somewhat static view of the text held by Frei and Lindbeck, and introduces the idea of a
continuing conversation. The emphasis moves from holy scripture to holy people, the
communion of saints. Hauerwas opposes any efforts to set up a theory of revelation or
knowledge or religion that attempts to bypass the community of faith. The ontological
level is definitely there - there is no doubt that he is a theological realist - but the narrative
of the community is the only way to get to it. He advocates performance as the only way
to assess the truth of Christian convictions. This is not because performance provides
unequivocal proof - he is well aware of the host of hermeneutical problems such as who
should assess and how they should go about it - but because of the impossibility of
assessing any other way.
The danger in overstressing performance is that the text can be absorbed into the
community, so that the two stand or fall together. This fails to do justice to the othemess
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of the text. For the community frequently fails miserably, but that does not mean the text
is not true. What matters increasingly in Hauerwas' later work is that the community
reading the text is committed to shaping its life in accordance with the text. Without this, a
truthful reading is not possible. But this remains a tension in Hauerwas' work.
How can the numerous areas of continuing criticism be resolved? I suggest that
the feature of story that has yet to be fully discussed is the fact that a story has an ending.
When a story has been told, whether non-fiction or fiction, one can look back over the
story and see which actions and people in the story were oriented towards the story's
ending, and which actions and people hinted at a possible alternative ending. One can trace
what one might call a 'critical path' through the story, of actions and people which, though
not necessarily bringing the ending about, had the same character as the ending.
I suggest that it is the role of the Church, placed as it is in the 'middle' of the
narrative, to strive to live on that critical path. This is what it means to live teleologically -
according to the end. For Christians the end, or closure, of the world is identical with its
telos, or purpose. Thus a teleological Christian ethic involves developing and sustaining
the practices that conform to the end of the world - in both senses. Actions can be said to
be truthful to the extent that they follow that critical path. Doctrines and ontological
claims can be described as true to the extent that they describe that ultimate state of
affairs.
Questions of hermeneutics remain, and always will. But I argue that an
eschatological approach resolves some criticisms from the hermeneutics of suspicion since
its 'critical path' of 'actions and lives oriented to the end' provides a way of rehabilitating
many neglected parts of the tradition. Such parts may be unheard today, since they
perhaps played a small or forgotten part in getting us to our present circumstances; but
they will finally be judged by the extent to which they were oriented to the final reality, the
End.
I also believe that an eschatological approach is more faithful to intratextualism
than some other approaches. For if the text is a narrative, then we must follow the
direction in which it points. And while most of the narrative is contextual, concerning
Israel's responses to Yahweh's covenant and the early disciples' responses to Jesus, there
can be little doubt that the end that the narrative points to is the fulfilment of ultimate
closure.
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An eschatological approach can help with the stalemate that sometimes appears in
intratextualist attempts to make sense of Christian witness. A serious danger for some
intratextualists is that they seem to assume that describing Christian practice and what
Christians mean by what they say is as far as they can go, without assuming any common
ground with the stranger. But the New Testament, part of the text in question, assumes
witness and conversion. What therefore is a postliberal Christian witness? Lindbeck offers
a dismal picture of the contemporary 'unchurched masses ... immunised against catechesis'
- but he offers no altemative. 203 He is limited by his purely retrospective understanding of
narrative. Of course it is difficult to re-educate adults with an alien theological language.
The teleological approach does not begin by asking people the somewhat unappealing
question Would you like to come from where we are coming from?, but instead focuses
on the more accessible, but no less intratextual and antifoundationalist question, 'Wm%
you like to be going where we are going?'.
I further believe that the approach I suggest is more contextual than that of some
cultural-linguistic approaches. Lindbeck speaks of the 'world' of the text as the 'real' world.
By the 'world of the text' he means the world of creation, fall, covenant, incarnation,
redemption, church and eschaton. But if we are to sustain his commitment to context, then
surely these must include space and time. Is it not escapist to see the only real world as
that of Sinai, Zion, Babylon and Galilee - at a time separated from ours by millennia? Is
not the ultimately real world, to which Lindbeck refers, the one which ultimately will be
the only world, that of the reign of God - that could at any time be suddenly upon us,
ending the story? The biblical stories, which hardly constitute one single coherent world,
inaugurate this ultimate world, instantiate it, anticipate it and most importantly direct our
attention towards it - but they surely do not constitute that world. If scripture is itself the
world in which we act, the result for ethics can only be confusion over the difference
between our world and the scriptural world, or escapism into a disembodied scriptural
world.
Attention to the ending of the story makes more sense of the plurality of Christian
practice. For if one's narrative only enables one to look back, then any deviation from the
practice of Israel, Jesus and the early Church is bound to look like unfaithfulness. But if
203 The Nature of Doctrine pp. 132-133.
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one's narrative is concerned with where one is going, one's method of getting there is
bound to be affected by where one is starting from. A contextual approach recognises that
Christians are currently in different places, but emphasises that they are all going to the
same place.
By retelling the tragic story of Jonestown I hoped to show that performance could
be used as a valid criterion for assessing truth. Jonestown is an example of the way a
premature closure of the story is a form of unfaithfulness: advocates of such foreclosure
could be described as heretics. Once again, one is not simply looking back to the story of
Jesus to assess faithfulness: one is asking 'In the light of the story of Jesus, what ending of
this story is appropriateT. Suicide was clearly not an appropriate ending - not because the
participants were too faithful to Tim Jones, but because they were not sufficiently faithful
to God.
To be sure Hauerwas is right when he directs our attention to the memory of the
community of faith, for it is only in this narrative that the community finds itself directed
towards the 'life of the end'. The problem with decisionist ethics is that it is unhistorical -
dealing simply in the present, without reference to memory, character, context, or the
practices of the end of the story. A further problem of consequentialist ethics is that it has
a highly premature conception of the end of its particular story. The eschatological
approach broadens the picture to reconceive the terms of the story the consequentialist
tells. 204
Finally, revelation is not an abstract doctrine of the manner of our knowledge of
God, but an anticipation of the revealing of the full picture in the future. Integral to
revelation is the process of how we come to trust in the God we hear described in
scripture. The resurrection of Jesus is the key event in scripture. This is because it is this
event that leads us to trust in the God to whom the life and death of Jesus point, and helps
us to see Jesus as the instantiation of the end - the full appearance of the reign of God.
2°4 Stanley Hauenvas does this on the nuclear annihilation issue. See Against the Nations chapters 8
and 9.
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The Story of God in the Character of
Humanity: The Church
3.1. Introduction
In the first chapter I argued that Stanley Hauerwas is right to place character as
the starting point for ethical discussion. I went on to make two claims, which formed the
substance of the next two chapters. The first of these claims was that character implies and
demands narrative; the second, that the central doctrine for Hauerwas is the communion
of saints and that the final cause of the agency of Christians is the Church. In chapter two I
took up the first of these claims. I showed how Hauerwas and others understand the
Christian narrative, and how performance is central to the way Christian communities
make truth-claims. I went on to argue that most of the criticisms of Hauerwas are resolved
if one understands the Christian narrative eschatologically. In this third chapter I take up
the second claim. How does the Church perform Jesus' story?
In this chapter I shall examine Hauerwas' understanding of the Church's
performance of the story. For Hauerwas, the Church embodies its beliefs about the
purposes of God, the nature of sin and the character of salvation, such that it does not
have a social ethic but indeed is a social ethic. The way the Church deals with conflict,
externally and internally, is at the heart of its mission. The question is, is Hauerwas'
understanding of the Church a true rendering of the Church? Does it bear the credal
marks of the Church?
I shall use the four credal marks of the Church - unity, holiness, catholicity and
apostolicity - as a way of explicating and assessing the faithfulness of Hauerwas'
performance. My argument is as follows. Hauerwas attacks a bland 'catholicity' by
reasserting an 'apostolic holiness'. 'Holiness' here refers to the 'virtue' tradition, and
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'apostolicity' to the emphasis on the narrative of Jesus and the early Church. Underlying
this attack is a deep suspicion of a false 'unity' - a suspicion learned from Yoder and shared
with the radical reformers. Hauerwas' position is, however, made vulnerable to
accusations of sectarianism by his tendency to use spatial metaphors. Talk of a spatial
distinction between Church and world invites criticism on the issues of unity and
catholicity, particularly from those of a 'Constantinian' inclination. Temporal or 'aeonic'
distinctions are more helpful, and will be explored in chapter four. Hauerwas'
understanding of the Church requires narrative display; therefore the chapter concludes
with the performance of the villagers of Le Chambon-sur-Lignon in Vichy France during
the Second World War, demonstrating the strengths and weaknesses of Hauerwas'
approach.
3.2. The Politics of the Church
The most distinctive, and perhaps the most notorious, characteristic of Stanley
Hauerwas' social ethics is his belief that morality lies not so much in rules, principles,
situations or consequences, but in the formation and sustenance of communities of
characterful people. It is a theme he returns to regularly; perhaps most cogently in the
following passage:
The first social ethical task of the church is to be the church - the servant community.
Such a claim may sound self-serving until we remember that what makes the church the
church is its faithful manifestation of the peaceable kingdom in the world. As such the
church does not have a social ethic: it is a social ethic.205
205 Stanley Hauerwas The Peaceable Kingdom p. 99. See also A Community of Character p. 40, Against
the Nations p. 74, Christian Existence Today p. 101, Resident Aliens p. 43.
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If there could be a summary of Stanley Hauerwas' ethical foundation, this would
be it. 206 The claim has implications both for the internal life of the Christian community
and to the way the community relates to the rest of the world. I shall examine these
implications in this first section of the chapter.
3.2.1. Politics within the Church
Being rather than having a social ethic entails offering a model of how to be
peaceful. The unity-in-diversity of the Church offers an alternative to the often violent
divisions found elsewhere. Hauerwas laments the scandal of the disunity of the Church - a
disunity based not only on doctrine, history and practice, but more sinisterly on race, class
and nationality. It is this disunity that hinders the Church's task of reminding the world that
it is the world.
Hauerwas has been deeply influenced by the writings of John Howard Yoder.
Yoder's Mennonite background accounts for a good deal of more 'mainstream' discomfort
with Hauerwas' ecclesiology. Hauerwas and Yoder talk extensively of the 'politics' of the
Church. Both have written significant meditations on Matthew 18:15ff. 207 For Yoder,
Christian ethics happens in the Church rather than at the desk. Obedience to Christ's will is
promised to the community gathered in his name around scripture, in the face of a given
moral challenge. Yoder relies on Matthew 18:15: 'What you bind on earth shall be
considered as bound in heaven'. Yoder renders this in carefully chosen words:
A transcendent moral ratification is claimed for the decisions made in the conversation
of tvio or three or more, in a context of forgiveness and in the juridical form of listening
to several witnesses.208
206This is not only Hauerwas' departure point It is also his conclusion.' Wilson Miscamble 'Sectarian
Passivism?' Theology Today April 1987 p.72.
20'J.H. Yoder The Henneneutics of Peoplehood' The Priestly Kingdom pp. 1545, especially pp. 26-28.
Stanley Hauerwas Peacemaking: The Virtue of the Church' Christian Existence Today pp. 89-97.
208J.H. Yoder The Hermeneutics of Peoplehood' p. 27.
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Thus there is conversation - not the deductive application of universally valid rules. The
conversation begins with the two parties of the conflict and gradually involves others only
insofar as is needed to achieve reconciliation. The decision is ratified in heaven. The
intention is to reconcile.
Since this is the mission of the Church, the ministry required is that which can
sustain this mission. Yoder identifies four kinds of people in particular who are needed in
such a community. The Church needs prophets who have a vision of the place of the
community in history. It needs scribes who know what to bring out of the storeroom of
community memory - and when to do so. It needs teachers who are aware of the tyranny
of language. And it needs agents of due process whose business is to facilitate and sum
2
up. 09
Stanley Hauerwas' discussion of Matthew 18 greatly illuminates what it means
when he says that the Church's first social task is to be itself For Hauerwas, the
peacemaking that is based on Matthew 18:15ff is not the avoidance of conflict but the
creation of the right kind of conflict. His essay is a call for the Church to be The most
political of institutions', given that unlike politics as it is generally understood it is
interested in truth. Hauerwas sees 'political' peacekeeping as The development of the
processes and institutions that make possible confrontation and resolution of differences
so that violence can be avoided'; as such, 'peacemaking 'is not simply one activity among
others but is the very form of the church'.21°
The passage from Matthew 18 is central because it unites the themes of
confrontation and forgiveness. Christians are called to confront their enemies. In the
process they may discover they have been mistaken about being wronged, or even that
their enemy might repent and they will therefore have to be reconciled. For the Church to
be 'a community of truthful peace' it must not fail to challenge sinners, for this would
abandon them to their sin. There is no limit to forgiveness (Matt 18:22); but the wronged
person always approaches the confrontation as one who has been forgiven. This is not to
be a recipe for self-righteousness (another form of power). Those who are excluded from
the process and treated as Gentiles or tax-collectors, are the self-righteous themselves -
209ibid pp. 29-34.
210 Stanley Hauerwas 'Peacemaking' pp. 96, 95.
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those who act like they have no need of forgiveness. There is no more violent act than the
unwillingness to accept reconciliation freely and honestly offered:2"
In relation to those outside the Church, the Church must be as truthful with the
world as it is with itself. It must call for a peace based on forgiveness rather than
forgetfulness. It must challenge 'the false peace of the world which is too often built more
on power than on truth'; in doing so it realises the world may become a more violent
place. Yet humanity is 'not naturally violent' but is 'created for peace'. Thus it is the
Church's task to 'help the world find the habits of peace' by witnessing in its own life the
right kind of conflict. For 'without the example of a peacemaking community, the world
has no alternative but to use violence as the means to settle disputes.'212
What is missing in Hauerwas is a lengthier discussion of these themes. If the
Church's first social-ethical task is to be itself; one needs to know more what 'being itself
involves. Hauerwas sometimes concentrates on what it does not involve, much to the
consternation of Niebuhrians. It still remains for Hauerwas to write more essays like
Peacemaking: The Virtue of the Church' to show what practices are required to be the
Church. Once the focus has settled on the internal working of the Christian community,
more needs to be said on how that community works.
3.2.2. The Constantinian Reversal
The change in Christian social practice and ecclesiology symbolised by the
conversion of Constantine is so significant to the thinking of John Howard Yoder and
those inspired by him that it is worth considering in detail. Yoder gives his most thorough
exposition of this profound shift in his essay The Constantinian Sources of Western Social
211,	 •
um p. 94. In The Politics ofJesus Yoder provides helpful insights into the nature of the forgiveness
that Hauerwas recommends. The personhood which [Jesus] proclaims as a healing, forgiving call to all is
integrated into the social novelty of the healing community. This ... would be even more clear if we could
read the Jesus story with a stronger sense of the Jewishness of his context and with Amos ringing in our
ears.' (p. 108). The forgiveness of sins is not, for Jesus, a mere assuaging of personal guiltiness or
interpersonal estrangement; it is a sign of the new age and the presupposition of a new possibility of
community.' (p. 108 n. 16).
212 ibid p. 95.
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Ethics'. 2 " Yoder's concern is not with the year 311 or with Constantine the man: it is with
how, for example, Christians went from rejecting the violence of army and empire in the
third century to considering it their vocation and duty to fight in the fourth and fifth.
What had happened? First of all, the forbidden had become the obligatory. From
persecuting Christians the empire before long began to persecute heretics. It became
increasingly difficult to identify the minority of 'true' Christians. In various interpretations
the 'invisible Church' were seen as the Elect (chosen by God), the sincerely faithful
(practised by humans), the 'religious' (who retained some social nonconformity) or - most
visibly - the hierarchy.
Second, eschatology and ecclesiology swapped places. The confession that 'Jesus
Christ is Lord' meant, for the early Christians, that in a largely hidden way Christ subdued
even the rebellion of the principalities and powers under his lordship and used it for his
ultimate purpose. With the conversion of Constantine, Christ's lordship was hidden no
longer. Providence was now an object no longer of faith but of empirical observation. A
Christian (and therefore Christians) ruled the world. The millennium was not a far-off
dream but a present reality.
Before Constantine, one knew as a fact of everyday experience that there was a
believing Christian community but one had to 'take it on faith' that God was governing
history. After Constantine, one had to believe without seeing that there was a
community of believers, within the larger nominally- Christian mass, bat one knew for a
fact that God was in control of history.2"
Before the shift the beleaguered Church represented God's providential working in the
world. Afterwards, the empire supported the Church, and the success of the two went
hand in hand. It was now the empire as a whole, rather than simply the Church, which
made God's providence visible. There was no reason for the Church to confront society:
its new duty was to support society. When faced with non-Christians outside the empire,
the cause of throne and altar was identical; the outsider was the 'infidel'; the result was the
crusade.
Third, the ruler or emperor replaced Jesus as the norm for Christian social ethics.
Ethics concerned what was possible for rulers to do in positions of power. Only a
213J.H. Yoder The Priestly Kingdom pp. 135-147.
214 ibid p. 137.
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minimum standard of behaviour applied to all Christians; the state maintains justice and
need not seek sanctity. The strenuous commands of Jesus were left to the 'religious'.
What, after all, if everyone were to give all their money away or love their enemies? The
trend is highly utilitarian, favouring what Yoder calls the 'engineering approach to ethics':
Once the evident course of history is held to be empirically discernible, and prosperity of
the regime is the measure of good, all morality boils down to efficacy. Right action is
what works; what does not promise results can hardly be right.215
Fourth, the prevailing metaphysic was dualist. The tension of the visible and the
invisible, the personal and the structural, the natural and the revealed, the needs of justice
and the counsels of the gospel: all these justified the new social arrangements.
Interiorisation and individualisation were functional explanations and justifications for the
displacement of the gospels as the primary authority for the ordering of the external world
of the Christian community. The sovereignty of Jesus in Christian social practice became
increasingly qualified by other values - power, mammon, fame, efficacy. Such other
values, known as responsibility, nature, efficiency or wisdom tended to become part of the
meaning of 'Christ', speaking where Jesus was silent or inappropriate.216
These four dimensions of 'Constantinianism' are significant because of their
influence on the thinking of Hauerwas and of theologians in the Mennonite and believers'
Church tradition.217
215 ibid p. 140.
216J.H. Yoder The Priestly Kingdom pp. 85-86.
217 In a recent article, J. Denny Weaver extends Yoder's analy sis into the field of soteriolou. Weaver
argues that the 'classic' or 'victory over the powers' theory of the atonement, so prominent in the early
Church, fell out of favour in the post-Constantine era due largely to a change in social circumstances.
Weaver describes how the early Church saw confrontation with the world as normal, and thus understood
the atonement in similarly adversarial terms. Jesus had escaped from clutches of death and Saran, taking
with him the souls of humankind, now free to reign with him in the Kingdom of God. The cross of Jesus
assured the manner of the confrontation, while the resurrection demonstrated the validity of the
confrontation. Christ's atonement established a new social order which stood over against, and in
confrontation with, the society as contemporary Christians found it This accords with the soteriology of
benaeus and Origen.
Weaver is anxious not to identify his argument with specific historical events: he is more
interested in a gradual trend. He acknowledges that he offers 'a hermeneutical model with which to
understand the relationship between understandings of atonement and ecclesiolou rather than arguing for
causal relationships between history and theology'. His approach rests on Yoder's identification of the
'Constantinian' shift. In the context of the primitive Church the social institution of the Church confronted
the social institution of the empire. Being a Christian was synonymous with being a part of the Church
made visible by its confrontation with the contemporary world. Salvation therefore had an inherently
social component - belonging to the people of God. Atonement was not simply a description of the
3.2.3. Responsible Social Ethics?
It is almost universally acknowledged amongst recent Christian ethicists that the
Christian's attitude to society cannot be one of indifference. It is commonly argued that the
Christian can or must work for the betterment of society. This will no doubt involve using
means that one would not employ in ideal circumstances - forms of evil or at least less
good. If one is to be effective, one must be prepared when necessary to meet force with
force. Those who refuse to do so thereby withdraw from the political mainstream.
Lying behind this apparent unanimity is a wide variety of understandings of how
Christianity and Christians are to be related to the state. This variety is explored by John
Howard Yoder in The Christian Witness to the State. What are the nature and extent of
the Christian's 'responsibility to the state?
The medieval view understands two kinds of persons each with their respective
vocation. The saints, a small minority, act on the level of love. Those responsible for the
economic and political function of the world can, indeed should, operate on a level of
justice. This level of justice is fixed, attainable, and knowable outside the revelation of the
incarnate Christ: it is based on natural law.
Lutheranism accepts the distinction between love and justice. Instead of dividing
people into religious and lay, however, it sees all people in a tension between both levels,
being nonresistant with the neighbour while justly following the ' pram of creatioti in
society. While as sinners we can never attain perfect love, justice is possible.
The Reformed thinkers dispensed with the distinction between reason (or nature)
and revelation. It would be wrong for individuals to try to act in a more loving way than
the entire people: to do so would deny their common responsibility for the civil order. If a
government is unjust, the responsible Christian must rebel.
restored relationship between the believer and the saviour: inseparable from that relationship was the
community of God's people, which was the expression and the instrument of the work of Christ. After the
Church moved to a position within the mainstream of society, its theologians gradually acknowledged that
the 'victory over the powers' theory had become irrelm-ant. This was not because of its demon imagery or
the objections to tricking the devil, but because social circumstances had changed and confrontation was a
distant memory. See J. Denny Weaver 'Atonement for the NonConstantinian Church' Modern Theology 6
July 1990 pp. 307-323.
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Reinhold Niebuhr accepts the Greek and Roman insights which supplement
Christian revelation to guide responsible witness to the state. He also accepts Luther's
distinction between face-to-face relations and those of social responsibility. Justice is no
longer a fixed quantity, but a balance between present practice and a line higher but not so
much so as to make it irrelevant. The duality, such as it is, is between the Christian and sin.
These four conceptions of Christian social ethics cover most of what I have called
The conventional wisdom'. What they have in common is that they all formulate the
problem in Constantinian terms. The issue is posed as if the only alternatives for the
Christian were 'responsibility' or 'withdrawal'. 'Responsibility' is a slogan whose use
assumes the loss of the Church's visible distinctiveness in order to leaven the whole of
society. Thus the Church tries to formulate an ethic that will work as well for non-
Christians as for Christians.
The implications are subtle but considerable. 'Responsibility' assumes the Christian
has a stake in the survival of the contemporary social order, an interest which surpasses
what most of these thinkers acknowledge to be the law of nonresistant love found in the
gospel. This law of love is no longer decisive but is substituted by a new autonomous
moral absolute called 'responsibility'.
In the name of 'responsibility', orders of creation, and natural law, Christians
depart from Christian revelation when grounding the authority of their witness. There are
held to be insights or ways of working which claim Christ-like authority yet which call
people to do things that Christ does not call people to do. Each of these alternatives bases
its social ethics and conception of justice on a reality other than the redemption that is in
Christ.
The Constantinian formulations of Christian social ethics all assume that it is the
Christian's duty to make the world come out right. They tend to posit metaphysical
distinctions between the orders of creation and redemption or God-given levels of
righteousness. They are also concerned to ensure survival by establishing a general,
fundamental ethical norm which can be met by those who do not confess Jesus Christ as
Lord as much as by those who can.
This is what Hauerwas and Yoder are determined to avoid. Yoder's writing, which
has been so deeply influential on Hauerwas, especially in the areas of ecclesiology and
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pacifism, presupposes a minority community. Yoder is not interested in public ethics - one
cannot do 'ethics for anyone'.
The obedience of faith does not make sense apart from the context of faith. ...
Crossbearing in the hope of resurrection, enemy love as a reflection of Gods love,
forgiving as one has been forgiven ... do not make sense in the context of unbelief.218
The duality in Christian social ethics is one not of orders but of agents: some
believe and some do not. If the Christian knows and does the good on the strength of the
forgiveness and regeneration of the gospel, how can one expect a society which has not
encountered the gospel to do likewise? The resources for making such redeemed
behaviour possible are lacking.
The Christian is a person who ... by the power of God working in him or her is a new
person. Conflict before was a normal built-in part of one's nabire; but now the person
has been disarmed ... The believer knovvs how to deal with [enmity] as with any other
temptation - in repentance, confession, and spiritual T4ctory. ... We cannot impose
[Christian behaviour] on entire nations ... We do not wait for the world to be ready to
follow us before we follow Cluist. 21 9
It does require some subtlety to separate minority ethics from a world-denying
tendency. Yoder does this with a thoroughly postmodern twist.
The dominant moral views of any known world are oppressive, provincial or (to say it
theologically) 'fallen'. This is true even if the terrain of the provincialism is large or the
majority holding the views is great. There is no 'public' that is not just another
particular province. We need a communal instrument of moral reasoning in the light of
faith precisely to defend the decision-maker against the stream of conformity to his own
world's self-midence.220
In his attack upon the 'Constantinian' presuppositions of much Christian social
ethics, Yoder points out as a cause for repentance that which is generally taken for
granted. His essay The Kingdom as Social Ethic' is a discussion of the logic and
psychology of weakness and how they differ from the logic and psychology of control.
For instance, 'in a situation of majority control, if something happens it is because you let it
happen and you are to blame for it, even for results which are partly evil'. Christians in
218.1.H. Yoder 'Radical Reformation Ethics in Ecumenical Perspective' The Priestly Kingdom p. 110.
2191.H. Yoder 'Living the Disarmed Life' p. 43.
220J.H. Yoder The Hermeneutics of Peoplehood' The Priest4, Kingdom p. 40. In The Politics opesus
he writes The Church does not attack the powers; this Christ has done. The Church concentrates on not
being seduced by them' (p. 150).
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majority or large-minority contexts often assume that 'perhaps the only way to do moral
deliberation is to work out a consequentialist calculation of the direction one wants the
whole social system to take'. 221 Ethics done by the weak looks very different:
There are things that we cannot control, which are nonetheless going to happen. ... This
means that it will be an expression of wisdom, and not of self-righteousness or
unconcern or isolation, if we accept the fact that those deeds are going to be done and
that we cannot stop them, and concentrate for ourselves on doing other things which no
one will do. This looks to our friends of a majoritarian cast of mind like acquiescence in
evil. It is; one of the differences between being powerful and powerless is that one has
thought more about the fact that there are evils one cannot prevent 222
Yoder sums up his position in two pairs of questions.
Instead of asking about one's action 'if I do this how will it tip the scale ... 7, one rather
asks 'in a situation in which I cannot tip the scales, on what other grounds might I
decide what to do?'223
if everyone gave their wealth away what would we do for capital? If everyone loved
their enemies who would ward off the Conununists? ... Such reasoning remains
ludicrous wherever committed Christians accept realistically their minority stalls For
more fitting than What if everybody did it? would be its inverse, What if nobody else
acted like a Christian, but we did?'224
Christian ethics are therefore done by powerless people who recognise that their
faithfulness will inevitably result in their being a minority community. It is not so much that
they have renounced control as that the forms of life they have adopted mean that control
is unlikely to come their way. They do not believe that the forces that determine the march
of history are controlled by the leaders of the armies and markets, so it is not inevitable
that Christians must become lords of the state and the economy so as to use that power
towards the ends they consider desirable. Yoder roots the central theme of powerlessness
squarely in the New Testament itself
The cross and not the sword, suffering and not brute power determines the meaning of
history. The key to the obedience of God's people is not their effectiveness but their
patience (Rev 13:10). ... The relationship between the obedience of God's people and the
triumph of God's cause is not a relationship of cause and effect hrt one of cross and
resurrection.2"
221 j
 Yoder 'The Kingdom as Social Ethic' The Priestly Kingdom pp. 100, 96.
222ibid p. 101.
223ibid.
2241H. Yoder The Priestly Kingdom p. 139.
225J.H. Yoder The Politics ofJesus p. 232.
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In the worship life of the late New Testament Church is displayed the most
desperate encounter of the Church's weakness - John in exile, Paul in prison - with the
power of evil rulers. This, says Yoder, is simply a logical unfolding of the meaning and
work of Jesus Christ himself, whose life followed suffering servanthood not violent
lordship, who was 'so faithful to the enemy-love of God that it cost him all his
effectiveness; he gave up every handle on history.'226
It is important to note that while faithfulness is a more important goal than
effectiveness, the two are by no means in opposition, and many churches that have not
claimed direct social significance or concern for society have often had the most social
significance. Indeed to accept an opposition between faithfulness and effectiveness would
be to accept a typology imposed by the 'responsibility school. It is no more true to
suppose that the 'responsible' use of power always gets results than to presume that
minority faithfulness is by definition ineffective. Yoder details a number of ways in which
social results can be a by-product of suffering love. The minority group can maintain
awareness of an issue, doing jobs no one else is doing, until social circumstances alter to
make the issue one of general concern. The Quaker experience of fair trading in the
eighteenth century eventually rewarded transcendent rather than consequential
commitments by creating a body of trust. Faithful minorities can move the public
conscience, as with Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King. They can represent those
who have no one to speak for them. They command respect when their social goals are in
the interest of others.227
Yoder's examples of the social significance of minority faith communities make it
clear that in following the gospels' social ethic the Church is not withdrawing from public
or political life. What the Christian withdraws from is the responsibility to transform
society from the top down.228
226ibid p. 233.
227J.H. Yoder The Priestly Kingdom pp. 96-99.
228 •tus 'ad hoc politics' may be compared with the 'ad hoc apologetics' discussed in chapter two. Yoder
gives a social-ethical embodiment to Hauerwas' postliberal clistaust of the 'large battalions' of systematic
theology, rooted in the medieval era when Church and stlte were so close. See 3.4.3. below for de Certeau's
impressive contribution to this argument.
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3.2.4. The Church is not the World
3.2.4.1. The Church is not the World
A great deal of subtlety is necessary for Hauerwas to affirm the particularity of the
Church without suggesting a dualism between Church and world. The Church, the people
capable of remembering and telling the story of God we find in Jesus', exists for the world.
The world is God's good creation; God has redeemed it, even though it refuses to
acknowledge the fact. Thus the Church attempts to show the world what it is meant to be.
Church and world cannot survive without each other; and each sins in frequently
forgetting this. The Church is constantly tempted to a dualism that suggests God's
redemption extends only to itself, or to a triumphalism that confuses servanthood with
domination as its mode of relation to the world. The Church has no right to determine the
boundaries of God's kingdom, for such is to limit the sphere of God's sovereignty.
It is important to stress that although 'wider society [is] the institutionalization of
unbelief and sin'229, Church and world are not concepts which are intelligible without the
other. The 'world' is not an ontological designation; 23° it is not inherently sinful. As often,
Hauerwas invokes Yoder when in need of subtle distinctions:
The distinction between church and the world is not something that God has imposed
on the world by a prior metaphysical definition, nor is it only something mlich timid
and pharisaical Christians have built up around themselves. It is all of that in creation
that has taken the freedom not yet to befieve.231
In Hauerwas' language:
...the world consists of those, including ourselves, who have chosen not to make the
story of God their story. The world in us refuses to affirm that this is God's world and
that, as loving Lord, God's care for creation is greater than our illusion of control. The
world is those aspects of our individual and social lives where we live untruthfully by
continuing to ray on violence to bring order.232
229Stanley Hauerwas The Nonresistant Church: The Theological Ethics of John Howard Yoder' Vision
and tirtue p. 206.
230Stanley Hauerwas The Peaceable Kingdom p. 100.
23I J.H. Yoder The Original Revolution Scottdale, Pennsylvania:Herald Press 1971 p. 116.
232 Stanley Hauetwas The Peaceable Kingdom p. 101.
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There is no room for Christians to be self-righteous, since the distinction between
Church and world runs through every agent. Christians will no doubt find non-Christians
who manifest God's peace better than they do; cooperation with such people is based not
on a generally shared natural morality but on the boundless width of God's kingdom,
which the Church has no right to circumscribe.
3.2.4.2. The Church understands the world
Related to the second dimension is the way the Church offers the correct
perspective from which to describe and understand the world. The story that stands at the
centre of the Church is one which, Christians believe, correctly describes the world. An
insight that Hauerwas originally gained from Iris Murdoch is that people act in the world
that they see. 2." What they are to do will be determined by what they perceive to be 'going
on'. How Christians see is learned through being a people who are formed by the
preaching and practice of their narrative. Hauerwas calls for the Church to be 'a
community which tries to develop the resources to stand within the world witnessing to
the peaceable kingdom and thus rightly understanding the world'.234
The search for a public moral language is motivated ... by embarrassment about
particularity, which is not willing to break through the embarrassment to confession by
taking the risk of a specific encounter, preferring to posit something argued to be more
solid and less threatening than an open market place, even if that 'something' be
nonexistent or vacuous ... The way to affirm our respect for others is to respect their
particularity and learn their languages, not to project in their absence a claim that we
see the truth of things with an authority umitiated by our particularity.235
There is no question that some in the world are bound to hate this people for
describing the world in these terms. For this reason the price of being unafraid to speak
the truth may be geographical mobility. Just as their saviour was often on the move,
Christians may find they have no earthly home but the Church itself. It is in no one's
233 See chapter five below for further discussion of this point_
234 ibid p. 102.
235J.H. Yoder The Priestly Kingdom p. 42. There is a clear link here with liauerwas' rejection of ethics
from the neutral observer's perspective. See 1.2.1. above.
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interest for the Church to abandon particularity in order to seek some less particular moral
consensus; for Christians believe that the way they see reality is the way reality really is.
The Church begins its social ethic by seeking to understand the world rather than
rush into acting in it. For John Milbank, theology is a social science which claims to read
and criticise what is going on in other societies. Meanwhile Christ and the Church are a
new social practice, critiquing all others. 236 On the basis of its counter-ontology - the
priority of nonviolent creating - the Church sets about 'out-narrating' a politics based on
coercion and falsehood.
This is the only context in which terms such as the 'ghetto' make any sense. If the
Church insists on calling attention to what the world is, Wit has no reason to fear the truth,
Wit is able to exist in the world without resorting to violence to maintain its presence, it is
not likely to be popular. When 'ghetto' is used as a slogan, it tends to be forgotten that
historically a ghetto was not an enclave chosen by a self-righteous group but a refuge into
which society drove those whose loyalty to the God of the Hebrew scriptures made them
cosmopolitans and therefore misfits in medieval Europe. 237 This is highly significant: if the
Church does come to be isolated, it will not be from withdrawal or from deliberately
provoking the world's violence. It may however mean that the only available path of
resistance is to leave one place for another. Christians are at home in no nation: their only
home is the Church itself
236John Milbank Theology and Social Theory p. 388.
231John Howard Yoder The Christian Tf itness to the State p. 88 n. 10. Hauerwas is aware that although
initially most Anabaptists did not withdraw but were forced to the periphery, 'this forced withdrawal later
became a self-fulfilling prophecy as Anabaptists misdescribed their own theological and social
commitments by making a virtue of necessity.' Stanley Hauerwas 'Will the real Sectarian Stand Up?
Theology Today April 1987 P. 91.
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3.2.4.3. The world is not the Church
In several essays, Hauerwas argues that Christians have only a qualified loyalty to
the nation state. 238 Hauerwas is anxious to resist the presumption of the state; he also
wishes to resist the supposition that the world's way of ruling is the only way to rule.
In resisting the presumption of the state, Hauerwas is most at odds with those
such as Richard Neuhaus who suppose that the Church should choose sides between
totalitarian and democratic states. A demand of this kind makes democracy an end in
itself It expects Christians to kill in order to preserve the democratic state against her
enemies; and yet that Church persists in supposing that it is free to recognise idolatry. In
Hauerwas' view, the Church in the United States is the captive of the state. The overriding
conflict of the twentieth centwy has not been that between freedom and oppression, or
democracy and totalitarianism. It has been, as ever, the conflict between
those that would remain loyal to God's kingdom and those that would side with the
world And the world is exactly those people and institutions claiming that Christians
too must be willing to choose sides and kill in order to preserve the social orders in
which they find themselves. As Christians when we accept that alternative it means we
are no longer the church that witnesses to God's sovereignty over all nations, but instead
we have become part of the world.239
With great clarity, Hauerwas charts how Christians have assumed that it was their
task to make the 'liberal' world work. In this 'liberal' world, Christian belief and practice
was restricted to the private realm; the result was a peaceful society. Hauerwas
characterises the ethics of Reinhold Niebuhr as one which focuses on love and justice,
requiring a balance of freedom and equality; Hauerwas describes this as 'functionally
atheistic'. 'In the name of Christian responsibility to the "world", theologians became
"ethicists" so they could be of service to liberal political regimens'. In a sardonic tone,
Hauerwas recalls Jeffi-ey Stout's observation that liberalism arose out of the chaos of the
Thirty Years' War:
The whole point ... of the philosophical and political developments since the
Enlightenment is to create people incapable of killing other people in the name of God
238 See especially The Reality of the Church: Even a Democratic State is Not the Kingdom' Against the
Nations pp. 122-131, 'A Christian Critique of Christian America' Christian existence Today pp 171-190
and The Politics of Salvation: Why there is no Salvation Outside the Church' After Christendom pp. 23-
44.
239Stanley Hauerwas The Reality of the Church' p. 129.
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Ironically, since the Enlightenment's triumph, people no longer kill one another in the
name of God but in the names of nation-states. ... The ultimate pathos of our times is
that we live in societies and polities formed by the assumption that there is literally
nothing worth for which it is worth dying. The irony is that such societies cannot live
without war as they seek to hide in war the essential emptiness of their conunitments.24°
3.2.5. Summary
Much of Stanley Hauerwas' writing is concerned with exposing false notions of
what it means to be Church. This outline of the dimensions of his understanding of the
Church began with his discussion of the practice of reconciliation in the Christian
community. I began with this in order to emphasise the centrality of the formation and
sustenance of the community of character as the final cause of Christian ethics. Without
the practices of such an alternative community, the world has no way of knowing it is the
world. Hauerwas and Yoder outline how this distinctive mission of the Church - to be
itself - has been deeply affected by historical developments, notably the adoption of
Christianity as the official religion of the Roman Empire and the rise of liberalism in
response to religious intolerance after the reformation. No Christian ethic can ignore these
significant developments; however by identifying them Hauerwas is developing a Christian
ethic that is not a hostage to them.
Though Hauerwas discusses some of the internal practices of the Church at
length, others he does not describe in great detail. This outline has been sufficient to
introduce a discussion on whether Hauerwas is true to the one, holy, catholic and
apostolic Church - and, in particular, whether there is any justification or significance in
describing him as a sectarian.
240Stanley Hauerwas The Politics of the Church' pp. 31, 33, 44. See also Reinhold Niebuhr The Nature
and Destiny ofMcrn volume 2 New York: Scnbners 1949 pp. 244-286 and Jeffrey Stout Ethics after Babel:
The Languages ofMorals and their Discontents Boston: Beacon 1988.
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3.3. Apostolic Holiness
Stanley Hauerwas' theology is Christocentric. Apostolicity is not a term he
specifically uses about his ethics; when I use it I refer to the way he identifies Jesus as the
norm for Christian behaviour. He bases this conviction on the fact that it was the apostles
and the early Church whose practice formed the canon of the New Testament; and the
close connection of the narrative of Jesus with the practice of the early Church implies that
Jesus expected the ethical behaviour of his followers to be little different from his own.
Though Hauerwas makes the notion that I have termed apostolicity central to his
ethical foundation, he does not have an idealised picture of the early Christian
communities; nor does he suppose that these communities should be reproduced today as
if there had never been a Constantine or a Thirty Years War or an Enlightenment.
Apostolicity is central to his antifoundationalist epistemology, and thus links his
ecclesiology with his concern for narrative, outlined in chapter two. It was in the Christian
community that the gospels were written: and it has been in Christian communities that
they have been performed. It is only in the performance of those communities that their
truth can be assessed.
My use of the term 'holiness' refers to the crucial role that sanctification plays from
the very beginning of Hauerwas' work.241 There are perhaps inevitable criticisms to be
considered. If holiness concentrates on the individual, suggestions of callous self-
righteousness, of the kind associated with deontological ethics, tend to appear. It can
appear that the individual's adherence to principle outweighs any other consideration.
on the other hand, holiness concentrates on the community, charges of sectarianism
quickly arise.
Thus when I use the term 'apostolic holiness' to refer to the general thrust of
Hauerwas' ecclesiology and social ethics, the expression denotes the belief that disciples
241 'Sanctification is not a recommended ethical programme of good dispositions and actions but rather
the effect of the conformation of the self to God's act' Character and the Christian Lift' p. 191. See 1.7.
above.
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are called to imitate the way God deals with the world, and that the definitive expression
of the manner of God way with the world is the life and passion of Jesus.
3.3.1. Jesus and the Sovereignty of God
For Hauerwas, Jesus' story provides the Church with 'a path to follow'. This is
Hauerwas' understanding of justification. 242 In Jesus Christ God establishes a new
kingdom by reclaiming the creation and subduing the powers to his will. The foundation
of Hauerwas' pacifism is not therefore on a prior definition of peace of which Christ is the
great exemplar. There is no independent, abstracted norm which determines the meaning
of Christ: instead, Christ and discipleship are the norm which determine the treatment of
evil.
It is important to Yoder that, though Jesus inaugurated a new ethic for dealing
with evil, the situation he faced was not new, but of abiding significance. Yoder begins
The Politics of Jesus by quoting C.H.Dodd's diagnosis of the political forces at work in
the gospel narrative:
... We should observe that the situation into which Jesus came was genuinely typical. ...
The forces with which he came into contact were such as are permanent factors in
history: - government, institutional religion, nationalism, social unrest —243
Among these forces one may also note religious bigotry, the violent use of political power,
the corruption ofjustice, mob spirit and action, militarism and racism.
This understanding of Christian nonviolence is apostolic insofar as it recognises
the abiding character of the forces which Jesus confronted - in the temptation narratives, in
the confrontations of his ministry with evil, ignorance, disease and self-interest, in the
242 Svaru—ey-- Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom p. 94.
243C.H.Dodd The Kingdom of God and the Present Situation' Christi= News-Letter May 29 1940,
supplement no. 31 quoted in J.H.Yoder The Politics ofJesus Second Edition p.
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weakness of his followers and in the way of the cross. Apostolicity lies in Christians
looking to the way Jesus dealt with much the same problems as are present today.
The key for both Hauerwas and Yoder is whether one sees these forces as
characterising the true nature of history, or whether one understands that Jesus Christ
exposed, addressed and redeemed these forces and defined history differently. The issue is
one of sovereignty. If Jesus Christ is Lord, then it is his activity, not that of the armies and
markets, that determines the meaning of history. Jesus' lordship relativises the sovereignty
of all other powers. All the 'givens' of history have their authority undermined if Jesus is
lord. And Jesus' lordship is revealed definitively in the cross. Thus it is the cross that is the
mewling of history. The revelation of the victory of the cross disarms all the powers the
Christian might be tempted to use. They do not have the force they once had. Thus 'when
the Christian whom God has disarmed lays aside carnal weapons, it is not, in the last
analysis, because they are too dangerous, but because they are too weak1.244
Therefore Christian nonviolence is a recognition of the sovereignty of God. It is
not just that Jesus taught his followers to love their enemies and not to resist evil: for if
Jesus were not fully divine, this ethic would not be binding or necessary. It is not just the
fact that Christ went to the cross: for if Christ were not fully human, this ethic would be an
impossible ideal. The Christian's belief in the sovereignty of God is an ontological and
eschatological claim. It is an ontological belief that in the cross God decisively dealt with
evil, not by responding in kind, but through self-giving, nonresistant love. And it is an
eschatological belief in the final triumph of the lamb who was slain.
What Christian nonviolence is not is a tactical calculation of appropriate methods
for getting one's way. Nonviolence is not right because it 'works'. Hauerwas is well aware
that the nonviolence of Christians may make the world a more violent place. His concern
is not with effective action but with faithful recognition of the approach to evil that Jesus
has made possible. The Christian response is that of imitation and participation.
244J.H_Yoder 'Living the Disarmed Life' A Matter of Faith: A Study Guide for Churches on the Nuclear
Arms Race Washington D.C.: Sojourners 1981 p.43.
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3.3.2. The Imitation of Christ
Hauerwas describes this second area as sanctification. Justification concerned the
ontological and eschatological matters of the sovereignty of God. When it comes to
sanctification, the issues come down to earth, and are more ecclesiological. Sanctification
is 'a way of reminding us of the kind of journey we must undertake in order to make the
story of Jesus our story'. 245
 It is a reminder that holiness is a practical, as well as ethereal,
thing.
Hauerwas' understanding of the imitation of God is most fully expressed in the
fifth chapter of The Peaceable Kingdom. It is here that one can see how Hauerwas'
commitment to nonviolence arises out of his understanding of narrative as outlined in my
previous chapter. When the early Church searched for ways of establishing the significance
of Jesus, they told stories of his life.
Hauerwas recognises that the picture of Jesus provided by the gospels is not the
'real' Jesus but Jesus as he was perceived by the early Church. But Hauerwas
undeterred by this:
The historical fact that we only learn who Jesus is as he is reflected through the eyes of
his followers, a fact that has driven many to despair because it seems they cannot know
the real Jesus, in fact is a theological necessity. For the 'real Jesus' did not come to leave
us unchanged, but rather to transform us to be worthy members of the comnumity of the
new age. ... It as assumed by the churches that gave us the gospels that we cannot
know who Jesus is and what he stands for without learning to be his followers.246
Learning to be followers of Jesus means being called to imitate God. Hauerwas
concentrates on Matthew 5:48: 'you must be teleioi,as your heavenly Father is teleios1.247
This is a point that is picked up by Yoder
Christians love their enemies not because they think the enemies are wonderful people,
nor because they believe that love is sure to conquer these enemies ... [nor] because they
fail to respect their native land or its rulers; nor because they are unconcerned for the
safety of their neighbours ... The Christian loves his or her enemies because God does.
and God commands his followers to do so: that is the only reason, and that is enough.248
245 Stanley Hauerwas The Peaceable Kingdom p. 94.
246ibid pp. 73-4.
24 'Hauerwas translates this 'perfect', though it could also be translated 'oriented toward the end', which
has implications on the eschatological approach to ethics I outlined at the end of chapter two.
248J.H.Yoder 'Living the Disarmed Life' p.42.
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The Christian is called to be like Jesus, not to be Jesus. This rules out a simple
copying of the external circumstances of Jesus. Yoder is careful to highlight that there is
no general notion of living like Jesus in the New Testament. Neither Paul nor any other
writer looks to barefoot mendicancy, the forsaking of home or property, the formation of
a close-knit group of disciples, the use of parables, singleness, time on mountains or in the
wilderness, or the artisan background for a model for the imitation of Christ.' Hauerwas
insists that one can only learn to be like Jesus if one joins a community that practises his
virtues - not by simply copying his external circumstances.
Hauerwas' understanding of imitation begins with the Biblical narrative. The early
Christians saw in Jesus a continuation of Gods dealings with Israel. These dealings
included in particular the crossing of the Red Sea, the giving of the law at Sinai, the
crossing of the Jordan and the construction of the Temple at Zion. By obeying the
commands, by fearing and loving the Lord, Israel believed it was imitating God. '... To
love God meant to learn to love as God loved and loves'?" By imitating God, Israel
depicted God's kingdom in the world. The early Church saw in Jesus a recapitulation of
the life of Israel, and a similar presentation of the life of God before the world. Imitating
Jesus was therefore continuing Israel's vocation by imitating God.
God does not impose his will upon Israel. Though he constantly calls her back to
faithfulness, she retains the possibility of disobedience. This pattern is continued in the
gospels. God does not accept violent means, but creates a people who refuse to meet the
world on its own terms. Being like Jesus means using the same methods as Jesus did when
he was confronted with powerful enemies. Because Jesus chose servanthood and
forgiveness rather than force and hostility, he went to the cross. Christians imitate him
when they make a similar choice, recognising that 'it shall not be so among you' (Mark
10:43).
Christian nonviolence in this light is apostolic because it affirms the definitive
character of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Jesus faced the same calls to
'responsible' action in society that the Church faces today. He too was concerned for the
downtrodden and oppressed; he too longed for justice on earth; he too saw the potential
249See especially J.H.Yoder The Politics ofJestts Second Edition pp.130-133.
250Stanley Hauerwas The Peaceable Kingdom p.78.
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of political power. Yet he took the path not of power and justice, but of humility and love.
He 'committed his cause to one who judges justly' (I Peter 2:23). And so 'the weapons we
wield' - our almighty meekness - 'are not merely human, but divinely potent' (2 Corinthians
10:4). Part of this definitive character of Christ is that he incorporates the story of God's
dealings with Israel, in a way that is particularly apparent in Matthew's gospel. Part of the
apostolicity of the Church is that it recognises this Jewishness of Jesus. Hauerwas
constantly underlines the importance of the Church's recognition of the place of the Jews
in God's providence.
3.3.3. Participation - the Mystical Union
'Truth, for Christianity, is not correspondence, but rather participation of the
beautiful in the beauty of God'. 251
 Sharing God's way with his world is a participation in
the life of God. It is not just a question of imitating Christ: the readiness to renounce
legitimate ends whenever they cannot be attained by legitimate means is a participation in
the triumphant suffering of the lamb.'
Christian nonviolence in this third light is a recognition of the incarnation: it is the
belief that God participated in human nature so that humanity might participate in God's
nature. Jesus Christ
was not simply a divine figure masquerading as a man whose apparent obedience was
therefore irrelevant to the rest of us; he was the true human being. Faith in Jesus Christ
is not an arbitrary or magical inscription on heavenly ledgers; faith is rather
participation in the being of God, incorporation into the body of Christ. The possibility
of obedience is therefore a statement not about our own human capabilities, but about
the fullness of the humanity of Jesus and the believers' identity with him through the
Spirit in the Church.253
25I John Milbank Theology and Social Theory Oxford: Blackwell 1990 p.427.
252 Stanley Hauerwas 'Messianic Pacifism' Worldview 16/6 June 1973 p.31.
253J.Ii Yoder '"Christ and Culture", A Critique of FL Richard Niebuhr' p.16 quoted in Stanley Bauerwas
Vision and 1, irtue p.201.
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This is the kind of statement with which Yoder ties together ontology, Christology
and ecclesiology. In this context a phrase like 'being (or doing) the truth' makes sense. The
Christian should conform him or herself to the perfect obedience of Christ. This is done by
participation in the nonviolent community. Participation in this community, the body of
Christ, the communion of saints, is in fact participation in the being of Christ - indeed, in
the life of God. The life of God is itself nonviolent, as we can see from the manner of both
creation and redemption, and God will triumph, as truth must, in the only nonviolent, self-
giving way that truth knows. This picture is thus `the way things really (ontologically) are'.
Not to participate in the nonviolent community is therefore to part company with the
truth.
Holiness is fundamentally the character of God. The Church is holy by
participating in God's way of dealing with the world. Through the notion of participation,
all that Hauerwas has said about the community of character - and the implications this has
for the communio scmctorum - becomes incorporated into his Christology. Participation
therefore emerges as a term which sums up the connection between what I have termed
apostolicity and holiness in Hauerwas' thought.
3.3.4. Ethics and the Life of Christ
Both Hauerwas and Yoder base Christian ethics on the full humanity and full
divinity of Christ. Their response to alternative views is thus that such views do not do full
justice to this orthodox doctrine. If Jesus were not fully human, his ethic would be an
impossible ideal; if he were not fully divine, his ethic would not be binding or necessary.
Mistakes made in Christian ethics tend to correspond with the denial either of Christ's full
divinity or of his fill humanity.
Yoder describes the first mistake as Ebionism. This is the term he uses for
methods which do not treat Jesus as the norm . 254 Yoder lists several grounds on which
254He has in mind recent situation ethics and Roman catholic natural law ethics.
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Jesus' irrelevance is asserted. Jesus anticipated an imminent eschaton; he thought in terms
of simple rural face-to-face relations; the contemporary Christian faces problems Jesus did
not face, particularly problems of the use of authority unthinkable before the
'Constantinian' revolution; his concern was spiritual not social; only his death has abiding
significance.' There is historical-critical scepticism about whether the text is clear enough
to guide us, or about whether it is consistent in its guidance from redactor to redactor; and
there is the characteristically Lutheran view that Jesus' ethic is designed not to tell us what
we can do but to bring us to our knees because we cannot do it.256
This style of ethics begins with the rhythms of the world in the realities around us.
It tends to be grounded on one or more of 'nature', 'reason', 'creation', and 'reality'. Rather
than choose not to follow Jesus, or read the story and find in it a different message, this
approach claims that the particular claims of the Jesus' ethic upon the life of the disciple
can be set aside on systematic, logical grounds. Yoder identifies this approach with a
denial of the absolute relevance, sovereignty and divinity of Jesus.
The second mistake Yoder describes as docetism. Docetism involves the perennial
subjugation of the historical Jesus to the givens of contemporary theological
presuppositions, and thus the undermining of the full humanity of Christ. The most
common form of docetism is to make Christology the servant of soteriology. It is not, of
course, possible to distinguish clinically the person of Christ from his work; the two
cannot be separated. However when today's society, and the social situation of the Church
within it, are taken as a given, Christology tends to become distorted. When soteriological
issues take a primary place, the character of Jesus becomes a function of the saving acts
required of him. His mission defines his person, rather than vice versa. Projected onto
Jesus are human desires to be saved, to become like God, to overcome guilt, to make
satisfaction for sin, to be perfect in action, purity, and trust. The historical Jesus can get
left behind.
The narrative character of the gospels discourages such a propositional rendering
of soteriology. The gospels do not separate the person of Christ from his work, the
255J.H. Yoder The Politics ofJesus Second Edition pp. 4-8.
256TheSe latter arguments are among those additions noted by Yoder in his second edition, ibid pp. 15-
19.
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incarnation from the atonement. There is no moral, metaphysical, or anthropological point
or message that is separable from the story of Jesus as the gospels render it. The character
of Jesus is unsubstitutable - he is not a myth but a particular person with particular
followers whom he called to do particular things. His identity is not gathered by
researching his titles or by assessing the effects of his ministry, but by learning to follow
him. He is the only given.
By starting with soteriology we tend to accept the ills from which Christ came to
deliver us as given. We then shape a saviour such as will deal with these given ills. Such a
method is often found in apologetics. We start with a great list of woes, of what is wrong
with the world: on these, at least, we can agree - and the apologist will habitually stop
before the catalogue of given ills becomes of unbearable dimension. But can all people
agree on these ills? And is it clear that these are the ills from which Christ came to deliver
us, or that - when the woes are expressed in these terms - he succeeded in doing so? Many
of the woes seem to be very much still with us. It is doubtful whether we can put together
a neat equation wherein such ills are simply subtracted by the work of Christ. The ills that
Christ overcomes are discovered as the disciple walks the way of the cross with him. In
the same way the gospel narratives do not begin with a catalogue of the world's given ills,
followed by diagnosis and cure. On the contrary, it is in learning to be an apostolic
community that follows a particular Saviour that Christians discover what are the sins and
shortcomings and powers from which they need to be, and have been, delivered.
3.33. Ethics and the Death of Christ
Yoder's concern is to establish the life of Jesus as normative for Christian ethics.
In order to do this Yoder steers a course between those who abstract certain elements
from the life of Christ, and those who advocate a step-by-step imitation of Jesus' lifestyle.
In common with the first group, Yoder asserts that one point in Jesus' life is more
important than the others; in common with the second group Yoder insists that this point
is not an abstraction.
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Yoder first criticises those who abstract from the gospel narrative some value such
as absolute love or humility or faith. Yet Yoder also criticises the 'mendicant' tradition
which develops a general concept of living like Jesus. The former approach is insufficiently
concrete; the latter is 'a red herring', since it does not offer a political alternative to the
'ethos of Caesar'.257
Despite his concern for the whole of Christ's life, Yoder does single out the
voluntary suffering of the cross as the normative revelation within the normative
revelation. There is no exaltation of suffering-in-general:
The early Christians had to be warned about claiming merit for any and all suffering;
only if their suffering be innocent, and as a result of the evil will of their adversaries,
may it be understood as meaningful before God (1 Peter 2:18-21, 3:14-18, 4:1,13-16,
5:9, James 4:10).258
The concept of imitation concentrates on one realm above all others: the 'concrete
social meaning of the cross in relation to enmity and power'. 259 The believer's cross is
voluntary, not inexplicable, suffering. It is 'the price of his social nonconformity'. It is up to
the believer to choose to be persecuted just as Jesus was.
Representing as he did the chine order now at hand, accessible; renouncing as he did
the legitimate use of violence and the accrediting of the existing authorities; renouncing
as %Nell the ritual purity of noninvolvement, his people will encounter in ways analogous
to his own the hostility of the old order.
Being human, Jesus must have been subject somehow or other to the testings
of pride, envy, anger, sloth, avarice, gluttony and lust; but it does not enter into the
concerns of the gospel writer to give us any information about any struggles he may
have had with their attraction. The one temptation the man Jesus faced - and faced
again and again - as a constitutive element in his public ministry, was the temptation to
exercise social responsibility, in the interest of justified revolution, through the use of
available violent methods. Social withdrawal was no temptation to him; that option
(which most Christians take part of the time) was excluded at the outset. Any alliance
with the Sadducean establishment in the exercise of conservative social responsibility
hich most Christians choose the rest of the time) was likewise excluded at the outset.
We understand Jesus only if we can empathize with this threefold rejection: the self-
evident, axiomatic, sweeping rejection of both quietism and establishment responsibility.
and the difficult, constantly reopened, genuinely attractive option of the crusade.-6°
''The Politics ofJesus Second Edition pp. 132-133.
258ibid p. 129.
259 ibid	 131.
260ibid pp. 96-97.
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Thus the cross is central not because of its role in the atonement, not as an
illustration of suffering-in-general, but as the voluntary choice of the Son of God whose
commitment to nonviolence and enemy-love led inevitably there.
An apostolic Church must always place the cross at the heart of its reflection on
social practice. This was where Jesus' ministry led him; this was where the ministry of
many of his earliest followers led. They did not believe that there was nothing worth dying
for; but there is no suggestion that they saw the necessity to kill.
3.3.6. The Problem of Perfectionism
The danger with holiness-renewal movements throughout the history of the
Church is their tendency to Donatisrn, to justification by works and to world-denying
sectarianism. One reason that it seems appropriate to highlight the 'apostolic holiness'
emphasis of Hauerwas' approach is that criticisms cluster around these areas. One criticism
is that Hauerwas and Yoder's approach simply asks too much - simply makes Jesus'
commands too strenuous. Are we expected to be perfect?
Matthew 5:48, 'you must be teleioi, as your heavenly Father is teleios', has often
been seen as a summary of the Sermon on the Mount. It could be seen as the highpoint of
apostolic holiness. I shall briefly discuss three approaches to the implications of this verse
for Christian social ethics.
Yoder points out that perfectionist preachers have seen in this verse the promise
that sinlessness can be attained. More often, ethicists pointed to the verse to illustrate their
belief that the Sermon is an impossible ideal. Yoder finds fault with extra-biblical concepts
of perfection which see perfection as a condition without limitation or flaw or temptation.
In the light of 5:43 ('...who makes his sun rise on good and bad alike, and sends the rain on
the honest and dishonest...'), Yoder perceives a simple command that the disciples should
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not discriminate between friend and enemy, in and out, good and evil. He therefore
understands the command to be, Be ye indiscriminate'?"
Hauerwas' concern is with deontological approaches to perfection which result in
moral callousness and self-righteousness. If perfection resides more in the principle than in
the person, the result can be legalism. The meaning of absolute commands or ideals is
seldom unequivocal; and principles can conflict with each other. Deontological principles
tend to be negatively formulated: they can easily slip into a search for moral purity rather
than an expression of agape. Nonviolence is not simply a question of not taking life; it
requires positive action that respects life. Christian faith is not simply an ethical stance to
be kept consistent, or a set of rules not to be broken. This is not perfection.
Hauerwas' proposal is based on narrative. Christians seek perfection by imitating
God's way of dealing with the world, as set forth in the biblical narrative. Like Yoder,
Hauerwas is uninterested in any static, abstract notion of perfection. If God's perfection is
displayed in human form and in Israel and the Church, why should human perfection be
any different? Hauerwas has a highly pragmatic approach to doctrine: doctrines are tested
by the forms of community they produce. He therefore has little interest in a definition of
perfection that distracted from the indispensable commitment of the practising community.
Human perfection is thus a dynamic, embodied story: participation in the communion of
saints.
I contend, as I have already done at the end of chapter two, that the element
implicit but undeveloped in Hauerwas' and Yoder's understanding is an eschatological one.
'You must be teleioi...' implies in its very language 'you must be oriented toward the end'.
This is hinted at in the passage quoted from Yoder above, 'representing the divine order
now at hand...', and in Hauerwas' understanding of narrative. Being teleios resembles the
behaviour that coincides with a belief that the end of the story is as has been revealed in
the life, death and resurrection of Jesus - or, to use the shorthand of Yoder, the belief that
the cross is the meaning of history. The question is therefore neither 'How will this
situation turn out WI act in this way? nor 'Am I doing the "right" thing?. The question is
more one of 1-low does this practice enact and continue God's way of dealing with the
world?'.
261 J.H. Yoder The Politics of Jesus pp. 116-7 and p. 225.
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3.4. Unity and Catholicity
I have chosen to look at unity and catholicity under one heading since it is so often
difficult to separate them. In this area lie the principal criticisms of Hauerwas as a
sociological sectarian. In principle there are two forms of criticism: that Hauerwas
separates his brand of Christianity from other brands; and that he separates the Church
from the world, such that the Church withdraws from wider society. In practice these two
areas become one. No one expects that the unity of the Church will be achieved by one
theological ethicist. He is deeply conscious of the sin of Christian disunity, and of the way
it hampers Christian mission. Yet he is unusually well placed to embody the catholicity of
the Church, since he has taught and studied at both Roman Catholic and Protestant
foundations. In 1981 he described himself as
... a (Southern) Methodist of doubtful theological background (when you are a
Methodist it goes without saying you have a doubtful theological background); who
teaches and worships with and is sustained morally and financially by Roman Catholics;
who believes that the most nearly faithful form of Christian witness is best exemplified
by the often unjustly ignored people called anabaptists or Mennonites. In short my
ecclesial preference is to be a high-church Mennonite.262
He went on to say he writes 'not only for the church that does exist but also for the church
that should exist if we were more courageous and faithful'.263
Hauerwas has set out his stall in terms that I have described as apostolic. His
foundation lies not in the search for a categorical imperative or in an understanding of
natural law or in an assessment of likely consequences; it lies in faithfulness to the practice
of Jesus as revealed in the gospels. It has often been said that this makes him a
sectarian. 2" I have reviewed the epistemological dimensions of this criticism in chapter
two, here I shall concentrate on the sociological issues involved.
262Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of Character p. 6.
263ibid
264 5ee particularly James Gustafson The Sectarian Temptation: Reflections on Theology, the Church,
and the University Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society 40 1985 pp. 83-94, and Wilson D.
Miscamble 'Sectarian Passivism? Theology Today April 1987 pp. 69-77.
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A working definition of catholicity is provided by the Vincentian canon: quod
ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus. Hauerwas' notion of apostolicity, as I have
rendered it, puts apostolicity immediately in conflict with such a catholicity so defined. For
the ways the Church catholic responded to the conversion of the emperor and the
universalising thrust of the Enlightenment, among other developments, has weakened the
notion that the church should be other than a support to the state. It is this bland
catholicity that Hauerwas sets out to undermine. The catholicity with which he hopes to
replace it is one based on an apostolic holiness. However it is difficult to claim this as
catholic under the terms of the Vmcentian canon. Apostolic holiness has always been a
part of the catholic tradition; Hauerwas regards as especially patronising those suggestions
which imply it should simply remain one option among many.
3.4.1. Consequentialism
Perhaps Hauerwas' most powerful defence against charges of sectarianism is that
there have been so few criticisms of his biblical exegesis or doctrinal orthodoxy. In his
introduction to The Peaceable Kingdom Hauerwas readily acknowledges the influence of
the John Howard Yoder's work The Politics of Jesus. 265 It is significant that Yoder's book
was based on wide biblical scholarship - not on controversial new readings.'" In the
terminology I have adopted in this chapter therefore, criticisms of Hauerwas are not
criticisms of his reading of the apostolic witness. What then are they? This point has
caused Hauerwas some frustration:
265For an even more striking acknowledgement, see the start of James W. McClendon's Ethics:
Systematic Theology Volume One Nashville: Abingdon 1986, where McClendon says That book changed
my life' (p. 7).
266'Each of the chapters of the 1972 book vvas then a summary of the wide13r known scholarship of the
time. As New Testament scholarship it was popularization, not fresh research.' J.1-L Yoder The Politics of
Jesus Preface to the Second Edition p. vii (original italics).
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Show me where I am wrong about God, Jesus, the limits of liberalism, the nature of the
virtues, or the doctrine of the Church - but do not shortcut that task by calling me a
sect1li1ii.267
The point that Hauerwas is making is that his ethics is being rejected for
consequential reasons. It is not so much that his doctrine and exegesis are flawed, as that
they take us to a place where we do not wish to be. The criticism of Hauerwas is that he is
making too much of the mark of apostolicity, to the detriment of catholicity and unity.
This is where the heart of the argument lies. Whatever Hauerwas says about the apostolic
claims of the ethic he outlines, it is not what has been believed everywhere, always and by
everybody - or at least, not what has been practised everywhere, always and by
everybody. Hauerwas himself does not see this as a damaging criticism: for in every age
there have been people of character schooled in the scriptural narrative prepared to be
faithful in the manner Hauerwas describes.
The question of consequences is fundamentally an eschatological matter, as I shall
explain in chapter four. For the story which is told by the consequentialist, and results in
the conclusion that the Christian should take 'responsibility' for public life, is a story whose
ending is premature. Hauerwas' understanding of ethics is teleological, that is, oriented to
the end of the story, where the story is going, rather than in foreclosing the story by
determining all consequences.
In his more recent work, Hauerwas has come to an understanding that the
contrast between faithfulness and effectiveness is a caricature arising from the
shortcomings of the consequentialist perspective. How long a timescale does the
consequentialist envisage? How often do things turn out as their perpetrators expect? It is,
in the end unnecessary to have to choose between a faithfulness ethic and a principle ethic:
since both are different forms of a principle ethic. In the same way, the contrast between
pacifism and 'responsibility1 is a contrast between two different eschatologies.
The person who says, 'You must give up some of your scruples in order to be effective'.
is still saying that because the goal for the sake of which to be effective is in principle a
good goal. So the argument which takes the clothing of 'principles versus effectiveness'
really means this principle versus that principle. It really means that goal, for the sake of
which I want you to give up other scruples, is so overriding/y important that those other
things are less important. That's an ethic of principle. ... Likewise, the people who say
'You must simply be true to God' ... and let the heavens fall' ... really say that because of
a conviction about Providence, trusting that if the heavens fall God has another better
267 Stanley Hauerwas Christian Existence Today, : Essays on Church, Worlg and living in Between
Durham: Labyrinth 1988 p. 8.
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set of heavens ready, which is part of the process, so even that is not thumbing your nose
at results. It's trusting God who gave the rules to know more about the results than we
know. So I am increasingly convinced that the debate between the effectiveness ethic
and the principle ethic is a false detrile.268
What this quotation from Yoder shows is that consequentialist criticisms of the
ethic developed by Hauerwas are making ethical distinctions that are finally unsustainable.
Hauerwas' pacifism is founded on the sovereignty of God and on apostolic faithfulness to
the definitive practice of Jesus. There is no guarantee that a consequentialist calculation
would be more catholic.
3.4.2. Who is the Real Sectarian?
Hauerwas' response to claims that his ecclesiology is weak on unity and catholicity
is to say that the alternative to the Church is the nation state and if ever there were a sect,
the nation state is it. 'The closest approximation we have to a universal society is in fact
the church through its unwillingness to be captured by narrow national loyalties'.' This is
a bold claim for catholicity based on the rejection of 'Constantinianism'. Hauerwas calls the
kingdom 'God's international'.' Those who give their primary loyalty to the nation state
(for instance because it preserves democracy against totalitarianism) have the more reason
to be called sectarian-
since they are usually the ones that develop justifications for Christians in one country
killing Christians in another country on grounds of some value entailed by national
loyalties. Surely if any position deserves the name 'sectarian' it is this, since it qualifies
the unity of the church in the name of a loyalty other than that to the kingdom of God.
... What kind of unity is it that would have us eat at the same table to which we have
been invited by a crucified saviour only to be told at the end of the meal that the peace of
268.1.H. Yoder Christian Attitudes to War, Peace, and Revolution: A Companion to Bainton Elkhart
Indiana: Goshen 1983 pp. 436-437, quoted in Stanley Hauerwas 'Epilogue: A Pacifist Response to the
Bishops' in Paul Ramsey Speak Up for Just War or Pacifism: A Critique of the United Methodist Bishop's
Pastoral Letter 'In Defense of Creation' University Park: The Pennsylvania State Press 1988 p. 180. See
also Stanley Hauerwas and William Willimon Resident Aliens:Lifi in the Christian Colony Nashville:
Abingdon 1989 p. 4.6.
269Stanley Hauenvas 'Will the Real Sectarian Stand Up?' Theology Today April 1987p. 88.
219Stanley Hauenvas The Peaceable Kingdom p. 151.
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that table does not mean we cannot kill one another for the goods of the nations in
which we find ourselves living?271
Hauerwas thus faces the charge of disunity head on, by confronting the idolatry of
the nation state. What claims to be the voice of general well-being may be no more than
the voice of a particularly influential economic or political interest. It requires an
alternative conversation to give a different reading of what may otherwise be taken for
granted. The Church provides such an alternative conversation.
It is important for Hauerwas that the conversation should not take place in a
language defined only by the nation state. It is a common assumption that once Hauerwas
has adopted Christian pacifism he must correspondingly envisage the withdrawal of the
Christian community from political life. Hauerwas strenuously denies this assumption. He
points out that it presumes that to be involved in politics requires that one is prepared to
kill on behalf of the state. There is plenty of politics that does not require killing A further
underlying assumption is that all politics is in the end a cover for violence. For Hauerwas,
by contrast, it is the disavowal of violence that is the beginning of politics. Hauerwas
advocates not withdrawal but 'selective service': there are times when participation in
some aspects of education, law, or government will not be appropriate; but these times
will be determined by the political commitments of the community of character.
3.4.3. Unity and power
Underlying most of the scholarly discussion of the issue of social engagement in
this century has been an assumption that the language of the debate has been set by Ernst
Troeltsch and H. Richard Niebuhr. 272
 The rejection of their two typologies is the subtext
271 Stanley Hauerwas Against the Nations pp. 7, 128.
272Ernst Troeltsch The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches New York: Macmillan 1931 and
H.R Niebuhr Christ and Culture New York: Harper and Row 1951. In Christian Existence Today (p. 19
n. 2) Hauerwas quotes Troeltsch's definition of a sect: 'a voluntary society ... (who) live apart from the
world, are limited to small groups, emphasize the law instead of grace, and ... set up the Christian order,
based on love ... in preparation for the coming Kingdom of God' (The Social Teachings 11 993). For a
helpful discussion of the background to Weber, Troeltsch and Niebuhr, see Arne Rasmusson The Church
as Polls: From Political Theology to Theological Politics as Fremplified by Jurgen Aloltman and Stanley
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of Hauerwas' polemic. Troeltsch assumes the 'church type' is superior to the 'sect type';
Niebuhr assumes (in practice if not in theory) the superiority of the 'Christ the transformer
of culture' model. It is not at all clear that Troeltsch's binary typology is adequate to cover
the nuances of a host of different positions; while Niebuhr's study is uncritical of the term
'culture', which begs the question of what culture is, and whether it is ever in the
singular. 273
 Both of these come under what I have called Hauerwas' attack on a 'bland
catholicity' and restoration of an 'apostolic holiness'.
By being tied into the 'responsibility' model, what both Troeltsch and Niebuhr miss
is the subtle way that unity can be a construction imposed by the powerful. A key
dimension of an eschatological understanding of unity is that it sees unity as a gift from
God, not a static norm to be imposed. Hauerwas ties this insight into his thought by
referring to a telling distinction made by Michel de Certeau.
De Certeau distinguishes between 'strategies' and 'tactics'. A strategy is any
calculation (or manipulation) of power relationships that becomes possible as soon as a
subject that will empower (a business, an army, a city, a scientific institution) can be
isolated It postulates a place that can be delimited as its own and serve as the base from
which relations with an exteriority composed of targets or threats (customers or
competitors, enemies, the country surrounding the city, objectives and objects of
research etc.) can be managed As in management, every 'strategic' rationalisation seeks
first of all to distinguish its 'own place', that is, the place of its own power and wilL from
an 'environment'. A Cartesian attitude, if you wish: it is an effort to delimit one's own
place in a world bmitched by the invisible powers of the Other. It is also the typical
attitude of modern science, politics, and military strateu.274
Hauerwas follows this quotation with an observation which sums up my argument
in this chapter. 'Strategy provides for a triumph of place over time insofar as it allows one
Hauerwas Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 1994 pp. 231-245; for a critique, see John
Milbank Theology and Social Theory pp. 75-143.
273 See Duane Friesen 'Normative Factors in Troeltsch's Typology of Religious Association' Journal of
Religious Ethics 3/2 Fall 1975 pp. 271-283. If Yoder can come up with seventeen varieties of religious
pacifism, one might look for more subtleties in the larger area of relationship of Church and 'society. See
J.H. Yoder Nevertheless: Varieties of Religious Pacifism Scottdale Pa: Herald 1992. In Resident Aliens
(pp. 39-47) Hauerwas and Willimon refer to Yoder's more helpful threefold typology of the activist church
(religiously glorified liberalism), the comwsionist church (oriented inward and thus religiousl) -glorified
conservatism) and the confessing church (determined to worship Christ in all things). See J.H. Yoder 'A
People in the World: Theological Interpretation' in ed. James Leo Garrett jr, The Concept of the Believers'
Church Scoudale: Herald 1969 pp. 252-283.
274Michel de Certeau The Practice of Everyday We translated by Stephen Rendall Berkley University
of California Press 1988 pp. 35-36, quoted in Stanley Hauerwas After Christendom pp. 16-17. (Original
italics.)
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to acquire advantages, to prepare for future expansions, and in general to create an
independence against contingency'. 2" The key to Hauerwas' defence against charges of
sectarianism lies here. Hauerwas enjoys expressions such as 'outside the church there is no
salvation'. 276 To his detractors this sounds like downright sectarianism. But this would
only be true Win his understanding the Church had a 'strategy'. Hauerwas maintains that on
the contrary it is the Constantinian version of the Church that adopts a 'strategy',
demarcating a world in which it is safe.
The Church that Hauerwas describes does not have that kind of power. Instead, it
adopts a 'tactic'. A tactic, according to de Certeau, is a
calculated action determined by the absence of a proper locus. No delineation of
exteriority, then, provides it with the conditions necessary for autonomy. The space of a
tactic is the space of the other, thus it must play on and with the terrain imposed on it
and organised by the law of a forcign power.2''
Hauerwas explains how a tactic does not form a general strategy: it makes ad hoc
engagements and must take advantage of such opportunities that arise. It has no 'base
where it can build up stockpiles for the next battle'. It is always on the hoof - at best a
resident alien. The tactic is 'the art of the weak'.
Once the Church's social ethic is seen as tactic rather than strategy, the concept of
withdrawal becomes meaningless. Whither is the Church to withdraw? There is no safe
place, no citadel, no barricade to patrol. The Church is always occupying 'the space of the
other'. In this regard the subtitles of two of Hauerwas' books - 'Church, World and Living
in Between' and 'Life in the Christian Colony1 are unfortunate. Such phrases only suggest
that Hauerwas is a sectarian after all, because they imply a separate space. More in
keeping is the subtitle of his 'Unleashing the Scripture' - 'Freeing the Bible from Captivity
to America'.
Thus the argument is that it is the Constaminian Church, rather than the
community of character, that is sectarian. The Constantinian Church, like an army, marks
Out a territory that it can defend, considers the exterior in terms of targets and threats, and
then makes forays across the boundary. I would add to Hauerwas' discussion that the
2 " 5 Stanley Hauerwas After Christendom p. 17,
276See for example After Christendom chapter one.
277Quoted in ibid pp.17-18.
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community of character inhabits not a different space but a different time. This different
time arises from the eschatological perspective, which I shall discuss in chapter four.
3.4.4. Detachment better serves the world
George Lindbeck picks up a theme dear to the heart of Yoder when he points out
that the Church gains little by pursuing relevance for its own sake.
Religious communities are likely to be practically relevant in the long run to the degree
that they do not first ask what is practical or relevant, but instead concentrate on their
ova nitrate:qua] outlooks and forms of life. ... A religious community's salvation is not
by works ... and yet good works of unforeseeable kinds flow from faithfulness. It was
thus, rather than by intentional effort, that biblical religion helped produce democracy
and science ...; and it is in similarly unimaginable and unplanned ways, if at all, that
biblical religion will help save the world ... from the demonic corruptions of these same
values."8
Hauerwas has no hesitation in asserting the positive role of Christians within the
public realm. This does not compromise the 'Church being itself: for the Church seeks
service rather than dominion. Therefore the Church does society an important service by
being a community capable of developing people of virtue. One does not have to have an
Aristotelian notion of political life to regard it as important that at least some citizens be
people of robust moral character. Hauerwas insists that any society will gain by honouring
honour.
One of the chief virtues of the community is to preserve a language of discourse
that enables imaginative approaches to ethical enquiry to be sustained. 'Christians should
... provide imaginative alternatives for social policy as they are released from the
"necessities" of those who would control the world in the name of security'. 279 I shall
develop this theme of imagination in chapter five. Here it will be enough to say that the
false unity of the nation state may tend to impose a false 'realism' which suggests that there
is no alternative to the necessary course of events. It is the peaceable practice of the
218George Lindbeck The Nature of Doctrine p. 128. In its theme and its place in the book, this
paragraph appears to be a gesture toward the last paragraph of Alasdair MacIntyre's Alter 1 irtue.
219Stanley Hauerwas A Community of Character p. 11.
131
kingdom that pictures a world that does not have to be this way, and makes possible a
resistance to this naturalistic fallacy.
Michael Quirk points out that Hauerwas is related to the tradition of civic
republicanism revived by Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sande!, Michael Walzer and
Charles Taylor. As Quirk notes, Hauerwas parts company with this movement insofar as
its roots are humanist rather than Christian. 280 The litmus test tends to be that of violence.
To the extent that the state demands that Christians commit violent acts to further its
policy, the Church will be deeply suspicious of the state. Upto that point, Hauerwas and
the civic republicans have much in common.
3.4.5. Pacifism demands politics
If one were to summarise Hauerwas' discontent with charges of advocating
withdrawal from political life, one would hear him asking the question, 'If one has
renounced violence, how is one to resolve disputes without politics?'. Politics is not
excluded by Hauerwas' ethics; it is positively demanded by his requirement that Christians
ask 1-low can I be a reconciling presence in the life of my neighbour?4.
Hauerwas is adamant that what society needs is not theories of justice or theories
of the state. What is required is people prepared to be formed with the virtue of justice by
being shaped by the practices of a characterful community - not a disembodied theory
which can be applied in all situations and attempts to bypass the need for community.
Here, if anywhere, is Hauerwas' common ground with the civic republicans. If, as society
fragments, politics is not preserved in the Church, where else are civic republicans to look
in search of an embodiment of the justice they seek? It is perhaps Hauerwas' chief
frustration with the United States of America that many of its constitutionalists have
assumed that the place to begin social formation is with an understanding of rationality
and a blank sheet of paper. The Church and the Jews have millennia of reconciling
28°Michae1 J. Quirk 'Beyond Sectarianism?' Theology Today April 1987 pp. 78-79.
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experience upon which to draw: and if civic republicans learn from their practices they
may avoid repeating some of their failures.
Hauerwas is not interested in the Church providing a blueprint for secular society.
He welcomes 1VIilbank's demonstration of the centrality of particularity to Christian
witness. Milbank shows how positivist and dialectical social sciences tried to replace
Christianity's inherent dependence upon particular revelation by establishing universals.
But these universals were inevitably founded on their own metaphysic. Milbank relates
how in the postmodern era an apparently infinite number of discourses claim to represent
humanity: universality can do no more than take its place among them. 2" Christian moral
judgements are related to regeneration, to forgiveness, to the church, to Christian hope:
they cannot simply be moralised into a blueprint for a non-Christian society.
Because the Church claims no special insight into the general form of the good
society, its witness will always be expressed in specific criticisms and suggestions,
addressing particular injustices at a given time and place. There is no level to which the
state could rise beyond which the Christian critique would have nothing more to ask. The
Church should not attempt to speak on every matter that arises: only when it is engaging
with the problem itself; and when it has something to say.
3.4.6. Summary
This discussion on the marks of unity and catholicity in Hauerwas' understanding
of the Church has focused on the issue of whether he can be described as a sociological
sectarian. Hauerwas addresses the issue with scepticism about the terminology generally
used in the debate. With the aid of Yoder's analyses he convincingly demonstrates that
supposed dichotomies, such as that between faithfulness and effectiveness, are false ones.
De Certeau's distinction between strategy and tactic makes clear that withdrawal is simply
inconceivable for the Church. Hauerwas goes on to demonstrate that the Church serves
the world best by having something distinct to say and embodying its own practices. A
281 John Milbank Theology and Social Theory p. 260.
133
Church which does not do so conforms instead to the sectarianism of the nation state.
Chief among the practices of the Church is the kind of politics indispensable for those who
have renounced violence and yet wish to be reconcilers. Only when such starting points
are acknowledged is the imagination released to become a significant factor in ethical
polity.
As Hauerwas himself points out, subtleties tend to be early casualties in debates of
this kind. The distinct community Hauerwas envisages is not a matter of the all-or-nothing
decision between responsibility or withdrawal. Hauerwas simply recommends 'selective
participation'. The emphasis on the decision between 'realism' and the 'sect' would lead
back to a decisionism that Hauerwas began his career by debunking.
When all Hauerwas' arguments are acknowledged, it remains true that he has a
case to answer. He goes much of the way to answering it himself. In his later work he
opens the direction in which further answers are to be found. There remains a tendency to
use spatial metaphors about the 'territory' occupied by Church and world.' Yet
Hauerwas is deeply aware that in addition to their membership of the Church, Christians
will and should always be members of other communities. Hauerwas is proud not just of
his faith community, but also of his state, country, and baseball tearn.2" Their stories are
woven together and inform each other.
It is the spatial metaphors that tinge Hauerwas' thought with the colour of
sectarianism. In chapter four I hope to show that the significant distinctions between
Church and world are not of space but of time. For as long as Hauerwas continues to be
attracted to spatial metaphors, he fails to throw off the last traces of the charge of
sectarianism. But these are only traces.
282For
 example the title of his 1994 work Dispatches from the Front.
283 Stariley Flauerwas 'A Tale of Two Stories: On Being a Christian and a Texan' Christian Existence
Today pp. 25-46. Note that the subtitle of this book refers to 'living in between' Church and world -
another spatial metaphor.
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3.5. Christian Nonviolence: A Test Case
3.5.1. Introduction: Le Chambon-sur-Lignon
In his book Lest Innocent Blood Be Shed Philip Hallie tells the story of how the
people of the village of Le Chambon-sur-Lignon in the south of France resisted the Nazis
during the years 1940-1944. 2" The story is more thoroughly documented in a large
collection of papers edited locally by Pierre Bolle.' The area was controlled first by the
Vichy government and gradually more directly by the Nazis, but the leaders of the village
community got it into their heads that they were going to do all they could to provide a
safe haven for Jews and other refugees fleeing from central Europe. Gradually during
1941 and 1942 it became known that this village called Le Charnbon was a place where
Jews would be protected, often being put up in boarding houses and private homes and
farms away up in the hills and mountains above the village. From time to time groups were
spirited away across the 200 miles to safety in Switzerland. The Nail army and the French
police knew what the villagers were up to, and often raided houses in the village, but only
very seldom found any refugees stored away. Somehow the bush telegraph almost always
beat them to it, and the refugees hid in the mountains for a few days until the coast was
clear. Hallie describes the story of Le Chambon in these years as 'a kitchen struggle, a
battle between a community of intimates and a vast, surrounding world of violence,
betrayal and indifference.'286
I propose to examine some of the features of this story as Hallie tells it, in order to
illuminate the more abstract foregoing discussion Hallie is not a Christian, and Hauerwas'
284.-. .pFnui Hallie Lest Innocent Blood Be Shed: The Story of the Village of Le Chambon-sur Lignon and
How Goodness Happened There London: Michael Joseph 1979. Stanley Hauemas refers to this WOrk in
Against the Nations pp. 87-88 n. 37.
285Pierre Bolle ed Le Plateau Vivarais-Lignon: Accueil et Resistance 1939-1944 Le Charnbon-sur-
Lignon: Societe d'Histoire de la Montagne 1992.
286Philip Bailie Lest Innocent Blood Be Shed p. 57.
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mention of the book is concerned largely with pointing out how little Hallie understands
the theological grounds of the nonviolence of the leaders in Le Chambon. 2" But this
drawback is simply an invitation to concentrate on what Hallie relates of the facts of the
story, without dwelling too much on his analysis. I shall take several themes of Hauerwas'
ethics and look at the Le Chambon story in their light.
3.5.2. The Practices of a Community are formed by a Narrative
Integral to the self-understanding of the village of Le Chambon was the fact that
more than two-thirds of its three thousand residents were Protestants in a country where
Protestants formed perhaps one per cent of the population. Their ancestors had survived
through three centuries of persecution, often losing their property, their liberty, or their
lives; worship had to be conducted in darkened homes or secluded fields or woods.
Pastors and people had been burned in Le Charnbon since the sixteenth century. The
population had remained remarkably stable: the thousand refugees who arrived after the
Edict of Nantes was revoked in 1685 had long been assimilated. History was very much
alive in the mind.
Centuries of persecution left among Protestants a tradition of resistance to the law
of the land and devotion to their pastors who maintained their solidarity. Le Chambon's
response to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes came not in battle but in
the devices peculiar to mountain people: silence, cunning and secrecy ... they resisted by
quietly refusing to abjure their faith, and by quietly conducting their senices in
meadows within the pine forests ... This was ... the resistance of exile.288
This tradition was written on the hearts of even those on the fringes of the congregational
life of Le Chambon. Hallie records a conversation with a daughter of a woman who had
run a boarding house which hid Jewish girls. Resistance came by habit:
One of the Marion daughters said 'What they were asking us to do was very much like
what the Protestants have done in France ever since the Reformation. Pastors were
287 Stanley Hauerwas Against the Nations pp. 87-88 n. 37.
...p
mutt Hallie Lest Innocent Blood Be Shed p. 167.
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hidden here in Le Chambon from the sixteenth century through the period of the 'desert'
in the eighteenth century.'289
This quotation vividly expresses what Hauerwas means by a community being formed by
a narrative.
In his sermons, the pastor, Andre Trocme emphasised that the community were
continuing part, not only of the protestant narrative, but of the narrative of the Jews in
exile. As early as March 1939 he took as his text for a sermon Deuteronomy 10:19 - 'And
you are to love those who are aliens (etrangers), for you yourselves were aliens in Egypt'.
At Christmas 1942 he recalls a town in Samaria where an old lady gave everything she had
to a Jewish couple hunted by Herod (whom he equates with Petain) and Archelaus (whom
he equates with Laval, the head of the police). Her generosity inspired others, and the
town became known as the most hospitable in Samaria.29°
3.5.3. The narrative of Jesus reveals God's way with the world
Faithfulness to the narrative of Jesus is what I have in this chapter described as
'apostolicity'. In Hallie's description, the faithfulness of the community as a whole is not
described at length. The account concentrates on the thinking of the pastor, Andre
Trocme. Hallie associates his nonviolence primarily with a personal journey in which he
recognised the precious character of human life. Hauerwas points out the humanism of
Hallie's account, and quotes from Trocrne's own Jesus and the Nonviolent Revolution to
broaden the picture of Trocme's theological position. Trocme's view that Jesus had
inaugurated a social revolution based on the jubilee year was influential on John Howard
Yoder's The Politics of Jesus. Trocme understands nonviolence as related to the delay of
the coming kingdom granted to humanity because of Jesus' sacrifice.'
2891bid 
p. 1 79.
290Francois Boulet 'L'Attitude Spirituelle des Protestants devant les Jiffs Refugies' in Pierre Bone ed. Le
Plateau livarais-Lignon pp. 402-4.
291 Andre Trocine Jesus and the Nonviolent Revolution Scottdale: Herald 1973.
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Notwithstanding Hauerwas' criticisms, Hallie outlines the key dimensions of
Trocme's 'apostolic' nonviolence. In a passage very similar to some of Yoder's arguments,
Hallie quotes Trocme's words to a men's circle meeting:
If Jesus really wallced upon this earth, why do we keep treating him as if he were a
disembodied, impossibly idealistic ethical theory? ... If he existed God has shcrwn us in
flesh-and-blood what goodness is for flesh-and-blood pcople.292
Bailie describes Trocme's desire to be with and imitate and obey Jesus, like the obedience
of a lover to his beloved. 'Jesus was for Trocme the embodied forgiveness of sins, and
staying close to Jesus meant always being ready to forgive your enemies instead of
torturing and killing them.' Hallie mentions later that nonviolence gives the enemy an
opportunity to repent, whereas killing the enemy leaves no time to do S0.293
3.5.4. Virtue arises more through habit than through decision
Hallie begins his narrative with the arrest of the leaders of Le Chambon in
February 1943. During the arrest comes an incident which demonstrates the way the
practices of a community make nonviolence a matter of habit and instinct rather than
decision. It exemplifies Hauerwas' insistence that the ethics of a community are more
about what all its members take for granted than about what an individual may decide to
do by consulting a moral law or assessing likely consequences. When the police arrived to
arrest Andre Trocme, and sat in the dining room awaiting his return with a suitcase,
Magda Trocrne invited the two policemen to dine with them. This was despite the
presence in the house of refugee Jews, concealed upstairs. When asked by Hallie how she
could be so magnanimous to men who were there to take her husband away, perhaps to
his death, she replied It was dinnertime ... the food was ready. What do you mean by such
292P/imp Hallie Lest Innocent Blood Be Shed p. 68.
291Ibid pp. 161, 34, 220. Consider Yoder's discussion of the ethics of killing someone who \NUS
attacking a third party: To keep out of heaven temporarily someone who wants to go there ultimately
anyway, I would consign to hell immediately someone whom I am in the world to save.' IR Yoder //hat
Would You Do? Scottdale: Herald 1992 p. 40.
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foolish words as "forgiving" and "decent"?' Hallie sums up the general attitude of the
Chambonnais to what they did in these years:
'How can you call us "good"? We were doing what had to be done. Who else could help
them? And what has all this to do with goodness? Things had to be done, that's all, and
we happened to be there to do them. You must understand that it was the most natural
thing in the world to help these people.'294
The villagers of Le Chambon did not decide that the village was to become a
haven for refugees. They did not cast themselves in the role of rescuers. They simply
found themselves incapable of turning refugees away. It was in the process of caring for
the refugees that they realised how dangerous was their guests' position. If the Gestapo
could kill an unarmed person for protecting a refugee, what would they do to the refugees
themselves? Gradually the villagers took on increasing danger and increasing hunger in
addition to the hardships of the Occupation. Eventually Andre Trocme established a more
formal scheme in some of the houses funded by the Quakers from Marseilles - but this was
not a 'decision', so much as an extension of what was already taken for granted.
3.5.5. The community is open to luck, surprise and the stranger
One of Yoder's emphases in discussing issues of nonviolence is the importance of
considering luck, surprise and accident. Things seldom turn out as predicted, especially
when the prediction entails the wholesome fruit to be borne by violence:
By assuming that it is my business to prevent or bring judgement upon evil, I authorise
myself to close the door upon the possibilities of reconciling and healing. When I take it
into my mil hands to guarantee that events will not him out in a way that is painful or
disadvantageous to me, I close off the live possibilities of reconciliation which might
have been let loose in the world.295
294Philip Hallie Lest Innocent Blood Be Shed pp. 196-7.
2951H. Yoder iihat Would You Do? pp. 31-32. The consequentialist negotiation tends to leave no room
for providence by assuming that history is our slave. Providence, for Yoder, 'designates the conviction that
the events of history are under control in ways that are beyond both our discerning and our manipulating,
although their pattern may occasionally be perceived by the prophet, and will later be celebrated by the
community,' (ibid p. 35).
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Hallie's account contains a remarkable incident which bears this out. After the
three leaders were arrested, they were taken to the internment camp of Saint-Paul
d'Eyjeaux near Limoges. After a month, they were offered release on condition that they
sign a promise to obey without question the orders of Marshal Petain's government.
Trocme and Edouard Theis refused to sign, to the consternation of fellow inmates who
recommended they be 'a skunk with the skunks'. The following morning, to everyone's
amazement, they were released on the orders of the prime minister of France - no one has
discovered why. Days later the other prisoners were deported to labour and concentration
camps in Poland and Silesia, where few survived.
Another characteristic story concerns the churchwarden Amelie who refused to
ring the church bells to mark the anniversary of the Legion Francaise des Combattants,
later to become the Mlice. Challenged by two women who tied to do it Themselves, she
bravely defended the church and was rescued by a downpour which drove the women
away. 296
The unexpected was common and essential to the life of the village. It came most
frequently in the form of the stranger. Several times in Hallie's account the stranger
disturbs and reveals the truth to the community. It is a German soldier during the First
War who convinces the young Frenchman Trocme that it was possible and necessary not
to carry weapons. It is the strange policemen who receive the presbytery's hospitality. It is
a young Jewish girl knocking on the door of the pastor's house who elicits the response
from Magda Trocme 'Naturally, come in, and come in'. It is this response which Hallie
takes to sum up the whole character of the village; and in the conclusion of his book, it
appears that Hallie himself has become this stranger. The fact that the stranger may be the
bringer of the gospel is underlined by the strangeness of Trocme himself from a bourgeois
family, educated in Paris, married to an Italian, yet acting as the yeast to a fanning
cornmunity.297
296Georges Menut 'Andre Troerne, im Violent Vaineu par Dieu' in Pierre Bolle ed. Le Plateau
ivarais-Lignan p. 398.
297 ibid p. 399.
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3.5.6. Christian nonviolence provokes and demands imagination
Throughout the period described by Hallie, the initiative lay with the occupying
power. The villagers were not in control of the situation; they could only survive by day-
to-day responses to moves from the powerful. They were therefore not in a position to
calculate likely outcomes in a c,onsequentialist way. Andre Trocme described predictions
in such circumstances as 'a refuge for cowards'. 298 The position corresponds to de
Certeau's distinction between strategies and tactics. The villagers were in no position to
contemplate a strategy; they had no safe space from which to make forays into 'enemy'
territory. They had to manage a tactic, constantly adapting to initiatives coming from
others.
Hallie records how Trocme had learned from his time as a soldier with the French
army in Morocco in 1921. 299 This taught him that it was no use professing a commitment
to nonviolence half-way through a campaign. The conviction had to be embodied from the
word go. This required a whole change of heart, rather than a temporary change in
strategy. It stimulated the imagination to find ways of living peaceably. Trocme met
weekly with the key members of the village. In these meetings they evolved 'practical
plans for overcoming evil with good': 'nonviolence was not a theory superimposed upon
reality; it was an itinerary that we explored day after day in communal prayer and in
obedience to the commands of the Spirit.'m
Nonviolence goes beyond violence, and allows us to create new situations. It brings
hope by inventing ways of breaking through the deadlock the world finds itself in It
creates unshakeable hope. It will no doubt be a long road which will demand patience as
new ways are grad' lally invented day by day.301
298Phi1ip Hallie Lest Innocent Blood Be Shed p. 285.
2"ibid p. 92.
300ibid p. 173. My italics.
1 Jacques Martin 'La Nonviolence, une Question a Notre Temps' in Pierre Bolle Le Plateau VivarcUs-
Lignon p. 377.
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3.5.7. Summary
Philip Hallie's account of Le Chambon-sur-Lignon demonstrates the claims and
the issues at stake in Hauerwas' approach. There is no question of withdrawal: the
community of character is surrounded. A history of dealing with minority status illustrates
the significance of narrative in forming the virtues of a people. It is crucial that this
community regarded Jesus as God's definitive ethical embodiment, not as merely an
abstract ideal or pious principle. Once the commitment to nonviolence had been made,
moments of decision did not disappear but were subservient - they explored the itinerary
of nonviolence and demanded imaginative responses from those involved in protecting
Jews. There was no rejection of politics: rather, constant wheeling and dealing was the
rule in order to keep the community alive.
The drawbacks are equally clear. Although there is no question of withdrawal, Le
Chambon is a geographically isolated community made up largely of one oppressed
denomination. Once again, it proves very difficult to avoid spatial conceptions in
describing the community of character. And on the question of catholicity, there remains
the abiding question of why the wider Church did not act in the way the Le Chambonnais
pioneered. Hauerwas' answer to this would no doubt be that this is a question for the
wider Church, not for the heroic people of Le Charnbon. To echo Yoder's words, the
question is not 'what if everyone were to act in this way?', but 'What if no one acted in this
way, but we did?'.
3.6. Conclusion
Stanley Hauerwas' description of Christian ethics emphasizes what might be called
'apostolic holiness'. This is wholly consistent with his claims (discussed in chapters one and
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two), that what kind of person one is has more significance than what one 'should' do, that
virtue implies and demands a narrative, and that the 'Christian story' reveals God's way of
dealing with the world. The 'holiness' dimension is broadly covered by Hauerwas' work on
virtue - concentrating on the doctrine of the communion of saints - and the 'apostolic'
dimension is covered by the role of narrative, particularly the way the community
recognise that the story of Jesus has become their story.
The chief criticisms of Hauerwas are that this is not what is and has been believed
by the majority of Christians (the 'catholicity' question), and that the apostolic holiness
emphasis implies a sectarian community (the 'unity' question). Hauerwas makes several
robust and imaginative responses to these criticisms. Underlying his responses is a
challenge to the conventional assumptions of the power and influence of the Church. I
have suggested that his argument is the weaker for his tendency to use spatial metaphors
('colony', 'living between church and world'); in chapter four I shall examine how the
eschatological distinction between Church and world is better expressed in the language of
time.
Hauerwas' strongest argument against those who assume his advocacy of
nonviolence is sectarian is that the Church requires and embodies a different form of
politics. The reason why his response to the charge of sectarianism has not been
completely convincing is that he has not yet fully displayed what he expects the politics of
the Church to be. Much of his work amply demonstrates that the Church needs a politics,
but with some exceptions this has not been mapped out in detail. He has shown
convincingly that 'withdrawal' is a meaningless term to describe his approach. I suggest the
underdeveloped regions lie less in how Christians relate to the world than in how they
relate to each other. The question is less about the sanctity of the Cominunio scoictorum,
but more about in what resides their communion. Perhaps the weakness of Methodism's
sacramental tradition lets Hauerwas down here.
Hauerwas' reluctance to be specific about the politics of the Church is
understandable, given his misgivings about providing an ethical blueprint. Nothing can
substitute for the actual practices of a community. What Hauerwas does do is to move
towards telling the stories of those who have been part of communities of character. The
community of Le Chambon-sur-Lignon is one such community (although Hauerwas
mentions it only in a footnote). By telling the story of Le Chambon, I hope to have shown
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the strengths and weaknesses of Hauerwas' politics. The Le Charnbon story in some ways
confirms the more friendly criticisms of Hauerwas' approach: for it is realised in the story
of an isolated village in a minority denomination in a time of crisis. Nonetheless, this
heroic story shows that what Hauerwas commends can be done, has been done, and does
produce people of virtue.
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The Description of Time:
The Ethics of the End
4.1. The Shape of the Christian Narrative:
Why Ethics Needs an End
In the first chapter I argued that character is more significant than decision in the
practice of Christian ethics. In the course of the chapter I made two claims which formed
the substance of the next two chapters. In chapter two I took up the claim that character
implies and demands a narrative. I discussed the strengths and weaknesses of intratextual
narrative theology, and concluded that the debate would be greatly aided were narrative
theologians to pay more attention to the ending of the Christian story. In chapter three I
took up the claim that the Church - the communion of saints - is the final cause of
Christian ethics. I considered whether Stanley Hauerwas' nonviolent approach made him
sectarian, and I concluded that his approach to the Church would be clarified if one
perceived the Church as inhabiting a new time, rather than a new space.
In this chapter I shall develop the conclusions reached in the two previous
chapters. I shall concentrate on the new time that the Church inhabits and on the
perception of the end which the Church sustains. In short, I shall examine the bearing of
eschatology upon Christian ethics.
Since eschatology has a low profile in most ethical discussion, I shall begin with a
discussion of why an eschatological perspective is necessary. This involves a discussion of
how eschatology relates to the Church's understanding of creation and salvation. I shall go
on to examine what it means to say the Church lives in a new time, and what perceptions
derive from this perspective. As with the other chapters, I conclude with a practical
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example - in this case the example of eschatological practice most often quoted by
Hauerwas: having children.
The philosophical argument against eschatology generally assumes that the biblical
notion of eschatology is incomprehensible given the 'modern world view'. A great part of
the Old Testament, and almost all of the New, were written by people who anticipated an
end to history: many of them assumed the end was imminent. Their understanding that the
world had an end corresponded with their belief that it had a beginning. Whereas life
continually subverts efforts to bind it in meaningful segments - proceeding on through
crises, climaxes, and deaths, full of unanticipated events and unforeseen consequences -
most of the Bible construes existence in terms of a coherent story. Crucial to rendering life
meaningful and endurable is the sense of an end to which all is tending, an end
commensurate with the rights and wrongs of this present existence, in which abiding
issues are resolved, so that judgement and assessment can be made, and a plot discerned in
the sequence of events. An end provides a necessary perspective for continuing life in this
world.
Yet the language in which the Biblical writers explore eschatology is strange and
confusing to the critical mind of most contemporary Western readers. It is not at all clear
which of the events described are to be taken literally and which figuratively. Rudolf
Bultrnann famously expressed the view that the one who used the electric light switch
could no longer believe in the three-decker universe presupposed by biblical
eschatology. 302
Leaving aside the questions of definition begged by a term such as 'modern world
view, the force of this argument must be recognised. The otherness of the biblical world is
profound and far-reaching. That said, one may also wonder whether eschatology is unique
among the Biblical material in causing offence to the liberal scientific conscience.
Prophecy, healing, authority, nature miracles, Satan: to varying degrees all of these sit
uncomfortably with Bultmann's electric light switch. One may, indeed, like Bultmann,
undertake a thoroughgoing restatement of the gospel in non-'mythological' terms; failing
that, however, it is arbitrary to excise the explicitly eschatological material alone. If we do
3°2Rudolf Bultrnann 'New Testament and Mythology in H.-W. Bartsch ed. Kerygma and Myth: A
Theological Debate (translated by RR Fuller) London: S.P.C.K. 1972 p. 5.
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so, as Hauerwas points out, we are left with a collection of baffling commands which
seem impractical and burdensome."' It may require the life of a community which
structures its behaviour around what it knows of the telos and eschaton of the world to
give the commands of Matthew 5-7 and elsewhere their proper context: in the absence of
such an eschatological interpretation, the commands seem strange and ominous.
Eschatology is therefore essential if the Church is to do justice to the New
Testament witness. It is also essential if one is to follow the narrative character of
Christian ethics. Maclntyre affirms the indispensability of teleology when he says there
is no present which is not infonned by some image of some future and an image of the
future which always presents itself in the form of a telos - or a variety of ends or goals -
towards which we are either moving or failing to move in the present.304
MacIrityre sees human life as a narrative quest - a journey directed toward a determinate
goal. As one journeys, one learns about the goal one seeks and also about oneself
For the Church, the telos is formed by Christians' perception of the eschaton. It is
the sense of an end to the story that makes it possible to speak of a story at all. The
Church learns about its hope by seeking it. It seeks, or quests, by embodying its belief in
God's sovereignty in the way it structures its own life and acts in the world.
The great failure of so many consequentialist approaches to Christian ethics is that
they have a highly premature notion of the end of the story they tell. They also tend to
suppose that that end will be brought about by the actions under review. Christian
theology demands that the story told be the story that stretches from creation to eschaton,
and that the centre of that story be not the acting subject but the sovereign God.
Eschatological ethics are an affirmation that God has (as well as is) the last Word.
303 Stanley Hauerwas and William Willimon Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony p. 90.
304Alasdair MacIntyre After 1 irtue Second Edition p.216.
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4.2. How Eschatology Relates to the
Christian Narrative
The theological issues concerning the place of eschatology in relation to Christian
ethics can be distinguished into two: how eschatology relates to creation, and how
eschatology relates to salvation.
4.2.1. Creation and Eschatology
There is an abiding danger among those who write about Christian ethics that a
split will emerge between those who incline to 'creation ethics' and those who demand
'kingdom ethics'. The tendency of the former is to concentrate on the created order, often
in terms of natural law, to the neglect of salvation and eschatology. Stanley Hauerwas is in
no danger of falling into this former camp. He has, however, been accused of a world-
denying tenor, hand-in-hand with suggestions of sectarianism, deriving from his refusal to
do 'ethics for everybody'. This is how he explains his position, in a somewhat rare
explicitly eschatological passage:
Those who emphasize apoca/yptk often are accused, of course, of failing to do justice to
God as creator. Despite the apparent centrality of creation to Christian faith, as actually
employed, creation talk often serves as a means for the domestication of the Gospel.
Appeals to creation are meant to suggest that all people, Christian or not, share
fundamental moral commitments that can provide a basis for common action. These
appeals to creation too often amount to legitimating strategies for the principalities and
powers that determine our lives. This type of creation talk is fundamentally false to the
biblical profession of faith in the Lord of creation because it implicitly underwrites the
lordship of the principalities and powers 305
In this scepticism about using a 'doctrine of creation' for ethics Hauerwas has been
much influenced by John Howard Yoder. 306 It has brought Hauerwas into conflict with
305 Stanley Hauerwas Dispatches from the Front p. 111.
306The following passage is a virtuoso display of Yoderian polemic: 'Historical study shows that it has
been possible to understand under "order of nature" just about anything a philosopher wanted stoicism or
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those, such as Oliver ODonovan, who have sought to mediate between 'creation ethics'
and 'kingdom ethics'. Hauerwas criticises ODonovan for using resurrection as a way of
bringing creation and natural law in by the back door.
I fear such appeals to order, and the correlative confessions in God's creation that
sustain them, because I do not believe such order is knowable apart from cross and
resurrection. O'Donovan seeks an account of natural law that is not governed by the
eschatological witness of Christ's resurrection. We cannot write about Resurrection and
Moral Order because any order we know as Christians is resurrection.3m
In reply °Donovan doubts whether Hauerwas has a view of the resurrection
which sufficiently differentiates it from the crucifixion. To some extent °Donovan misses
the point here, because Hauerwas is talking of the resurrection as an eschatological
witness, rather than more narrowly of an event tied to Jesus' death. Yet °Donovan is
perceptive in pointing out Hauerwas' increasing 'tendency to privilege the crucifixion over
other moments of the Christ-event, in keeping with an emphasis on martyrdom and death
as the normative expression of Christian witness'. 3" What O'Donovan does not point out,
but is implicit in his criticism, is that by over-emphasising the cross and underplaying
epicureanism, creative evolution or political restorationism, Puritan democracy or Aryan dictatorship. ...
"Nature" may be the struggle of the species for survival; it may be the existing social order in its interplay
of hierarchies and pow er claims; or, on the other hand, it may be the essence of a person or thing that he is
called to become. The word thus includes two different scales of variability, when nature is understood to
mean a quasi-platonic essence, distinct from what things appear to do, we have the whole gamut of ideals
R hic h have not yet been actualized in experience: if, on the other hand, by nature we understand "things as
they are", we must deal with the entire scale of empirical realities. The conviction_ almost universally
shared, that nature is a reliable source of knowable and binding ethical norms rests on failure to clarify
either the content which it claims to have proved or the truth claims which it presupposes.' (John Howard
Yoder The Christian il'imess to the State Newton, Kansas: Faith and Life Press 1964 pp. 33, 82).
This is a devastating critique of natural law foluidationalism. Yoder goes on to say that we may
be able to establish the structures of 'things as they are' - this is the aim of 'natural' science - but this
structure cannot be a critique or a moral imperative. Alternatively we may be able to understand The nature
of things' as some sort of philosophical essence to be distinguished from things as they are - this could be a
moral imperative, but it gives up any claim to be empirically ascertained from nature; moreover for a
Christian this essenrialict approach must justify itself since it is foreign to the historical thrust of the
Biblical revelation.
The 'almost universally shared conviction that nature is a reliable source of ethical norms is not
simply a harmless fallacy, in Yoder's view. There is within the logic of natural law and corresponding
natural (or universal) rights a powerful justification for violence. If one first accepts the presuppositions of
natural law, the existence of one WhO will not act according to them becomes morally objectionable, since
such differences should not exist. If someone were to deny the 'universal' right to be free, to worship, to
speak, to assemble, they would seem morally obtuse: it is a short step to forcing them to mend their ways.
3°7 Stanley Hauerwas Dispatches from the Front p. 175.
3080liver O'Donovan Resurrection and Moral Order Second edition p. xv. The emphasis on the
crucifixion is a theme Hauerwas shares with Yoder.
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creation, Hauerwas falls short of his own criteria. By this I mean that Hauerwas is failing
to do full justice to the narrative form of Christian convictions. This narrative has a
beginning, a middle and an end. By concentrating too much on one point (the crucifixion),
Hauerwas may be led to neglect those other dimensions of the narrative.
Hauerwas develops this point in response to another of his critics, James
Gustafson. Hauerwas is unimpressed by Gustafson's suggestion that an independent
doctrine of creation is required as a basis for ethics: 'Why doesn't Gustafson simply say
that what is needed is a morality in which all people can agree?'. Hauerwas is concerned
that when abstracted from reference to Israel and Jesus, creation (and redemption)
become ciphers. For Hauerwas, common ground lies not in the breadth of shared
humanity but in the wideness of God's mercy, stretching beyond the Church. What a
commitment to revelation through narrative enables Hauerwas to say is that creation only
has theological substance when it is seen as part of the Christian story: 'creation in
Christian theology is an eschatological act that binds nature and history together by
placing them in a teleological order.' Christ's resurrection unites nature and history so that
they can no longer be talked of as separate orders.309
It would not be fair, however, to ignore steps Hauerwas has made towards a more
positive view of creation. For these steps we need to look to two unpublished papers, one
distancing himself from Iris Murdoch, another aligning himself with John Milbank.
In Murdochian Muddles: Can We Get Through Them If God Does Not Exist?',
Hauerwas recognises that Iris Murdoch's philosophy is finally incompatible with Christian
ethics for a number of reasons, of which two are pertinent here. The first concerns
Murdoch's confidence in the myth of the demiurge, the 'paradigmatic artist making beauty
out of necessity'. 31° As convinced as Murdoch is by this model, the ontological argument
demonstrates to her the fact that no such God can exist. In response, Hauerwas asserts
that the doctrine of creation ex nihilo affirms the free decision of God, a decision
exercised spontaneously and graciously. The transition from Murdoch to Hauerwas is
expressed in the transition from talking of the 'contingent' to talking of the 'created'. Each
309See James Gustafson The Sectarian Temptation: Reflections on Theology, the Church, and the
University Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society 40 1985 83-94: Stanley Hauerwas Christian
Existence Today pp. 1-19.
310Stanley Hauerwas 'Murdochian Muddles' p. 14.
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created thing is a gift whose purpose is to praise the creator. Hence a definition of sin
arises from the doctrine of creation:
For the Christian 'sin' names the training we must undergo to discover our lives are
possessed by powers, by narratives, whose purpose it is to hide from us the fact that we
are creatures of a gracious God. Such 'knowledge' does not come 'naturally, but rather
from being made pail of a community with practices that offer the transformation and
reordering of our lives and relationships. ... Only through [forgiveness and]
reconciliation do we believe we can fully acknowledge our contingency and
particularity. ii 1
Murdoch's second unacceptable belief is in the absolute pointlessness of existence.
Hauerwas responds to this claim by demonstrating the way the doctrine of creation
initiates the Christian story, whose purpose is that all creation should worship God. This
narrative needs constant retelling: indeed the whole story must remain open to renarration,
due to the constant creating work of providence. The following is perhaps the closest
Hauerwas comes to meeting his critics' demand for clarification of the relation of creation
and eschaton:
The (telos' that characterises the Christian understanding of morality is not that of a
single overriding purpose that violently forces all we do into a preestablished hierarchy.
Rather it is a telos of hope that gives us the confidence to believe that we are not fated by
our collective and individual pasts. We know that we cannot avoid being creatures of
history, but that very way of putting the matter presumes we should desire, if possible,
an alternative. Such a desire cannot help but appear to the Christian as a sinful attempt
to escape our creattueliness. Our only alternative is not a salvation that mystically frees
us from history, from our past, but rather an alternative history made possible by a
community of people across time who maintain a memory of God's hope for us and for
the worle 2
In his dialogue with Murdoch, Hauerwas is drawn to emphasise the importance of
Christian community in demonstrating that what appears to be contingent is in fact
created. With his second dialogue partner, John Milbank, the concern is more with the
character of the God that does the creating.' In his unpublished paper 'Creation,
Contingency, and Truthful Nonviolence: A Milbankian Reflection' Hauerwas combines a
view of creation with an eschatological perspective, while still maintaining his emphasis on
witness through martyrdom. In this paper Hauerwas commends Milbank's view of
311 ibid p. 21.
312ibid p. 20-21.
313Jolm Milbank Theology and Social Theory Oxford: Blackwell 1490.
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creation as the ongoing nonviolent work of the Trinity. The reason why Milbank is so
important to Hauerwas is that Milbank gives Hauerwas a way of talking about creation.
Hauerwas has tended to avoid talk of creation because it seemed to underwrite the project
of universalist epistemology. Having accepted the critique of 'foundationalist'
epistemology of this kind, Hauerwas was left with no way of talking about creation.
What Milbank does is to talk of God's nonviolent creation. This gives Hauerwas
the opportunity to extend to creation the insights he has derived (originally from Yoder
and outlined in Chapter 3 above) from God's nonviolent salvation. The crucial link
between non-foundationalism and nonviolence that connects them with creation is the fact
that they accept, acknowledge and encourage difference. Difference is at the heart of non-
foundationalism, because unlike liberalism it does not assume that all accounts of
knowledge and existence are at root the same. Difference is at the heart of nonviolence,
because without a commitment to nonviolence, the conflict that inevitably arises from
difference would be destructive (especially given the foundationalist presumption that
unity is in the nature of things). 3 " It is in this context that Milbank's understanding of
creation in terms of harmonious difference is so fruitful. For Milbank, the Trinity itself is a
social being embodying harmonious difference. This is his foundation. Creation is thus the
bringing-about in existence of the Trinity's own harmonious difference. This is how
Milbank summarises his position:
Christianity ... recognises no original violence. It construes the infinite not as chaos, but
as a harmonic peace which is yet beyond the circumscribing power of any totalising
reason. Peace no longer depends on the reduction to the self-identical, but is the
sociality of harmonious difference. Violence, by contrast, is always a secondary willed
intrusion upon this possible infinite order (which is actual for God). ... It is Christianity
which exposes the non-necessity of supposing, like the Nietzscheans, that difference,
non-totalisation and indeterminacy of meaning necessarily imply arbitrariness and
violence. ... Christianity, by contrast, is the coding of transcendental difference as
peace. 31 5
3141n Against the Nations (p. 84 it. 26), Hauerwas quotes Reinhold Niebuhr's indictment of the violence
of universalism: The logic of the decay of modern culture from universalistic humanism to nationalistic
anarchy may be expressed as follows: Men seek a universal standard of human good_ After painful effort
they define it. The painfulness of their effort convinces them that they have discovered a genuinely
universal value. To their sorrow, some of their fellow men refuse to accept the standard. Since they know
the standard to be universal the recalcitrance of their fellows is a proof in their minds, of some defect in
the humanity of the non-conformists. Thus a rationalistic age creates a new fanaticism. The non-
conformists are figuratively welled from the human community'. Reinhold Niebuhr Beyond Tragedy
New York: Scribners 1965 p. 237.
315ibid pp. 5-6; italics original.
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This summary is tremendously important for integrating the whole of Hauerwas'
theology. Creation, upto now, has undoubtedly been the missing ingredient. It was missing
because it seemed to open the door to formal theories of natural law, foundational
accounts of knowledge, and in the end to a violence that denied the particularity of story,
Christian or otherwise. Milbank offers a way for Hauerwas' perception of the Christian
narrative to have a greater emphasis on the beginning of the story. Thus Hauerwas can
finally bridge the divide between creation ethics and kingdom ethics.
4.2.2. Salvation and Eschatology
In the foregoing discussion of eschatology and creation I have shown how the two
are compatible when we see creation as the nonviolent establishment of harmonious
difference. The theological difficulty which remains is whether an emphasis on eschatology
plays down and underestimates the significance of the person and work of Christ. Can one
continue to maintain the finality of Christ for Christian doctrine and his centrality in
Christian ethics (see Chapter 3 above), while talking of the ultimate resolution of things
and the command to live in the world which will be and is coming to be?
The views that look forward to a future resolution of human aspirations in this
world may be termed historicist. 316
 Historicist positions put a high value on the notion of
history. In this perspective, all teleology is historical teleology. One cannot talk of an 'end'
(or a beginning) outside time. All meanings emerge within the process of time itself. The
future is the only judge: all our strivings undergo the 'test of time'. For the gradualist, the
world is growing from childhood to adulthood, and its problems are largely due to
immaturity. The revolutionary is more inclined than the gradualist to hurry up the growth
process, but the only force that can do the hurrying is the revolutionaries themselves, since
an intervention from outside time and history is excluded.
3161-lere I am following the use of the term 'historicist' by Oliver O'Donovan in his Resurrection and
Moral Order Second Edition Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 1994 chapter 3.
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There are several problems with this perspective. The chief problem is that it does
not distinguish between the immature and the evil. If creation is portrayed as incomplete,
one comes close to a gnosticism that says creation is bad. If creation is not 'good', but only
'getting better', what would constitute evil? This comes close to an idealism which denies
the reality of evil. °Donovan summarises the problem neatly: The characterization of
history as a process replaces the categories of good and evil with those of past and
future'. The monopoly of history over all meanings also excludes grace, the definitive
action of God. One could say no more about Christ than that he is a representative and an
anticipation of the tendency and potential that was already in the world. There is no place
for a decisive act, only for a guiding hand. This is an inability to distinguish providence, the
teleological ordering of and within the created order, from salvation, the eschatological
action from without. Historicism has a place for providence, but not for salvation.3I8
In the chapter three I cited John Howard Yoder's description of the 'Constantinian'
shift, by which the Church came to see its own best interests coinciding with those of the
state. One can see the way the 'Constantinian' shift favoured a historicist perspective. The
workings of providence and the activity of salvation became difficult to distinguish from
one another. A decisive eschaton seemed unnecessary, since all that could be wished for
was simply more of what already existed. Eschatology lost its transcendent power to
criticise historical tendencies and instead underwrote them with a promise of more of the
same. A this-worldly eschatology not only favours a 'Constantinian' politics: the two
together are intimately connected with a consequentialist ethical method, as °Donovan,
here talking of Western liberal culture, implies:
'Oliver3  O'Donovan Resurrection and Moral Order: An Outline for Evangelical Ethics Leicester
Inter-Varsity Press 1986 p. 63. It is hard to see how such a perspective is sustainable in view of the delay
of the eschaton noted by the New Testament authors. The fact that evil was still very much around was
surely one of the most important reasons why the New Testament was written.
318Hence the tendency of this kind of eschatology to be more concerned with the incompleteness to be
removed than in describing or conceiving of the wonders to come. Such a reticence is appropriate for
those who believe in an other-worldly eschaton, for such would be by nature inconceivable. The same
should not apply for a salvation within time, which should be much more open to conception, but seems
not to be. One recalls Oscar Wilde: 'One wonders how long the meek will keep the earth after they inherit
The shortcomings of an ethical gradualist version of eschatology, such as that of Albrecht Ritschl,
were caricatured by Richard Niebuhr: 'A God without wrath brought men without sin into a kingdom
without judgement through the ministrations of a Christ without a cross' (H.R.Niebuhr The Kingdom of
God in America New York: Harper Torchbooks 1959 p. 193).
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To criticize the culture as a whole is unthinkable; one can only speak for the culture
against the culture, as the representative of a new strand in the culture which will
fashion its future. To this implausible disguise, then, moral criticism resorts in modern
liberal society, presenting itself partly as sociological prediction, card) , as threat. The
critic must describe the future of the culture in a way that justifies his concerns; and he
must show that he speaks for a constituency sufficiently large or sufficiently determined
to make his predictions come true!319
In short, one must be able to show one is master of one's own eschaton. What is missing
from this approach is both the transcendent quality of the eschaton and the perception of
grace, in particular Christ, as decisive.320
However a more continuous relationship between eschatology and salvation can
be established by attending to the context in which the synoptic gospels were written. It is
impossible to separate the 'historical Jesus' from the Jesus handed on to us through the
understanding of the early Church. Our principal evidence of him is in the transformation
he made in the lives of his followers. From the canonical gospels, particularly the
synoptics, two related themes emerge. First, Jesus' healing, teaching and miraculous
power were focused not so much on himself but on the kingdom of God. Second, Jesus
and his followers saw his ministry and passion as decisive. It was not that the first disciples
had a mistaken notion of eschatology; rather, they knew, better than us, the decisive effect
of the climax of Jesus' ministry. The early Christians
looked to the end of the world because they were so profoundly convinced that they had
already seen the end in the person and work of Jesus Christ. They did not look to the
future because they thought the kingdom had not been fulfilled but because they thought
it had been fulfilled through the vocation of this man Jesus. ... The kind of nonresistant
love characteristic of Jesus' disciples was possible only because they were convinced the
kingdom, the end, had in fact come through the life, death and resurrection of Jesus.321
319CYDonovan, ibid p. 73. O'Donovan observes that protest is the way liberalism pinches itself to find
out if it is still alive. Many theologians have asserted a Christological foundation for the significance of
protest O'Donovan, however, suspects 'that here, as with the crowd before the praetorium, what is realty
happening is the replacement of Christ by Barabbas'. (p. 73).
32°An ironic twist to the this-worldly and future version of eschatology is that it is not necessarily
immune from some of the dangers perceived in an other-worldly and future version This has been
demonstrated in the failure of the Marxist rendering of the revolutionary apocalypse. Ruether summarises
the similarity thus: 'As in Christian history, Marxism begins with the announcement of the apocalyptic day
of wrath and the speedy advent of the kingdom of God, but ends in the indefinite prolonging of the era of
the Church, which can justify all persecution and suppression of liberty in the name of that final liberation
which never comes but to which it is the exclusive gateway.' (Rosemary Radford Ruether The Radar!
Kingdom: The Western Experience ofiliessfranic Hope New York: Harper and Row 1970 p. 25.)
321 Hauerwas, The Need for an Ending' The Modern Churchman 27/3 1986 pp. 4-5.
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It may be that Jesus anticipated that the events of his passion would precipitate the
apocalyptic events described in Mark 13 and elsewhere. It may also be the case that many
of the anticipated events concerned not the cosmic end of the world but the destruction of
the Temple, which took place in 70 AD. In any case the writers of the New Testament
assume that the decisive, all-important event has already happened; we are those 'upon
whom the end of the ages has come' (1 Corinthians 10:11); we have 'tasted the powers of
the age to come' (Hebrews 6:5). It must therefore be a mistake to understand the kingdom
as a purely future event. And yet an other-worldly element remains in the abiding
expectation of an imminent closure to the story.
The other-worldliness of the kingdom is important in the sense that God's ways
are not our ways. The this-worldliness is affirmed by the fact that the kingdom has already
come to this world in Jesus and will return when he does. Yet the fact that the kingdom is
a past event clarifies the distinction between whether it is present or future: it can be
present and it will be future because it has been in the past. And what it was in the past
shows us what it is in the present and what it will be in the future. In short, the kingdom
can be present, and can break into the present from another world, because it has been
decisively present in the past in the career of Jesus. Christians proclaim a future hope and
a present community on the basis of a past event.
The theological demands of creation and salvation should therefore profoundly
influence the place given to eschatology in Christian ethics. From creation is gained an
emphasis on ontology - that which was, is, and will be true before, during, and after the
eschaton. From salvation is gained what Hauerwas usually calls the Christian narrative -
the historical character of Christian convictions, that which cannot be gainsaid by any
future eschaton. So eschatological ethics are characterised by a rootedness in the ontology
of continuing nonviolent creation and particular nonviolent salvation.
I shall now proceed to the examination of the character of eschatological ethics,
under two headings: the twin themes of time and ending.
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4.3. The Significance of Time
Jesus' ethical teaching [lies] ... at the very edge of what we usually believe to be possible.
Jesus' message has power not in spite of; hit because of, its promise of a future which is
not ideal or utopian, nor a mere variation on what we know already, hit is both radically
new and able to be envisioned on a human time-scale, 'in our generation'. Faithful and
eager attention to such a future introduces a new dimension to the present; for the
present becomes, not a mere working out of the consequences of the past, but a
transition to an altogether different future. The present is transformed by the discovery
of possibilities which were not apparent until it was seen in the light of the future.322
In the last chapter I argued that Hauerwas leaves himself open to the charge of
being a sectarian by his use of spatial metaphors for the relationship between Church and
world. He uses these metaphors in order to stress his conviction that the two differ in their
most fundamental convictions, and that Christian communities have distinctive practices
which embody their particular narrative. Hauerwas' most helpful discussion of this issue is
in his employment of Mchel de Certeau's distinction between a strategy and a tactic. 323 A
strategy is the art of the strong: it concentrates its power in one place and makes
systematic forays into enemy territory. A tactic is the art of the weak: it has no front line
since it is perpetually surrounded. It thus entertains ad hoc encounters with powerful
forces. 324
 De Certeau's distinction suggests that it is not the Christian community that is
sectarian: on the contrary it is the dominant secular forces that adopt strategies and thus
power bases. However it seems Hauerwas will go on being accused of sectarianism (and
go on being exasperated by the accusation) until he ceases to use confusing spatial
metaphors.m
322A.E.Harvey, Jesus and the Constraints of History, London: Duckworth 1982 p. 97
323 See 3.4.3. above.
324Thus, for example, Hauerwas' observation that Christianity 'must always be a Diaspora religion'
Against the Nations p. 77.
325The title of his recent book Dispatches from the Front seems in contradiction with ck Certeau's
notion of tactic: for where is the front line? the same book, Theological Engagements with the Secular
restores a more 'tactical' approach.
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It is my argument now that it makes much more sense of Hauerwas' approach to
understand the Church as existing in a new time. 326 It is this observation that enables us to
see how Hauerwas' perspective on Christian ethics is profoundly eschatological. The
theme of time emerges as a unifying theme of Hauerwas' work. Each of his major claims is
a claim about the significance of time for Christian ethics. In Kenneson's words,
All of the categories that have become the hallmark of Hauerwas' work - character,
narrative, memory, virtue - all are attempts to make connections between the self's
communal nature and the conununity's irreducibly temporal character.
In exploring eschatology therefore, I am examining the direction implicit throughout
Hauerwas' work. I shall now briefly demonstrate the implicit place of time in each of my
three previous chapters.
Time is implicit in Hauerwas' treatment of character, examined in chapter one
above. It arises at the point where Hauerwas becomes aware of the significance of
narrative. This most clearly represented in his 'Character, Narrative and Growth in the
Christian Life':
The growth of character, and our corresponding ability to claim our actions as our own,
is a correlative of our being initiated into a determinative story. For it is only through a
narrative which we learn to 'live into' that we acquire a character sufficient to make our
histon our own.327
A key difference between a 'determinative story' and a story of one's own choosing
is that a determinative story is a communal thing. In practice the term 'character', for
Hauerwas, means a person's ability to identify the place or part they fulfil in a narrative.
Thus a phrase such as 'my story' is almost meaningless: the story is always communal, and
communal identity is prior to personal identity. Character and community emerge as the
way Hauerwas ensures the identity of the self over time. Meanwhile the communion of
saints is the way doctrine speaks of the Church over time.
Time is implicit in my discussion in chapter two of Hauerwas' treatment of the
particular Christian narrative. Narrative is the way Christians understand the revelation of
God over time. The faithfulness and providence of God would be meaningless if there was
not a continuity to the story stretching from Israel through Jesus to the Church. Just as
3261 derive this idea from Philip Kenneson Taking Time for the Trivial: Reflections on Yet Another
Book from Hauerwas' Asbury Theological Journal 45 Spring 1990 65-74.
327 Stanley Hauerwas A Community of Character p. 151.
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when Christians guide their ethical behaviour by asking 'of what story am I a part?', so
they seek the character of God by considering his revelation over time.
Time is implicit in my discussion of Hauerwas' treatment of nonviolence. It arises
at the point where one considers the end of the story. Consequential reasoning tends to
foreshorten the story by concentrating on the destiny one can oneself determine.
Eschatological reasoning has a longer view of time, and commends action in accordance
with the End of the story.
Hauerwas unites the themes of time, character, narrative and nonviolence in his
essay Taking Time for Peace: The Ethical Significance of the Trivial'.' His argument is
that Christians witness by distinguishing survival from life; and the way Christians affirm
that God has done what is necessary to ensure the latter is by taking time to do apparently
trivial things. The unity of the themes comes through in the following passage:
The virtues ... are dineful activities. This is not just because the virtues can only be
developed through habitual formation, but because the virtues bind our past with our
future by providing us with continuity of self. Berniise we are virtuous people, as we are
peaceful people, we do not confront just any future but a future of a very definite kind.
Just as fears of a courageous person are not the fears of a coward, so the future of the
virtuous person is not the future of those who lack character.329
I shall now proceed to reinterpret the traditional categories of eschatological
thought - resurrection, millennium, second coming in judgement, and the kingdom of
heaven - in the light of what I have demonstrated about the way the implicit theme of time
unifies Hauerwas' work.
328Christian Existence Today pp. 253-266.
329ibid p. 265.
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4.4. The Content of Eschatology
4.4.1. Resurrection: living forgiven histories
Forgiveness, giving and receiving, is the key to Hauerwas' vision of life in the
messianic community. 33° Forgiveness is the way Hauerwas integrates the political and
personal demand to renounce control. Discipleship requires letting go of the ways we give
significance to the world and ourselves, letting go of our impulse to control the world and
make it come out right, and also letting go of the control we can exert over one another
by forgiving without receiving forgiveness. Accepting forgiveness tends to make us
powerless: asking us to be a forgiven people is asking us to live out of control. Our lives
are not in our own hands: we depend on others, learning to trust them as we learn to trust
God.
Forgiveness implies being at peace with our histories. This is not an ethic which
tries to abstract the individual or the community from its history. We are able to claim our
past, inexorably sinful, as our own, with no need to tell ourselves false stories, because we
can accept forgiveness for what we have done and not done. Only then can we live in
peace with ourselves and one another."'
This forgiveness is founded on the resurrection in which we 'recognize our victim
as our hope' 32 . It is through this recognition that the love of the enemy comes to
symbolize the eschatological ethic. By giving himself up to be killed, Jesus handed over
the kingdom into the hands of God's people. In the killing of Jesus we see what happens
when the kingdom to which we belong is seen as the kingdom which belongs to us - to
control and dispose of or to deem irrelevant to contemporary demands. In the
resurrection we see that this is not the end of the story, that the kingdom is not limited by
33°See Stanley Hauenvas The Peaceable Kingdom Chapter 5.
331 See especially 'Resurrection, the Holocaust, and the Obligation to Forgive' in Unleashing the
Scnpture pp. 140-148.
332ibid p. 90.
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our limitations, that our victim is offered back to us as our hope at Easter and Pentecost.
Therefore we can forgive the enemy, because our control over our own sin has been taken
away from us. We are dispossessed - dispossessed of our illusions of security and power,
dispossessed of our efforts to exclude the presence of surprises in our lives, dispossessed
of the false stories of our history, dispossessed of any righteousness that we may have
thought we deserved, dispossessed of any control over the end of the world - and as
dispossessed, we have nothing to withhold from the stranger. Imitating the resurrection,
imitating the end of the world, we deal as we have been dealt with, and offer forgiveness
where it has not been deserved.
In Jesus we see not only the proclamation and the possibility of what seemed to be
impossible ethical ideals, but the embodiment of a way of life that God has now made
possible. His life reveals to us the manner of God's reign. Eschatological ethics requires
seeing Christ's life as decisive for the breaking in of the kingdom into this world, as
integral to the nature and possibility of the kingdom. The kingdom is present insofar as
[Jesus'] life reveals the effective power of God to create a transformed people capable of
living peaceably in a violent world. ...His life is the life of the end - this is the way the
world is meant to be - and thus those who follow him become a people of the last times,
the people of the new age".
The resurrection of Jesus reveals the manner in which the end of the world is
disclosed. The last enemy is overcome. God breaks into a world dominated by death.
The resurrection, therefore, is not an exua-ordinary event added to this man's life, but a
confirmation by God that the character of Jesus' life prior to the resurrection is perfectly
faithful to his claim to proclaim and make present God's kingdom. Without the
resurrection our concentration on Jesus would be idolatry, but without Jesus' life we
would not know what kind of God it is who has raised him from the dead!
If the last enemy has been overcome, then all lesser powers must inevitably give way to
the rule of the crucified one. On the resurrection is founded the hope that forgiveness and
love are in the end to prevail over coercion and violence. Our true nature and end -
creation and eschatology - are revealed in the story of this one man.
3331-lauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom pp. 83, 85.
334 ibid p. 79.
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Besides making us a 'people of the last times', in what other way does the
resurrection bring a new time? The conflicts Jesus has with religious leaders over
observance of the sabbath make much more sense when one recognises that the
resurrection of Jesus is The embodiment of God's sabbath as a reality for all people'. If
the resurrection is the end of the world, living the sabbath is living toward the world's end
- living in the telos and eschaton of creation, to follow the Genesis account. Since our lives
are in God's hands, since we have seen the end of the world, it is possible to rest: the
sabbath becomes a form of life, a new time, a peace between people and between people
and our world. Life is valued not as an end in itself, not as the foundation of all value, but
as valuable because God has valued and created it.
4.4.2. The Millennium: Time to Make Peace with the Jews
The millennium is significant because it ties eschatology firmly to concrete history,
and thus with the Christian narrative. It indicates that the eschaton is 'not the replacement
of one kind of reality by another but the final interweaving of God's acts in all
dimensions'.' The ingrafting' of Israel is particularly important here, both in providing a
context for Jesus' life and in reminding us that the present history of the Jewish people is
not outside God's main concern.
The kingdom does not start with nature, with the notion that the perfection implicit in
creation be reformed by divine assistance; rather, the kingdom starts as the hope of a
people formed by God, which for Christians is defined by the life and death of the
crucified Christ. ... What we can know of this God and his kingdom is always given
through the history of Israel filtered through the light of Jesus' cross?
It is only in eschatological terms that we can make sense of the role of the Jewish
people, before Christ and since. For the issue in Romans 11 is a crucial one: if God has
'rejected his people whom he forelcnew', then his promises and his faithfulness, the
335 ibid p. 87.
3mThornas Finger Christian Theology: An Eschatological Approach Nashville: Nelson 1985 pp. 170-
171.
337Stanley Hauerwas Against the Nations p. 115.
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foundation of the gospel, are unreliable. What makes Israel Israel is to remember (in an
active, Hebrew, sense) the definitive acts of God - the Exodus, the law-giving at Sinai, the
crossing of the Jordan, the temple at Zion - and to meditate on the way of the Lord, with
the help of the prophet, the priest, and the king, living in obedience, fear, love, and
perfection. It is nothing less than a call to imitate God, to reflect the character expressed in
his deliverance of his people.' The prophet, priest and king were to be the models for the
people to imitate. In the Servant of Second Isaiah these three functions coalesce. The
servant enacts the three offices, displaying on the purpose and task of Israel and revealing
the life of God. In Jesus' life, death and resurrection the early Christians saw a continuation
of Israel's vocation to imitate God and manifest God's kingdom. Imitating Jesus would be
imitating God, and entering the inheritance of the kingdom.
By rooting us in the concrete history of Israel and Jesus, the millennium prevents
us from diverting attention from the crucified one to a calculation of events and timings.
The narrative of Israel, fulfilled and renewed in the narrative of the life of Jesus, not only
displays a life, but trains us to 'situate our lives in relation to that life."' We discover who
Jesus is and what his resurrection means by learning to follow him in his life, and in the
process losing false notions about what kind of kingdom he brings, In Jerusalem we
discover the cost and the crown of the kingdom. We keep our eyes on the kingdom by
never taking our eyes off the king.
The cutting edge of Christian belief in the eschatological role of Israel lies in
contemporary Christian relationships with the Jews, particularly in the light of the
Holocaust. In his essay Remembering as a Moral Task: The Challenge of the Holocaust',
Hauerwas suggests a number of approaches. 34° Christians need to learn their history in a
different way: reading Ivfidrash, Talmud, and Jewish experience of Christianity. Christians
should acknowledge that its universalist claim is eschatological, grounded in the final unity
of all people, rather than anthropological, based on the commonalities of humankind. It is
perhaps here that Hauerwas' concern for the particular Christian narrative coincides most
clearly with my own emphasis that that narrative should include the eschaton. The two are
338 Stariley Hauerwas The Peaceable Kingdom pp. 76-78.
339ibid p. 74.
349See Against the Nations Chapter 4, especially pp. 74-78.
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well expressed by Andre Trocme, the pastor of Le Charnbon-sur-Lignon: 'Let us never
forget that the God of Jesus Christ was the God of Israel. The Christian faith dissolves
into mythology as soon as it no longer leans on Judaism.°41
4.4.3. Second Coming and Judgement: An End to the Story
A constant theme of Hauerwas' writing is the need for patience among members
of the Christian community. It is one of the most important of all the virtues - perhaps the
definitive virtue, next to charity. A key fault of consequentialist reasoning is that by
assuming it can predict outcomes it foreshortens the story. Belief in the second coming
and last judgement remind the Christian that the end of the story comes much later - or
very much sooner - than may be supposed. Tragedy can only be sustained by a belief in
the ultimate wiping away of every tear from every eye: as I noted in chapter one, too
much social ethics tends toward violence precisely because it seeks to wipe away the tear
all too hastily.
Two claims relate specifically to the establishment of a new time. The first is the
discontinuity implied by the personal, bodily return of Christ. The ethical implications of
Christ's sudden return contrast with the implication of other versions of eschatology. The
version that supposes all the language of the parousia should be interpreted figuratively or
existentially provides no challenge to the existing order. Like belief in the immortal soul, it
allows the interiorisation of the decisiveness of Christ, and dispenses with the cosmic
dimension. Faith in the crucified one may, in this version, be a private matter. Yet it was
not for the crucified one. Neither was it for his earliest followers, who saw in his life the
coming of the kingdom. Meanwhile there is the version that understands that the universal
kingdom of justice and peace will come literally and gradually. This view provides even
more encouragement to those who suppose that Christians must seek to control the
present order, making it most nearly conform to the kingdom of justice and peace. But
34I André Trocme Jesus and the Nonviolent Revolution Scottdale: Herald Press 1973 p. 2, quoted by
Hauerwas in Agcrinst the Nations p. 86 n. 33.
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this would suggest that there is hope for the world other than in the way of Christ's cross
and his return, that we can hope in what we can do rather than in what Christ has already
done. The need to control, and the fear of failure that underlies it, imply that we, not God,
are the lords of history.
By contrast, belief in the catastrophic discontinuity of a personal, bodily return
means we are obliged not to succeed, but to be faithful and ready. If we are concerned
with the gradual, continuous manifestation of Christ's advancing reign, it is tempting to
form alliances with what seem to be the agreeable forces of the contemporary age. A more
discontinuous eschatology reminds us that evil can cloak itself under the guise of progress;
apparently agreeable forces were among those which Jesus rejected in the temptation
narrative and which put him to death.
In The Peaceable Kingdom (pp. 78-9) Hauerwas discusses the temptation
narrative in the light of these agreeable forces. The first temptation recalls Israel's desire
for a certain future of her own choosing. 'Surely it would be a good thing to ... feed the
hungry and poor. But Jesus rejects that means of proving how God reigns with his people
knowing that the life offered Israel is more than bread can supply.' The second temptation
is to a dominion that will bring peace to nations. But God's rule is through weakness, his
power is love, his peace is not coercion. 'Jesus ... rejects Israel's temptation to an idolatry
that necessarily results in violence between people and nations. For our violence is
correlative to the falseness of the objects we worship, and the more false they are, the
greater our stake in maintaining loyalty to them and protecting them through coercion.'
The third temptation is to dictate the manner and timing of God's intervention in history.
Jesus' refusal shows his commitment that God's will be done in his life and death.342
The second claim which relates specifically to a new time is more concerned with
the last judgement. The fact that the person who returns as judge is none other than the
person who went to the cross like a lamb to the slaughter is the foundation for the
Christian response to evil. It is Christ who judges, not the Christian or the Church. flis
judgement waits until after his passion.
Throughout the story narrated in the Bible the apparently righteous often suffer.
The apparently wicked prosper. This raises many questions. Who is really righteous? Will
342For further discussion of the temptation narrative, see chapter five below.
165
God keep his promises to those who suffer? Does he really care about them? Can he
overcome the forces that oppress the righteous? The questions are abiding ones. Is God
good and is his reign universal? There must come a day when evil is abolished and
righteousness reigns, when the significance of history is revealed, the secrets of all hearts
made plain, the plot unravelled; when the agony of poverty, violence, starvation, loneliness
and despair is lifted. Things will not always be this way.
In the meantime, Christians have nothing to gain by in practice assuming God got
it wrong in Christ, that the crucifixion was a ghastly mistake, and that we must
consequently act differently to ensure the world comes out right second time around. We
know that God acted decisively in Christ; we also know that things in the contemporary
world do not conform to the end of the world. But in the words of Michael Ramsey, God
is Christlike: in him there is no un-Christlikeness at all. History has already come out right
in Christ. In Christ God has shown us the way he deals with the world and the way he
would have his world governed. Because we see that forgiveness and love have been
vindicated in the resurrection, we know that he will end the story justly, in a manner not
unlike the manner in which he has already decisively acted.
The commitment of Christians to live life in Gods sabbath - in the belief that God
has already made the world come out right and it is not upto us to do so - does not close
their eyes to the magnitude of evil in the contemporary world. God has defeated evil and
vindicated love and forgiveness. The victory is absolute. Those who open themselves to
this reign and join others who are structuring a life around it need not fear the final
destruction of evil. Nevertheless, evil is still present, and Christians constantly pursue a
nonviolent commitment to turn against it.
The firther virtue associated with belief in the last judgement is the virtue of
courage. Courage is an eschatological virtue because it consists in recognising that the
End does not lie in the death of the self but in the final eschaton. The Christian life is beset
by great dangers. The person of courage experiences a different set of dangers from the
coward, since courage itself makes the world more dangerous. 343 For the courageous
person fears not to possess the spiritual benefits and goods of the virtuous person;
343 See The Difference of Virtue and the Difference it Makes: Courage Ex=plified Modern Theology
9/3 1993 pp. 249-264.
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whereas the coward fears merely to lose temporal goods. The courageous have the
characteristics that befit those who know their cause will finally succeed: endurance,
steadfastness, constancy, patience and perseverance. The courageous person knows the
prize will be attained; knows the journey may be long and arduous; knows the sorrow that
comes of losing some goods on the way. The paradigm of Christian courage is
martyrdom. Martyrdom requires an extraordinary courage, made possible by the belief in a
last judgement that vindicates the righteous.
Through Christ [Christians] have been given power over death and all forms of
victimization that trade on the power of death. ... Though our enemies may kill us they
cannot determine the meaning of our death_ ... We refuse to let our oppressors define us
as victims. We endure because no matter what may be done to us we know that those
who would determine the meaning of our life by threatening our death have already
decisively lost.344
This explains Hauerwas' response to ODonovan's criticism. ODonovan says Hauerwas'
treatment of martyrdom constitutes an overemphasis on the cross. But the perspective of
the last judgement shows that martyrdom is a feature of Hauerwas' implicit emphasis on
the eschatological character of Christian ethics.
4.4.4. The Kingdom of Heaven: The Community of a New Time
As Thomas Finger points out, the biblical writings speak of heaven in two
principal ways."' The first is a literal place, a created realm, a place of disharmony as well
as harmony (Ephesians 2:2, 3:10, 4: 9-10), which will, unlike God's reign but like the
earth, one day pass away. The second is a figurative space where God is fully obeyed. In
this latter sense, the healings, teachings and exorcisms of Jesus' early ministry showed that
The kingdom of heaven is at hand' (Matthew 4:17). Heaven is more nearly a verb than a
noun. It is very much like what is meant by 'life' or 'eternal life'. It speaks not of a territory
over which God rules but of God's reign as dynamic and transforming, and met with
3" Stank) Hauenvas 'On Developing Hopeful Virtues' Christian Scholar's Review 18/21988 p. 113.
3 4sThomas Finger Christian Theology: An Eschatological Approach p. 157.
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obedience, service and joy. The coming of heaven to earth means a radical transformation
of the way we do and are done by.
The ultimate eschatological hope, then, is not that indivicbials will go to heaven but that
heaven will fully and finally pervade earth. It is that 'the earth will be filled with the
knowledge of the glory of God as the waters cover the sea' (1-labbalcuk 2: 14).346
Thus the eschatological hope is embodied by people who see heaven not so much
as a 'space' but as a way of understanding acting in time - as a verb, rather than as a noun.
The ethical implications of this last dimension of eschatology orient the Christian toward
time, rather than away from time in search of timeless reward. As has been seen with other
features of eschatological hope, it is important to steer away from temptations to
gnosticism.
Perhaps because Christians are so often unfaithful, and the Church is such an
abject witness to the kingdom, there abides an understandable temptation to try to escape
the fallibility of Christian life, step out of time and talk of salvation in ahistorical terms.347
The doctrine of the atonement is often discussed in such abstract categories. When
salvation is discussed in ahistorical terms it is possible to bypass the human community
that such salvation creates. This is a gnostic tendency since it implies that salvation is
simply a matter of God's achievement and our knowledge of it. However we are not just
saved from something, we are saved to something. That latter something is the new
people, the eschatological community, that lives as if God, not humanity, rules. The life of
this community cannot be bypassed when describing salvation: its very life is a crucial,
albeit insufficient, manifestation of God's rule. Indeed it may not be possible to know what
salvation means apart from such a community. Salvation saves humans within time, not
from time. In Hauerwas' words, 'That God "saves" is not a pietistic claim about my status
individually. ... Rather, the God of Israel and Jesus offers us salvation insofar as we are
346ibid p. 158. This is not the place to enter into the philosophical and ethical issues raised by hell. lithe
final coming of heaven is to be complete, we may assume that to stand before the coming brightness and
glory of God, knowing one has irreversibly set one's fire against that irresistible reality, will be an occasion
of complete horror. To be aware of other life going on to the fulfilment for which it was created, while one
knows that one is set against that: this is an agony. It is an agony which we may suppose may be a
purgatory, and not eternal: but this may not be obvious at the time and of small consolation if all that has
turned against the brightness is integral to one's person.
341This discussion follows that of Philip Kenneson in 'Taking Time for the Trivial'.
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invited to become citizens of the kingdom and thus to become participants in the history
which God is creating'?"
An ahistorical salvation accords well with an ahistorical eschatology. The heresy
involved in both is docetism. God is so other that he could not stoop to be involved in
time. The moral consequence is that Christ has no decisive relevance for ethics. In these
circumstances the temptation towards either human control or despair is almost
irresistible.
Neither of these responses recognises hope. Christian hope expresses the
relationship between salvation and time. Salvation involves time and does not bypass
temporal human activities and communities. Yet time seems to be the ultimate unalterable
igiven'. 349 Time enslaves us and tyrannises us. In our contemporary culture time is the
most valuable commodity: we spend it, save it, use it, waste it, put it aside and buy it; we
seek after the elixir of 'quality time'. Time is an 'enemy bearing arms for oblivion'. Our
pathetic efforts to kill it only show its mastery over us. Time cannot, it appears, be
recycled: it is the ultimate non-renewable resource.
A historical salvation is a salvation that establishes a new time. Salvation creates a
new people, the eschatological people: and a characteristic of this new people is that they
live in a new time - an eschatological time. In this new time the priorities of existence are
transformed: activities are significant to the extent that they proclaim and accord with the
new time.
Christians may agree with the 'realists' that ethics must be earthed in the real
world; there may however be some disagreement on what the real world is. How we act in
the world depends on how we see the world in which we act. The New Testament, and in
particular the description of the kingdom given in the Sermon on the Mount and
elsewhere, train Christians to see the world as it really is. The Beatitudes display, not a
manifesto for a new society, but a picture and a promise of the kingdom which has
happened in Jesus and is breaking in to this society; not a prudential ethic for a sensible
approach to conflict resolution, but a shock to the imagination to show that all is not as it
348 Stanley Hauerwas The Peaceable Kingdom p. 63. In Against the Nations p. 115, he adds The
kingdom of God is a category which presumes and creates a people'.
349For the full dimensions of 'givens', see chapter five below.
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seems. This is ethics on the very edge of possibility, an ethic which is breaking into a new
time, where the demands of reality are very different. The transformation is summarised
most lucidly in a passage in Resident Aliens.
If the world is a society in which only the strong, the independent, the detached, the
liberated, and the successful are blessed, then we act accordingly. However, if the world
is really a place where God blesses the poor, the hungry, and the persecuted for
righteousness' sake, then we must act in accordance with reality or else appear
bafflingly out of step with the way things are. ... So discipleship, seen through this
eschatology, becomes extended training in letting go of the ways we try to preserve and
give significance to the world, ways brought to an end in Jesus, and in relying on God's
definition of the direction and meaning of the world - that is, the kingdom of God35°
4.5 Eschatology and Irony
In the previous section I took up the implications for Hauerwas' ethics of the claim
that the Church lives in a new, eschatological, time (as opposed to a separate, sectarian,
space). In this section I concentrate on the other major concern of this chapter, the claim
that attention to the ending of the Christian narrative offers a different perspective on the
genre of the Church's story.
4.5.1. Tragedy
Tragedy is a theme to which Stanley Hauerwas returns regularly, particularly in
the period 1977-1983. He makes a number of claims for the way tragedy forms the moral
3501-iauerwas and Willimon Resident,4liens pp. 88-89.
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life. Three areas are particularly significant and illustrate the way tragedy applies to a much
wider field. First, in Truthfidness and Tragedy, Hauerwas is largely concerned with the
importance of tragedy in medicine. The tragic is experienced when a person (perhaps a
highly virtuous person) with several responsibilities and obligations, confronted with a
single decision having irreversible consequences, finds that these many interests conflict
with both his or her own interest and with each other.
The practice of medicine offers an intense paradigm of the moral life. For the moral task
is to continue to do the right, to care for this immediate patient, even when we have no
assurance that it will be the successful thing to do. ... When a culture loses touch with
the tragic__ we must redescribe our failures in acceptable terms. Yet to do so ipso facto
traps us in self-deceiving accounts of what we have done.351
Hauerwas goes on to argue that policies based on these premises lead to coercion.
Medicine teaches us that tragic circumstances are 'what the moral life is all about'.352 In the
last essay in the book, Medicine as a Tragic Profession', Hauerwas explores these issues in
greater detail, and concludes that medicine serves us best when it helps us face up to
(rather than cure) the tragic character of our existence.
Second, in A Community of Character, Hauerwas applies his notion of tragedy to
the issue of relativism. In doing so he develops his notion of tragedy:
The conflict of right with right ... is but a form of a more profound sense of tragedy
inherent in living in a divided world For tragedy consists in the moral necessity of
having to risk our lives and the lives of others in order to live faithful to the histories
that are the only means we have for knowing and living truthful/y.353
Hauerwas goes on to argue that tragedy arises when the faithfulness to one's
character leads one into situations in which one's 'multiple responsibilities and obligations
conflict not only with self-interest, but with each other'. There is no use trying to
underestimate or deny the extent of division in the moral world. The tendency of
deontological or utilitarian theories is to try to bypass these moral divisions; thus they deny
the tragic. This, says Hauerwas, only leads to violence. 354 This leads him to an
understanding of the Church as a people who can keep each other faithful despite the
inevitable tragedies each member faces.
351 Stanley Hauerw-as Truthfulness and Tragedy pp. 37-38.
352Stanle, Hauerwas A Community of Character p. 115.
353ibid p. 106.
354ibid p. 107. See 1.2.3. above.
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Third, Hauerwas considers tragedy in his profound meditation on the spirituality
of peaceableness in the last chapter of The Peaceable Kingdom. The virtue of patience
emerges as the key to enabling Christians to be faithful despite the inevitable tragedies of
their lives. This is the point at which the eschatological perspective implicit in his
discussion of tragedy comes to the surface.
As I-1. Richard Niebuhr suggested, our unwillingness to employ violence to make the
world 'better' means that we must often learn to wait. Yet such a waiting must resist the
temptation to cynicism, conservatism, or false utopianism that assumes the process of
history will result in 'everything coming out all righf. For Christians hope not in the
'processes of history', but in the God whom we believe has already determined the end of
history in the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ?
Hauerwas goes on to contrast the peace based on conspiracies of lies, with the Church's
peace, which unmasks those conspiracies, faces the forces those conspiracies had kept in
check, and cares for the casualties.
4.5.2. Beyond Tragedy
Hauerwas' arguments for the significance of tragedy are insightful and persuasive.
However when it comes to placing them in an eschatological perspective, it begins to
appear that tragedy is not quite the right genre. Tragedy has deep associations with Greek
notions of fate: fate is stronger even than the gods. Tragic heroes are often those who
transgress the natural moral law. Fate and natural law are notions which sit uncomfortably
with Hauerwas' interest in providence and destiny."' More importantly, the last word in
any Christian narrative can never be tragedy since, as Hauerwas himself insists, the last
word is Jesus Christ. The Christian narrative claims that God has taken the tragic
character of our existence into his very life'. 357 Hauerwas himself acknowledges, in the
355 Stanley Hauerwas The Peaceable Kingdom p. 145.
356'Communities formed by a truthful narrative must provide the skills to transform fate into destiny'. A
Community of Character p. 10.
357 ibid p. 108.
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words of Reinhold Niebuhr, that the Christian hope lies 'beyond tragedy . 358 But where is
that?
Hauerwas' insistence on tragedy makes sense when tragedy is used as a way of not
trying to escape the dilemmas of human existence. His argument for the tragic character of
medicine is directed against the tendency of consequentiafist reasoning to assume that
'right answers' can be plucked out of the moral whirlpool. The consequentialist tells what
we might call a 'comic' story - one with a happy ending, which the action under
consideration will aim to bring about. Hauerwas is absolutely right to expose and reject
this rendering of the story. But by telling a tragic story Hauerwas comes to share a number
of the problems of the deontological approach. He is aware that deontological approaches
can become 'a formula for moral callousness and self-righteousness' if the narrative context
is ignored. 359 Yet the deontological 'story is often a tragic story too.
What is missing from Hauerwas' discussion of tragedy is the notion of irony. It is
not totally absent: he uses the word 'irony three times in his discussion of 'Tragedy and
Peaceableness'?" but it is the genre which resolves the ambiguities of the notion of
tragedy. John Howard Yoder introduces a dimension of irony into Hauerwas' thought by
his insistence on luck, surprise and accident, and the way a commitment to nonviolence
introduces these factors into ethical discussion. But Hauerwas still tends to concentrate on
martyrdom and the cross, emphasising the tragic character of Christian faithfulness.
The journey from tragedy to irony may be illustrated by returning to the notion of
'medicine as a tragic profession'. Hauerwas derives this notion from MacIntyre. And
indeed it is true: for medicine should teach society the disciplines of tragedy. But the
journey from Machrtyre to Hauerwas is the journey from society to the Church. That
journey is a journey from tragedy to irony. For what the Church has to say to the
profession of medicine is, yes, medicine is not a 'comic' story, but no, medicine is not just a
tragic story. It goes beyond tragedy. To say this much is to enter the field of irony.
358 T/7e Peaceable Kingdom p. 148.
359ibid p. 128.
360ibid pp. 142-146.
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4.5.3. Irony as the Genre of Eschatology
The tenor of an ironic story is one of contrast - contrast between how things
appear and how they are, between what participants are aware of and what happens in
spite of them, between the status quo and its increasingly apparent absurdities. The
contrasts of the Christian story are between human expectations and God's reality,
between human failure and God's victory, between what we suppose to be the end of the
story and the final end of the world. The central irony of the Christian story is that it is a
human tragedy and a divine comedy. Christians perform that story by affirming the central
role of God in the narrative.
The pare or archetypal ironist is God ... He is the ironist par excellence because he is
omniscient, omnipotent, transcendent, absolute, infinite and fate. ... In earthly art, irony
has this meaning - conduct similar to Gods' (Karl Solger). The archetypal victim of
irony is man, seen, par contra, as trapped and submerged in time and matter, blind.
contingent, limited and unfree - and confidently unaware that this is his predicament.36'
It becomes clear that irony is a characteristic both of Hauerwas' method and of an
eschatological approach to ethics. Hauerwas is constantly chipping away at the self-
assurance of those who are confidently unaware of the insecurity or transitoriness or
violence of their convictions. He sets up no grand plan, no strategy of the big battalion as
a new Babel; instead he engages in hand to hand disputes with those who challenge the
pattern of the Christian narrative.
Meanwhile an eschatological perspective is intensely ironic. It truly transforms fate
into destiny. It sits in judgement over this time and this world; it mocks all who attempt to
thwart its power - by arrogating power to themselves, by trying to evade death, or by
behaving as if impervious to judgement. All human efforts to construct an earthly paradise
are subsumed in a heaven beyond human imagining. All complacency is undermined when
the eschaton comes at a time that no one expects. Apparent triumph turns to dust;
apparent defeat is exalted. The secrets of all hearts are revealed: neither the sheep nor the
goats know quite what to expect. The ethic could best be summarised thus: it is better to
36 'D.C. Muecke Irony, the Critical Idiom London: Methuen 1970 pp. 37-8.
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fail in a cause that will finally succeed than to succeed in a cause that will finally fail.362
This is the language of profound irony: beyond tragedy.
When Hauerwas talks at length of the cross and martyrdom, critics such as Oliver
O'Donovan complain that his outlook is too bleak. The reason for this bleakness, I
suggest, is that Hauerwas takes the ironic perspective for granted, and thus overstresses
the tragic dimensions of discipleship. The result is that he labours the human tragedy, and
skips the divine comedy. But all the while, the ironic perspective is implicit in what he is
saying. This is illustrated by one of the most gruesome stories he tells, that of the Dunkard
Brethren.
Hauerwas quotes U.J. Jones' thoroughly unsympathetic account of the German
Dunkard' Brethren in Morrison's Cove, Pennsylvania, who refused to take up arms or pay
for others to do so during the French, Indian and Revolutionary wars in the eighteenth
century. Jones notes that during an Indian raid the Dunkards made no effort at resistance.
A handful of Dunkards hid themselves away; but by far the most of them stood by and
witnessed the butchery of wives and children, merely saying "Gottes wille sei gethan".'
The warriors carried off more than thirty scalps and plenty of plunder. Upto this point this
is an extraordinary example of the demands of discipleship implied by Hauerwas. But then
there is an ironic twist. Jones apparently misses the significance of his own observation
that the Brethren repeated IGottes wille sei gethan' so often during the massacre that the
Indians thought it was the name of this strange tribe; a fact that came to light when some
of the Indians were later captured and enquired whether the 'Gotswilthans' still lived in the
Cove.' What appeared to be a tragic story turns out to be beyond tragedy. This is at the
heart of an eschatological perspective.
3621 owe this expression to Bill Arlow.
363 See Stanley Hauerwas 'Creation, Contingency and Truthful Nonviolence: A Milbankian Reflection'
unpublished per 1992, Rufus D. Bowman Church of the Brethren and War Elgin: Brethren Publishing
House 1944 pp. 74-75.
175
43.4. Ethics without irony
A further illustration of the ironic character of Hauerwas' eschatological
perspective may be taken from his essay 'On Surviving Justly: Ethics and Nuclear
Disarmament'. The issue here is that one cannot dispense with eschatology: one simply
chooses between good eschatology and bad eschatology. In characteristic fashion,
Hauerwas exposes the absurdity of the survivalist argument.
The survivalist argument concludes that because nuclear weapons are so
destructive; because any nuclear war would probably be a total war; and because the
human species may not survive such a war, nuclear war must be excluded at all costs.364
Humanity, it is said, has no right to endanger a common world based on the biological
immortality of our species. This common world is seen as the source of all value: There are
no ethics apart from service to the human community, and therefore no ethical
commandments that can justify the extinction of humanity.' Thus anything that threatens
the value of value itself must be immoral. Survival becomes the first principle of ethics.
This argument relies on the human species as the determinant moral factor. But is
it so clear that without humanity there will be nothing left of value? This certainly has
implications for the relation of humanity to the animal world. The end of survival appears
on this view to be so paramount that any means necessary to secure it are presumably
legitimate. Such peace at any price is unlikely to be a just peace. Survivalism thus exhibits
the shortcomings of an ethic with a weak eschatology. In heavily ironic terms, Hauerwas
summarises the problems involved in the rejection of eschatology on ethical grounds:
What good is a peace movement that works for peace for the same idolatrous reason
that we build bombs - name/y, the anxious self-interested protection of our world as it
is? ... We do not argue that the bomb is the worst thing humanity can do to itself We
have already done the worst thing we could do when we hung Gods Son on a cross. We
do not argue that we must do something about the bomb or else we shall obliterate our
civilisation, because God has already obliterated our civilisation in the life, teaching,
death and resurrection of Jesus. ... Our hope is based not on Caesar's missiles or Caesar's
treaties but on the name of the Lord who made heaven and earth. People often work for
peace out of the same anxieties and perverted views of reality that lead people to build
bombs.366
564 Stanley Hauerwas Against the Nations: War and Survival in a Liberal Society pp. 140-146.
365Jonathan Schell The Fate Of The Earth New York: Alfred Knopf, 1982, quoted in Hauerwas,
Against the Nations p. 142.
366Stanley Hauervvas, Resident Aliens pp. 89-90.
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4.5.5. The Dangers of Ironic Ethics
If Hauerwas' style is so clearly ironic, and his ethic has such a strong tendency
toward eschatology, why are these themes not more thoroughly embraced by his work?
I suspect that the reason may be that irony tends to assume the position of the
observer. The archetypal ironic figure is the stranger in a new country, noticing the absurd
habits that the locals take for granted. Now in one respect this is very much Hauerwas'
position: he is the Christian in a secular world, noticing the absurdities of liberal
presuppositions; he also writes as if he is at one remove from denominational differences.
Yet in another respect the position of the observer is one that Hauerwas shuns. He shuns
it because the kind of ethics he has set himself against is that which assumes it can take the
neutral high ground of the disinterested observer. Such an observer has no understanding
of the particular narrative and character of those involved in an issue, and thus is in no
position to pass judgement - besides which, no such neutral ground exists.
A corresponding criticism of the eschatological perspective on Christian ethics is
the danger of gnosticism. If eschatology becomes a secret knowledge concerning events
and timings, the Christian ethics has lost the perspective on time that I outlined earlier in
this chapter. Time has ceased to be a gift, and has become another object to be
manipulated. If the eschaton is seen as the complete replacement of the present order,
both creation and salvation are undermined. Such a view prizes the Kingdom so highly
that it denies our present existence altogether. The result is a gnostic view that assumes
that the telos of the world is wholly other than its present form, and thus that creation will
be set aside in the eschaton. The gnostic approach sees the decisive events in salvation not
as creation and Christ but as Fall and eschaton.
The theologian who has come closest to the approach I am outlining is Wolfhart
Pannenberg. The following passage expresses his metaphysical commitment to the
'ontological priority of the future':
If it is true that only with reference to the totality of reality can one speak meaningfully
about a revelation of God as the worlds Creator and Lord, and that reality (unckrstood
as historical) is first constituted as the totality of a single history by the end of all
occurrences, then eschatology acquires a constitutive significance not only for the
question of the knowledge, but also for that of the reality, of God.367
367 Wolfhart Pannenberg Basic Questions in Theology Volume One London: S.C.M. 1971 p. XV.
177
In an important dialogue with Pannenberg, Hauerwas makes explicit his
misgivings about what I have called an ironic approach.'" The issue at stake is whether
one can talk meaningfully of the not-yet-existent as if it were the most concrete thing of
all. Hauerwas' scepticism here reflects his concern with the particular and contingent: he is,
as ever, suspicious of attempts to escape the practical and everyday in search of the
timeless and absolute. Hauerwas goes on to criticise Pannenberg for translating the
otherness of the kingdom into undefined generalities of justice and love. The heart of
Hauerwas' frustration with Pannenberg lies in the latter's resort to abstraction when
articulating the ethics of the kingdom, But I believe Hauerwas goes unnecessarily far in
criticising the notion of the 'ontological priority of the future' as an abstraction also. For, as
I have already shown, this eschatological perspective does thorough justice to two key
elements in Hauerwas' thought: the significance of Jesus as the embodiment of the
kingdom, and the perception of the length of the Christian story which consequentialist
approaches underestimate. The problem with Pannenberg, in my view, is not that he
makes metaphysical claims about something that is not yet fully realised - for surely this
tension runs through Christian theology, Hauerwas included - but that he does not go far
enough towards outlining the particular implications of his eschatological perspective. I
have attempted in this chapter to deepen the metaphysical dimensions of Hauerwas'
thought by embracing it with l'vfilbank's view of creation and Pannenberg's perspective on
eschatology.
While Hauerwas may well have misgivings about irony, I maintain that his
concentration on Christian community is the strongest safeguard against them. It is the
lives and habits of an actual community that gives eschatology its contemporary concrete
embodiment. It is the earthing in the traditions and practices of such a community that
both ensures a narrative approach and ties salvation to vocation and thus prevents it
becoming other-worldly and world-denying. The existence of an eschatological
community, expressing its faithfulness especially in its attitude to time, is the new reality
that salvation brings. Standing in the same place as the world, but in a different time;
looking for a time when all shall be well; appearing at times absurd to the secular mind;
368 Stan1ey Hauerwas and Mark Sherwindt The Reality of the Kingdom: An Ecclesial Space for Peace'
in Stanley Hauerwas Against the Nations pp. 107-121.
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modelling a parallel way of being society; affirming all the while that God's ways are
different from human ways; in all these ways the Church embodies an ironic perspective
and tells its ironic story. Charles Pinches expresses beautifully this vocation to imitate the
archetypal ironist:
God is conunitted to the won is not identical with the world; he is for the world,
but this is not his whole being; he is prior to the world; without him, the world could
not know itself as world; he would do the world no favour by being absorbed into the
world; he serves the world, but has his own integrity and inner life. The Church is the
same. 369
Thus one could describe the Church as an ironic parody of society, a satire on
secularism. The Church is the cuckoo in the nest, on others' territory, a resident alien.
Hauerwas revels in this approach: he adores to point out to emperors that they have no
clothes. The ironist inhabits the same space as the rest of society, but has a perspective
that makes some of the nostrums of that society seem absurd. The ironic community
makes no claims to superiority or seclusion: it simply operates with a different timescale
from the rest of society. For the Church, that is the eschatological perspective.
4.6. An Eschatological Practice: Having Children
In his book The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics, Thomas Ogletree
distinguishes between two kinds of eschatology. He labels them futurist and dialectical
eschatologies. The futurist eschatologies, largely found in exilic and post-exilic literature,
combine an ethic of hope toward a time of fulfilment with an ethic of patient waiting (or in
some cases determined action) in the meantime. Dialectical eschatologies see the hoped-
369Charles Pinches 'A Response to Muray' Process Studies 1812 1989 p. 99.
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for age as already becoming a reality, taking form in faithful communities as they
encounter the larger society. The new reality is present, though the old reality still holds
sway.
The differences between the two eschatologies largely concern the way in which
the faithful community places itself in history. For futurist eschatologies, a break with the
present reality is essential in order to affirm the legacy of the past: the Messiah has not yet
come. For dialectical eschatologies, the Messiah has indeed come, a break with the past
has been made, and the new age has begun. Ogletree notes that the crucial institutional
distinctions between futurist (Jewish) and dialectical (Christian) eschatologies concern the
relation between family and community of faith.
In postexilic Judaism, ... the family is foundational for the existence of the people. The
community of faith is constituted through the joining of families in covenant ... For
Christian understanding, the family is secondary and derivative; the community of faith,
primary and fimdamental.37°
So the family is deeply challenged by eschatological ethics. And yet having children is
commonplace. Why is having children so seldom regarded as a moral issue?
Having children has often been excluded from ethical debate because of the
shortcomings in the way moral theology is often conducted. It has been excluded because
it is value-laden, and it is often (wrongly) assumed that ethics concerns objective value-
free facts such as 'rights' and 'nature'. It has been excluded also because it is often (again
wrongly) assumed that ethics consists of moments of conscious choice: and having
children is not something that many people do after an agony of moral decision, so again it
does not look like a moral issue.371 But the moral ethos of a community is generally
revealed more by issues that are taken for granted than by a decision made in a crisis.
Ethics is more about the long-term formation of people than it is about immediate
judgements about actions. Rights and wrongs cannot simply be settled instantly in any
situation by some universally-applicable principles: they depend on the prior moral
commitments of the people involved, and these commitments are largely derived from the
37°Thomas Ogletree The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics Oxford: Blacicwell 1984 p. 181.
371 Many may indeed have agonies of decision, bin such are generally about methods of aiding or
impeding conception; seldom is it perceived that actually having the child is a moral question. The issues
are usually considered to be whether and how one should 'interfere' with 'nature'.
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community of which the people are a part. The question of whether we should switch off
a life-support machine cannot be settled by abstract principle: it rests, instead, on what
view of life we already have. The treatment of a severely retarded child has no a priori
solution: it depends, instead, on what we value about all children. The assertion of a child's
rights is not about 'natural law': it is determined by our prior view of how children differ
from adults and what parenting involves.
For example one of the great injustices of giving birth to a child with a severe
mental handicap is often perceived to be that such a child does not and will not turn out as
the parents had expected. Yet on a little more reflection it is clear that no child turns out as
we had expected: we are not able to control the outcome of any child's life 372 • The
question thus develops into a wider one of how we receive the unexpected child, what we
expect any child to be, and why, in fact, we have children at all.
Christians and non-Christians alike have children: and perhaps few Christians
understand what they are doing as different from what a non-Christian is doing in having
children. But having children is not a necessity or simply a 'natural' fact. Instead, it forms
and expresses our deepest assumptions and convictions about our lives and identities. It
therefore offers a helpful demonstration of the embodiment of the eschatological ethic in
the life of the Christian community.
I thus conclude this chapter with an extended illustidtion of the way eschatological
perspectives translate into the 'trivial' life or everyday activity of the Christian
community. 373 In doing so I hope to show how the kingdom involves a new ethical time,
and how we can see the 'trivial' practice of having children as a key practice for the
eschatological community. Under four headings I outline how the practice of having
children embodies the significant claims made in this chapter.
372See Truthfulness and Tragedy pp. 153-154.
3' 3 'The primary meaning of "trivial"... is not "trifling" but "that which can be met anywhere"! Stanley
Hauerwas Christi= Existence Today p. 263.
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4.6.1. Having Children is a Vocation
Christians see the world from a particular point of view, and describe the world in
a particular way. 374 They understand that the world is deeply damaged by sin. This sin is in
turn displayed in the way that all relationships experience distrust. Distrust commonly
issues in violence and coercion, and thus in fear. Fear evokes the belief that security is to
be attained only through control. Anyone whom one cannot control is a potential enemy.
Distrust, fear, violence and untruthfulness are thus characteristics of despair in a world
which assumes that control lies with humanity and not with God.
Christians are called to form the Church - that is, communities which recognise
God's sovereignty over all existence and therefore do not need to control the world in
order to be secure. Because these communities are not based on fear, they can display the
trust and love which God's rule makes possible. Christians and their communities often get
it wrong: they often live in fear, particularly fear of the truth; they are often distrustful and
sometimes violent. Yet the power of despair and falsehood only illustrates the urgency of
truthful, hopeful living. This new, eschatological, community is the crucial demonstration
that salvation affirms creation: salvation does not extract humans from time but restores
them in a new time.
Having children anchors Christians to historical time. A parent cannot escape the
mundanities of existence in the way a single person can. 375 The inter-generational ties of
the family teach us what it means to be historic beings. Being in a family is part of being
'stuck with' a history and a people. If ethics is to be as historical as salvation, it must resist
the timeless abstractions of the universal, the abstract, and the moment, and take seriously
the habits, ordinariness, and triviality of family life.
In the discussion that follows, I owe the understanding of salvation to Stanley Hauerwas, Suffering
Presence pp. 147-148, and the discussion of time to Philip D. Kenneson, Taking Time for the Trivial:
Reflections on Yet Another Book from Hauerwas t, Asbury Theological Journal 45/1 1990 pp. 70-72.
375Janet Martin Soslcice sununarises this parental 'contingency': 'I have been in the past envious and in
awe of colleagues (usually bachelors) who spend their holidays living with monks in the Euptian deseit or
making long retreats on Mount Athos. They return refreshed and renewed and say things like "It was
wonckrful. I was able to read the whole of The City of God in the Latin ... something I've not done for three
or four years now." I then recall my own "holiday" as entirely taken up with explaining why you can't
Willi in the river with an infected ear, why two ice creams before lunch is a had icka, with trips to
disgusting public conveniences with children who are "desperate"...'. (Janet Martin Soslcice, 'Love and
Attention' in Michael McGee ed. Philosophy, Religion and Spiritual Lift Cambridge University Press p.
61.)
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This commitment to historical time is implied by a narrative understanding of
revelation. But it also implies an awareness of how things could have been different. The
origin of the Christian understanding of having children is itself intimately bound up with
historical contingency. The writers of the New Testament did not make marriage and the
family the norm for the Christian life: what was required was complete service to the
Kingdom. The Christian community was expected to grow through the conversion and
baptism of outsiders rather than simply through marriage and procreation from within.376
As the urgency of the imminent eschaton receded, the legacy remained: marriage and
family had ceased to be a natural or moral necessity and had become a vocation - that is,
not the result of choice but the result of being called.
The demand for complete service to the Kingdom not only removed the necessity
of marriage: it showed that marriage and the family were not objects of loyalty in
themselves but were transcended by loyalty to God's rule. Since, as we have seen, God's
sovereignty is not to be understood as abstracted from time, it is the Christian community,
the Church, that transcends the farnily. 377 God's salvation infiises all aspects of humanity,
including those - language, interpretation, memory, belief; action, understanding - which
are inextricably communal.' 78
Whether we ourselves are called to have children or not, we would not be here
unless our ancestors and parents had had children. Again, we cannot abstract ourselves
from contingency. The only way to know ourselves is through our history when we talk
of inheritance, expectation, change, growth and development, we are using the language
of an incipient story. We establish our own identity when we are able to thread together
376This is a clear departure from the Old Testament period, with which in other respects the themes of
vocation and historical contingency have much in common.
377This is significant for the issue of children's rights. Parents in a Christian community do not raise
their children to conform just to what they, the child's particular parents, think right The parents are the
agents of the conununity's commitments, memories and understandings. The child is able to appeal to
these symbols of significance beyond the family - which apply equally to child and parent - thus
guaranteeing the necewry moral and physical space to gain independence from his or her parents. The
Church has a role in protecting the child: this is exercised not through the rights of the child, but through
the higher loyalty of both the parents and the child. Everyone in the community is responsible for children,
though not eveiyone has children. it is not a matter of protecting individual rights hit of learning public
duties. In the absence of the Church, the child is likely to turn to its peer group or culture to balance the
Pull of the fiunily to be a substitute church.
378 See Philip Kenneson 'Taking Time' p. 71.
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separate events and realities in our history. Being able to make judgements and give
reasons for our actions is an important part of claiming our life as something we have
done, something that is our own. 379 These judgements and reasons are very often
retrospective ones: history is lived forwards and understood backwards. This is all the
more reason for needing a sense of a narrative that acknowledges truthfully what we have
been yet enables us to go on. For instance, if we treat having children as something that
simply happens (or does not happen) to us, we fail to claim our lives and actions as our
own." What we need is a story that places having children in a coherent relation to other
events in our lives and does not see our actions as either determined or random. Without
such a story of and for the self we are particularly vulnerable to those who will offer us
their own ideological rendering of our existence. As Hauerwas frequently comments, the
ideology of Western liberal democracies is a story which assumes we can live without a
story. This leaves us with children but with no idea why we had them. The story that
enables Christians to claim the action of having children as their own is the story of
salvation whose broad dimensions I have briefly outlined above.
4.6.2. Having Children Demonstrates the Virtue of Patience
The understanding of having children as a vocation within a community rests on a
fundamental description of Christian hope. This is the conviction that despite the evidence
of misery in the world, God is sovereign, creator and redeemer, though racked with sin,
the world and odstence are good, and our Lord has given us the sldlls to deal with sin, in
379Hauenvas' clearest exposition of this point is in his essay 'Character, Narrative and Growth in the
Christian Life' A Community of Character chapter 7.
38°Parents do no favours to their children by refraining from teaching them 'values' in orckr that they
might later be free to make up their own minds. This is another doomed effort to free children from
contingency. More often, it can mask a moral cowardice, since if we ask our children to believe as we
believe, act as we act, and live as we live, we must have the courage to expect ourselves to live faithfully.
(See Hauerwas' discussion of this in A Community of Character p. 166.) If our values are not good enough
for our children, they are not good enough for us. It is less a matter of controlling our children than of
being faithful ourselves.
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ourselves and others, in a manner that will destroy neither us nor them. In this context,
children are our 'promissory note' to present and future generations that we trust the Lord
who has called us as his people. Having children witnesses to our belief that life is worth
living.
Christian hope expresses the relationship between salvation and time. We saw
above that salvation involves time and does not bypass temporal human activities and
communities. Yet time seems to be the ultimate unalterable 'given'. Time enslaves us and
tyrannises us, as we saw above. And with much wrong that needs righting in the world,
having children may appear to be a surrender to the tyranny of time. For having children
simply takes up so much time - time that could be spent on scholarship, creating wealth,
alleviating poverty, curing disease, or undermining unjust structures.
To the one committed to making the world 'come out right', having children seems
an act of despair. On the one hand having children seems pointless and cruel, since one is
bringing them into such an unjust world, and one should not be tied down until the world
is made fair and just; on the other hand the world seems beyond hope, and having children
is a self-indulgent form of capitulation to the status quo. How, in a world of injustice, can
having children be anything other than an admission of failure, a complacent retreat to the
'private' realm, in short, an act of either selfishness or despair?
The answer to this pressing question lies again in the manner of salvation
discussed above. Salvation establishes a new people, the eschatological people: and a
characteristic of that people is that they live in a new time - an eschatological time. Thus
all our contemporary society's struggles with time, our greatest enemy, are but another -
perhaps the definitive - effort to assert control. Instead, time is a gift. Patience means
living in a new time. Just as the kingdom made having children a vocation rather than a
necessity, so eschatology makes time, like children, a gift rather than a given. 381 God is
sovereign, and not us; the kingdom is of God's making, not ours; the Christian community
can afford to spend time on the ordinary and trivial, since the tyranny of time has been
broken, and they trust in a 'new time, in which their salvation and happiness do not
depend on how they 'spend' or Luse' their time.
381 For the distinction between a gift and a given, see chapter five below.
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In this 'new' time, Christians can care for those who cannot make the world
healthier, wealthier, or wiser. They can comfort one person rather than seek the status of
comforting many. They can have time for worship, though the time might have been
'spent' making the world come out 'right'. Such activities, which challenge the prevailing
view of time, are eschatological practices. Having children is one of them. Whenever
Christian communities engage in such practices, the kingdom breaks in.
4.6.3. Having Children Creates Time
In his early work, Hauerwas is critical of the emphasis on decision in Christian
ethics. One of the fruits of this criticism is a recovery of the significance of everyday habits
and practices. Having children is one of a number of practices that are generally taken for
granted in Christian communities. In Hauerwas' eyes, ethics is about learning to take the
right things for granted, about educating one's habits.
Having children is commonly passed over as an ethical issue because it is
perceived as being natural, normal and necessary. These are all suppositions about
creation. I have pointed out elsewhere that 'natural' and 'normal' are not the value-free
terms they at first appear to be. They may certainly be replaced by the word 'common' (or
'trivial), but, as I have noted, the most ordinary activities of life are among the most
significant.
In his' essay 'Taking Time for Peace: The Ethical Significance of the Trivial',
Hauerwas unites the themes of time, narrative, peace, and creation, around the
commitment to take care over 'trivial' practices. The first step in a two-step argument is
that peace and time are closely related.
Peace takes time. Put even more strongly, peace creates time by its srearlfact refusal to
force the other to submit in the name of order. Peace is not a static state but an activity
which requires constant attention and care. An activity by its very nature takes place
over time. In fact, activity creates time, as we know how to characterise duration only by
noting that we did this first, and then this second, and so on, until we either got
somewhere or accomplished this or that task So peace is the process through which we
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make time our own rather than be determined by 'events' over which, it is alleged, we
have no contro1.382
The second step is to apply this notion of activity to the practice of having
children. Having children emerges as the embodiment of the relationship between time and
peace.
Having children is activity in its most paradigmatic fojiti, as the having of a child is its
own meaning. Moreover, having children is our most basic time-full project, not only in
the sense that children are time-consuming, but because through children our world
quite literally is made timeful. Children bind existence temporally, as through them we
are given beginnings, middles and ends. They require us to take time and, as a result,
we learn that time is only possible as a form of peace.383
Hauerwas goes on to maintain that the most radical stance possible for any human is the
willingness to have a child in the faze of injustice, oppression and tyranny. Having children
is the ultimate defeat of all totalitarianisrns ... Nothing can be more important for us ...
than to go on having children.'
'Taking Time for Peace' is a very important essay because it shows how a practice
that affirms creation is also an eschatological practice. I shall go on in chapter six to
explain how the notion of gift is the most successful way of uniting the beginning and end
of the story. In the meantime, it is important to stress that children are a gift.
Children are not the possession of their parents, as might be the case if the parents'
choice were the only factor in their birth; they are not the possession simply of the
community, as a strong view of the state might imply; nor are they owned by themselves,
as the language of rights suggests. Instead they are the possession of God, called and
chosen by him. Parents do not so much choose their children as discover them as gifts that
are not simply of their own making. Children are therefore a gift. They are not simply
under our control, they are not always what we expect or want, the surprises they bring
may be ones of pain and suffering rather than joy. As gifts, they do not just supply needs
or wants, they create needs, teaching us what wants we should have. Children teach us
how to be: they create in us the need to want and love one another. They draw our love to
them while refusing to be as we wish them to be.
382Taking Time for Peace' p. 258.
383ibid p. 262.
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Having children emerges as a practice crucial to helping Christians understand the
doctrine of creation in the light of the eschatological ethic. Children teach us that life is not
under our control. The willingness to bear them is an affirmation that time is in safe hands.
4.6.4. Having Children is an Ironic Practice
Having children is therefore an ironic practice. It seems to be one of the few things
in life that is under our control, but it turns out to be the opposite. Having children is a
recognition that God is in control. Irony is a characteristic of eschatology, since it
contrasts the ways of God, who sees all things, with the ways of his people, who see dimly
and respond weakly. An eschatological view of having children makes clear that the
activity, the child, and the consequences are nothing like so much ours as they appear.
Seeing childrearing as an ironic practice avoids two particular misunderstandings
of having children. In the first place, having children is not a direct embodiment of
resurrection - as might be understood by saying 'life goes on'. This reductionist view of
resurrection is inadequate in the light of the eschatological view offered earlier in this
chapter. The vital insight is the connection outlined there between resurrection and
forgiveness. Just as resurrection is an ironic commentary on the limitations of human life,
so forgiveness is an ironic statement that human sinfulness does not have the last word.
Neither, in the second place, should childrearing be understood in gradualist
terms. There is no analogy to be drawn between the growth of children to maturity and
the moral growth of the world: this leads to replacing the categories of good and evil with
those of past and future. If an analogy is to be drawn it is between having children and the
relationship of the Church to wider society. Hauerwas describes the idea that one should
not impose one's own values on one's children as 'moral cowardice'?" Yet failing to
influence the world in the same way is not moral cowardice. Is this inconsistent? Perhaps
the answer is that Christians share their values with their children not in order to make
them faithful, but in order to be faithful themselves. In the same way they act in the world
384 Stanley Hauerwas A Community of Character p. 166.
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in a certain way (such as nonviolence) not in order to conform the world to them, but
because they see that way as the only way to be faithful to the gospel. It is certainly the
case that if the Church is to be cohesive as an ironic satire on contemporary society it must
have disciplined training and faithful teachers.
The Church learns to deal with time through the way it learns to understand
children. The Christian community learns that children are not a natural, normal or
necessary 'given' but a gift Children are a gift to the Church, teaching the practices of
peace. Likewise the Church learns to see time not as an enemy to be controlled but as a
gift to be enjoyed. Time is not simply a necessary fact of existence: the way Christians
respond to time is a witness to their faith in God's sovereignty. To the extent that the
Christian community is called to have children, it is given time to do so.
4.7. Summary
Eschatology brings a shape to Christian theology and in turn to Christian ethics.
By providing an end to the story it enables us to perceive that the christian narrative is
indeed a story, not an endless sequence of events. Since the end is provided from outside,
it is not humanity's task to bring this end about. Christian ethics is therefore about acting in
accord with the ending that will come about, rather than acting so that a desirable end will
come about.
Christians believe that God is trustworthy. His character has been revealed
definitively in Jesus Christ. They therefore believe that the character of the eschaton -
God's final act - will resemble the character of Christ - God's definitive act. The traditional
elements of eschatological thinking - resurrection, thousand-year reign, last judgement,
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and the kingdom - affirm what has been said in earlier chapters about the timeful,
narrative, communal character of human life.
Viewing human existence from the end of the story lends an ironic perspective to
Christian ethics. For the ending of any story exposes the folly of those who had acted
assuming an alternative conclusion. If one knows how the story is going to end, and that
ending is final, one is more likely to live that way in the middle of the story. It is better to
fail in a cause that will finally succeed than to succeed in a cause that will finally fail. The
danger of an ironic perspective is that it can lead to a sectarian, quietist, detached
gnosticism - the possession of a special knowledge that separates one from the world and
makes action unnecessary. This is where the narrative is so important: because God has
immersed himself in his world through Israel, Christ, and the Church, Christians must do
the same.
This immersion in the 'triviality' of the world expresses the new time in which
Christians live. Because they are not anxious about creating a propitious end to the story,
they can spend their time doing things that witness their faith that the story has already
been assigned an end. Having children is a key practice that affirms Christians'
commitment to the contingencies of life while exhibiting their patience and hope.
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The Description of Ethics: Improvisation
The argument of this chapter is a bold one. I maintain that the analogy with
improvisation in the theatre resolves many of the tensions in Stanley Hauerwas' theological
ethics. I begin by examining Hauerwas' initial venture into the moral imagination - his use
of Iris Murdoch's notion of vision. I then establish that a tension exists in Hauerwas'
discussion of vision and throughout his subsequent work between habit, on the one hand,
and moral effort, on the other. I then return to the narrative character of the Christian
tradition, and suggest that theological ethics concerns the petformance of Christian
doctrine. Given that the Church faces ever new situations, this performance is closer to
improvisation than to simple repetition. Improvisation resolves the tension between habit
and moral effort: the dimensions of the analogy are explored in some detail. As in previous
chapters, the thesis is tested in relation to a practical example: in this case the response of
Christian ethics to a severely mentally and physically handicapped child.
5.1. Vision and Imagination
5.1.1. Vision
The essay The Significance of Vision: Toward an Aesthetic Ethic' is such a
landmark in Hauerwas' early work that it is worth outlining its argument in full. It
anticipates a transition that later takes place as Hauerwas' centre of gravity shifts from
385 Stanley Hauerwas Vision and Lirtue pp 3047.
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character to narrative. The transition is from ethics as right action to ethics as the vision of
God.
Hauerwas describes how the ethical worlds people inhabit vary enormously. One
cannot simply adjudicate correct choices based on an even assessment of the facts - for
people act in the world that they see, and they see different worlds. It is not just that
people select different facts from a common world: they actually see different worlds. One
can only choose from within the world one sees. Ethics considers and recommends these
different worlds, rather than different choices.
The important thing about the world one sees is that it should be the world as it
really is. Virtue is the pursuit of this real world, divested of selfish consciousness. Ethics is
directed toward seeing the Good without illusion or fantasy: only love enables us to see, in
the unique particularity of circumstance, the key to ultimate destiny. In a phrase that
anticipates Milbank, Murdoch describes love as The nonviolent apprehension of
differences'. 3" Like great art, therefore, love shows aspects of reality to which fantasy or
convention usually keep us blind. Love and art require us to allow the existence of things
and persons other than ourselves. It is love that makes freedom possible: we learn to be
free as we learn to respect and accept things and persons other than ourselves. Freedom is
a matter of degree, not an absolute; it concerns the degree to which we respect difference
and the other; in short, the degree to which we have adapted to reality. Murdoch's term
for the process by which we learn to love the other as an equal is attention. To form our
attention, and thus our vision, is a matter of 'moral imagination and moral effort'.387
Hauerwas draws two principal conclusions from his discussion. Each of them is
picked up in his subsequent work on narrative. The first is that once vision becomes
integral to ethics, the latter becomes not so much a debate about decisions as an attempt,
through loving attention, to become more like the world that one sees. This point is
developed in later work as Hauerwas more fully articulates his Christology under Yoder's
guidance The reality of the world is disclosed by Jesus Christ, and it is the Christian's
vocation to imitate God's way of dealing with the world as disclosed in the incarnate Son.
386ibid p. 39. See Iris Murdoch The Sublime and the Good' Chicago Review 13 Autumn 1959 p. 54.
Compare John Milbank's phrase 'Christianity ... is the coding of transcendental difference as peace'
Theology and Social Theory Orford: Blackwell 1990 pp. 5-6.
381 Stanley Hauerwas The Significance of Vision' p. 42.
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The second conclusion is that 'attention' reaffirms the ethical commitment to the everyday
and particular, by contrast with the temptation to concentrate on occasional crises ." 8 The
Christian life is constantly tested by its encounter with reality.
5.1.2. Imagination
Vision drops out of Hauerwas' subsequent discussion to such an extent that it
does not even register in the index of The Peaceable Kingdom. Why is this? Vision came
in for criticism from some of Hauerwas' early critics. Gene Outka points out three ways in
which an ethics of vision is incompatible with an ethics of character. 39 Thomas Ogletree
correctly anticipates that issues of vision will be absorbed into the emerging category of
narrative.'" Wesley Robbins objects to Hauerwas' assertion that a total vision of life is a
necessary precondition of having any specific morality at all. 391 Most of the criticisms hint
'For illustrations of this from another perspective, see Janet Martin Soskice, 'Love and Attention' in
Michael McGee ed. Philosophy, Religion and Spiritual life Cambridge University Press p. 61.
3890utIca's concerns are (a) that Hauerwas has talked of the self as agent whereas Murdoch criticises
this; (b) that Murdoch's notion of submission to a vision of reality sits uneasily with human freedom (one
can see the influence of Simone Weil here); (c) that Murdoch sees the ego as the enemy of the moral life
whereas Hauerwas' early work inclines more toward seeing the enemy as human passivity. Murdoch's
understanding of human freedom is largely derived from Simone Weil. For further discussion of freedom,
see 1.4.2. and 1.5. above. For Outica's criticisms, see Gene Outka 'Character, Vision, and Narrative'
Religious Studies Review 6/2 April 1980 pp. 110-118. Hauerwas moves in Murdoch's direction and avvay
from his emphases in Character and the Christian Life on all of these issues.
390 Fhornas Ogletree 'Character and Narrative: Stanley Hauerwas' Studies of the Christian Life'
Religious Studies Review 6/1 January 1980 pp. 24-30.
39I Robbins claims (a) that Hauerwas' understanding of morality as a 'total vision of life' is as restrictive
as those theories Hauerwas opposes - do we, for example, exclude those whose lives are disorganised?
(Hauenvas replies that a vision of life is not a sine qua non for having morality, but simply a way of
affirming the cohesiveness of the Christian story); (b) that theists and polytheists may often act in similar
ways (Hauerwas responds that this statement does not therefore mean they have the same morality to
suggest so would artificially separate what people do from why they do it); (c) that Hauerwas'
understanding leads to moral relativism (Hauerwas does not provide a theory against moral relativism: he
simply challenges people to live out the implications of their position). See J. Wesley Robbins 'On the Role
of Vision in Morality' and Stanley Hauenvas 'Learning to See Red Wheelbarrows: On Vision and
Relativism' Journal of the American Academy of Religion 45 1977 pp. 623-641 and 643-655. See also
Paul Nelson Narrative and Morality: A Theological Enquiry University Park and London: The
Pennsylvania State University Press 1987 chapter 7.
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at the interminable underlying tension between the (broadly Platonic) vision of the good
and the (broadly Aristotelian) commitment to the pragmatic outworking of theory in the
everyday. Hauerwas' increasing sympathy with theologians such as Lindbeck who
concentrate on the detail of cultural practice and with philosophers such as Mdgely who
affirm the complexity of human life inclines him in an Aristotelian direction. Murdoch's
own response to this tension is found largely in the detail of her novels.
I suggest that more important than these criticisms is a general broadening of
Hauerwas' understanding of the ethical background - what might be called the
prolegomena of morality. In his later work he is less anxious to distance himself from
decisionists, and more aware of the communal dimension of moral discernment. What he
once focused on as moral vision, he comes to see as part of the whole area of the moral
imagination. Imagination encompasses both vision and projected action, both formation
and instinct. In the following quotation one can see that his earlier interest in Murdoch's
notion of attention is alive and well, but now thoroughly assimilated into his category of
narrative:
There is perhaps no more serious Christian offence than to fail in imagination, that is. to
abandon or forget the resources God has given us as the means of calling us to his
kingdom.
The Christian community lives through a hope fastened on the imaginative
world created by God. ... His reality as the Christ is the resource empowering Christians
with the courage to create the necessity of being a peaceable people in a violent world. ...
Christians live on hope and learn to trust in an imagination disciplined by God's
peaceable kingdom into accepting the cross as the alternative to violence. Our
imagination is the vely means by which Re live morally, and our moral life is in truth
the source of our imagination.392
In this and several other places Hauerwas suggests that imagination may rightly take the
place in Christian ethics that he had once earmarked for vision. Imagination is the active,
inward assimilation of the insights of vision.
The tensions in the area of imagination are similar to those experienced when
considering vision. They are helpfully brought out by Mary Warnock in her study
Imagination."' Warnock begins with Hume and Kant, and goes on to Schelling; she looks
at Romantic thought, especially Coleridge, in detail before going on to Sartre and
Wittgenstein. She does not discuss Hegel: in consequence she does not acknowledge
392 Stauley Haucrwas, Against the Nations p. 59.
393London: Faber 1976.
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either that in Western philosophy imagination has, in status, traditionally been inferior to
intellect, or that imagination is indispensable to religious faith. These omissions are the
starting point for James Mackey in his introduction to Religious Imagination. 394 Together,
these two works establish the place of the imagination in ordinary and religious
perception.
As I have suggested, there is a tension between imagination as habit and
imagination as moral effort. Warnock distinguishes between imagination understood as an
indispensable feature of all perception, and imagination understood as a creative
characteristic, idiosyncratic to each perceiver. In the first place, Warnock makes clear that
we use imagination in our ordinary perception of the world. This perception cannot be
separated from interpretation. ... Imagination is necessary ... to enable us to recognize
things in the world as familiar, to take for granted features of the world which we need
to take for granted and rely on, if we are to go about our ordinary business.395
The very process of perceiving the world about us at all is to construe it as an
organised pattern of objects which we can categorise, name, absti	 act into concepts,
investigate, and to a large extent predict. We understand the nature of objects by referring
to their past, by positing their future, and by comparing them with other objects - and
none of these alternatives are immediately perceptible; we therefore go beyond the limits
of immediate perception by summoning images, and these images are the building blocks
from which thoughts emerge.
If we step out of Warnock and Mackey's argument for a moment and glance
across to the conventional discussions of morality, it is clear that the argument applies
equally well. We do not simply act in a situation. We remember the history of the
situation, we suppose its possible future and the consequences of any projected action,
and we consider relevant examples of comparable situations. None of these is immediately
perceptible; they require memory, interpretation, guesswork, supposition, inspiration: in
short, the field of the imagination.
Returning to Warnock and Mackey, there is a second understanding of the term
'imagination':
Interpretation ... can be inventive, personal, and revolutionary. Imagination is ... also
necessary if we are to see the world as significant of something unfamiliar, if we are
394ed J. P. Mackey, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 1986.
395MMY Warnock Imagination p. 10.
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ever to treat the objects of perception as symbolising or suggesting things other than
themselves.396
The peculiar strength of the imagination is to be able to see simultaneously what is and
what might yet be for the best, to engage at the same time the most creative of human
paccions, and consequently to lure into action and to sustain conunitment.397
Mackey thus distinguishes between 'what is' and 'what might yet be'. When this
distinction has been made it becomes easier to see the tension in the ethics of Stanley
Hauerwas. One the one hand lies that which is in the nature of human society - doing most
things by habit, sharing assumptions between members of a community, not being aware
of most of the decisions one has made - in short, what I have earlier described as 'narrative
from below1 . 398 On the other hand lie the themes of Hauerwas' later period - the
particularities and distinctive claims of the Christian story, the challenge nonviolence
makes to the imagination, the significance of martyrdom: these correspond rather more
with the Barthian character of the postliberal 'narrative from above'.399 The first category
moves away from an ethics of decision toward an ethics of habit; the second category
suggests that these habits, though perhaps undemonstrative, may well be very distinctive,
and very hard to develop. Hauerwas moves from commending an ethic of character to
recommending what specific character that ethic should have. It is important to recognise
that both of these steps involve the moral imagination.
Are the two sets of arguments reconcilable? I suggest they are, and that the point
at issue is that identified in Hauerwas' early essay on Murdoch, The Significance of
Vision'. The key to the tension lies in what one perceives to be the first task of ethics. For
Murdoch, ethical debate is less about choices than about different worlds. Moral
theologians and philosophers seek to commend the world that they see as the true one. In
Hauerwas' later work, he is more influenced by the postliberal claim that the scriptural
world is the real world, and thus he elaborates how Christians are to live in this world.40°
396ibid
397James Mackey Religious Imagination p. 23.
398 See above 1.6.1. and 2.4.1.
399See above 1.6.1. and 2.4.2.
"Intratextual theology redescribes reality within the scriptural framework rather than translating
Scripture into extrascriptural categories. It is the text, so to speak, that absorbs the world, rather than the
world the text.' George Lincbeck The Nature of Doctrine Philadelphia: Westminster 1984 p. 118.
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The important point is that for Hauerwas the moral effort takes place in terms of Christian
formation - the establishment and maintenance of communities of character; Christian
practice, by contrast, which others see as an agony of moral choice, is for Hauerwas more
a matter of habit and instinct - of not realising, for example, that some time ago one did
without thinking what others might regard as an act of great courage. The creative side of
the imagination is largely about forming people of character. Moments of moral crisis, by
contrast, are emphatically not moments of creativity: they are times for doing the obvious
- or what has come to seem obvious within the creative formation by the Christian
narrative. For example, the practices of nonviolence can only be maintained by people
who have become used to establishing other means of resolving conflict: nonviolence is
not a spontaneous one-off tactic to disarm an attacker.
In The Peaceable Kingdom Hauerwas, in contrast to the general Roman Catholic
tradition, recasts the practice of casuistry as an imaginative enterprise. The novelty of
associating casuistry with the imagination perhaps reflects a number of misconceptions
about imagination and morality. As Hauerwas points out in his essay 'On Keeping
Theological Ethics Imaginative 4w , the field of imagination is customarily associated with
spontaneity, originality, creativity, the artist, the unexpected, the unpredictable - a world
not subject to discipline and necessity, a world full of wayward but tolerated individuals, a
world which challenges, threatens, and disrupts the established conventions of our social
morality. By contrast the field of morality is that of fulfilling expectations, furthering the
common good of society, keeping obligations and maintaining trust, staying in the real
world not escaping to an imaginary one.
According to Hauerwas, this dichotomy is a false one. It makes several very
doubtful assumptions. Imagination is not the unique preserve of a few talented individuals
but a necessity for the whole Christian community. It does not depend entirely on the
inspiration of the moment but can be developed through training. Christian ethics is not
primarily about fulfilling expectations of the common good of society: many of the
conventions of our social morality need threatening and disrupting. Maintaining trust is
not a virtue in itself it depends on the parties maintaining the trust and what practices are
required to maintain it. Staying in the real world presupposes that ontological reality
401Agennst the Nations pp. 51-60.
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corresponds with the necessities of the passing moment - even though retrospect, let alone
eschatology, suggests otherwise.
Hauerwas maintains that it is not the task of Christian ethics to underpin the social
status quo. Rather its task is to describe the world in which Christians perceive themselves
to live and act, and to help the Christian community form practices consistent with life in
such a world. When ethics is understood as the adjudication of tricky cases of conscience
by balancing moral principles, the practice is implicitly socially conservative - since it
assumes there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the status quo, only with its anomalies.
In contrast, the Christian community lives within a tradition based on a story which in
many respects contradicts the assumptions of the contemporary social status quo. How
then does the community faithfully live out its story? This is the field of casuistry.
Casuistry, for Hauerwas, is
the process by which a tradition tests whether its practices are consistent (that is,
truthful) or inconsistent in the light of its basic habits and convictions or whether these
convictions require new habits and behaviour. ... We only recognise certain dangers and
challenges because we have been trained to do so by the narrative that has bound our
lives. It is true that in the beginning we perhaps do not recognise such dangers to be
part of the narrative but as we 'grow into the story' we see more fully its implications.
Casuistry is the reflection by a community on its experience to test imaginatively the
often unnoticed and unacknowledged implications of its narrative commitments.402
Once a community has made a prior commitment that, for instance, the kingdom
of God embodied in Jesus demands a response which must be nonviolent, imagination is
essential if Christian practice is to be delivered from a callous self-righteousness which
preserves its own integrity at the expense of the welfare of others. Many pacifists assume,
like those they oppose, that it is the armies and markets that determine the meaning of
history. It is possible for a community to deny that this is the case; but it takes imagination
for such a community to live as if it believes that it is the cross, rather than the armies or
markets, that determines history's meaning. Such a commitment assumes the formation of
people used to the practices of nonviolence. Ethics in a given situation then becomes less a
matter of making a decision than of using our imaginations (informed by a truthful
narrative) to describe the situation in a perspective that enables the community to act in a
402Stanley Hauerwas The Peaceable Kingdom London: S.C.M. 1983 p. 120.
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manner consistent with its moral commitments and habits. This perspective may well
reveal that less in the situation is 'given' than at first appeared.
5.2. Performance
In chapter two I discussed the extent to which the truth of a narrative might be
assessed by the performance of that narrative. 403 I now return to the notion of
performance as a way of understanding the use of the Bible in Christian ethics.
Nicholas Lash develops this notion of performance in his essay Performing the
Scriptures'. 4" Taken together, he argues, the texts of the New Testament 'tell the story' of
Jesus and the early communities of believers. It is the life and practices of the believing
community that are the fundamental form of the Christian interpretation of scripture. The
performance of scripture is the life of the Church. Lash goes on to argue
that Christian practice, as interpretative action, consists in the performance of texts
which are construed as 'rendering', bearing witness to, one whose words and deeds.
discourse and suffering, 'rendered' the truth of God in human history. The performance
of the New Testament enacts the conviction that these texts are most appropriately read
as the story of Jesus, the story of everyone else, and the story of God.4°5
Lash illustrates this by pointing to the American society, whose life, activity and
organisation are the enactment of the American constitution. Thus the scriptures are the
'constitution' of the Church, and Christian ethics concerns their enactment. In the
performance of a play there must always be an element of creativity which enables the
performers to make the text a living event. Lash describes the eucharist as the best
403 5ee above 2.4.3.
404 Theology on the Way to Emmaus London: S.C.M. 1986 pp. 37-46.
*35ibid p. 42.
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illustration of the interpretative performance that is the whole of the Christian life. Praise,
confession and petition enact the meanings they embody. The story is told in order that it
may be performed when the participants depart in peace: The quality of our humanity will
be the criterion of the adequacy of our performance'.406
Times and circumstances change, however, and there is no final or definitive
interpretation of either constitution or scripture. This is a problem for Lash. He is
concerned that the finality of God's self-disclosure in Christ should not be impeded. He
concludes that those performing the text should continue to understand the question to
which this text sought to provide an answer. If the text ascribed unsurpassable significance
to the life and death of this one man, then appropriate performance should do the same.
The story is told differently: but it must continue to be the same story.
What remains unclear from the ethical implications of Lash's conclusion is what
the Christian community is to do when it faces circumstances in which it is not clear how
the story is to be performed. Christian ethics cannot, unlike King Lear, be read off the
page of the text: Christians do not have 'parts' in the drama, with 'lines' pre-prepared and
learnt by heart. Frances Young hints at this issue in the last chapter of her book The Art of
Peiformance . 4°7 She talks of the practice of cadenzas in concertos. The performer of a
cadenza keeps to the style and themes of the concerto, but also shows virtuosity and
inspiration in adapting and continuing in keeping with the setting and form. However
Young's vision of performance is very limited - considering only the herrneneutical skills
needed by the preacher and teacher. What of the skills needed by the Christian community
as a whole?
Walter Brueggetnann discusses in some detail the notion of Biblical faith as
drama. 408 He notes several dimensions of drama that make the metaphor attractive. Drama
must sustain both the constancy and the development of character, so that the third act is
consistent with the first, without being a simple repetition. One is told all one needs to
406ibid p. 46, italics original.
407London: Darton, Longman and Todd 1990. See also Stephen Barton Biblical Interpretation as
Performance' unpublished paper 1994.
4°8Walter Brueggematm The Bible and the Postmodern Imagination: Texts Under Negotiation London:
S.C.lvt. 1993, especially pp. 64-70.
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know about the characters by what happens to them on stage. 409 There is a settled script -
yet one which can be rendered in a variety of ways. He describes our life as 'a collage of
dramas, in which we cope with significant others, in which we struggle for constancy and
freedom, and in which we find ourselves endlessly scripted but seeking to act gracefully
and freely, to work the script in a new way. 41° Drama teaches us that we need other
characters to play with and against: the Biblical drama teaches us that God is 'a genuinely
other character who takes a decisive role in the drama', and that we are 'others' to God!41'
Like Young, Brueggernann limits his perspective to that of the preacher and
teacher.412 Brueggernann's view is incomplete because it does not incorporate the activity
of a community of interpretation; and because it does not offer ways in which such a
community might face ethical practice in the future. There is insufficient attention to the
sense of open-endedness of the drama. It is not just a question of repeating the same
script, albeit in different ways: Brueggemann's account needs an extra dimension.
It is clear from Lash, Young and Brueggernann that theatrical (and also musical)
performance is a very helpful way of understanding the role of the Bible in Christian
ethics. This is especially the case for Stanley Hauerwas, who in his early work discusses
the method of assessing the truth of Christian convictions by their performance in
Christian communities. Yet the analogy clearly needs more than simply the reproduction
of the Christian scriptures in ever-changing circumstances.
What I now offer is an analogy that develops this notion of Christian ethics as the
performance of scripture, while taking note both of the inadequacy of mere repetition, and
of the presence in the moral imagination of both habit and creative effort. I offer a model
of Christian ethics along the lines of improvisation in the theatre.
409This observation has much in common with Hans Frei's notion of the way Mark's gospel 'renders' the
identity. of Jesus. See Hans Frei The Identity ofJesus Christ Philadelphia: Fortress 1975.
41 °Walter Brueggemann The Bible and the Postmodern Imagination p. 67.
411 , • • p.inia 68. Brueggemann's most suggestive words are these: 'Barth has made clear that the God of
the Bible is "Wholly Other". In conventional interpretation, the accent has been on "wholly", stressing the
contrast and discontinuity. When, however, accent is placed on "other", dramatic interpretation can pay
attention to the dialectical, dialogical interaction in which each "other" impinges upon its partner in
transfonnative ways. That is, "otherness" need not mean distance and severity, but can also mean
dialectical, transfonnative engagement with. (p. 106 n. 19.)
412The minister enacts the drama and invites members of the listening, participating congregation to
come be in the drama as he or she chooses or is able' (p. 68).
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5.3. Improvisation
I shall use as my model of theatrical improvisation Keith Johnstone's work Impro:
Improvisation and the Theatre.' I shall start by examining some of the misgivings that
may be felt at entering this area, before going on to examine the parallels and insights to be
made.
I shall begin by returning to Hauerwas' observation that There is perhaps no more
serious Christian offence than to fail in imagination, that is, to abandon or forget the
resources God has given us as the means of calling us to his kingdom!" 4 As I have
already argued, this refers to imagination in both a creative (formative) sense, and a
habitual (practical) sense. In what sense is sin a failure of the imagination? The strenuous
ethic of the synoptic gospels expressed particularly in the parables and the Sermon on the
Mount stretches the imagination of the disciple: Jesus' teaching pushes us to the very edge
and almost beyond what we generally accept to be possible. Given that the future will be
an unanticipated rearrangement of the materials of the present, it is appropriate that Jesus'
ethic is in an eschatological perspective. The present is given possibilities, and judged, by a
promised future.
In this perspective one improvises by behaving in the light of the eschatological
promise. One improvises well by finding a response that enables one to act in the present
in accordance with the world pictured by the parables, accepting that this may place one
on the way of the cross. One improvises badly when one fails to hope in the promised
eschatological future, falling back instead on one's own originality, one's own ability to
create a world in which to act. This is our sin, our assumption that it is up to us to create
the world, our resistance to living in the world that God has created. Our sin refuses to let
our imagination enter the kingdom into which God invites us. The kingdom is almost
unimaginable, only made imaginable by the life, death, and resurrection of Christ.
4I3London: Methuen 1981.
4I4Against the Nations p. 59.
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Some of the differences between improvisation in the theatre and living in
accordance with eschatological hope can be explained by the role of the audience. The
behaviour of improvising actors is amusing and engaging, and often challenging, so long
as it does not appear to be out of control or perverted. If the audience were not seated a
safe distance away, and the participants, though still improvising, were not acting, the
process would be much more threatening, and perhaps close to violence. For it is not an
easy thing to be with people who may be out of control."'" Those who are prepared to live
life 'out of control' in the manner that Hauerwas advocates must expect hostility from
those many who find the presence of such people intolerable. An 'improvising community'
might well receive treatment comparable to that received by people with a mental
handicap. This latter group already experiences much of society's inability to cope with
those whom it perceives to be out of control. It may be that an 'improvising community'
will have a great deal to learn from the experience of such people.
5.3.1. Keeping the story going
Much of the fear of improvisation derives from a fear of the unconscious, and an
unstated suspicion that unconscious thoughts and desires are generally sinful. Such a fear
suggests that the future, and the self, particularly the self in a group, are dangerous.
In his chapter dealing with narrative skills, Keith Johnstone describes a game
called Word at a time', in which he asks one student for the first word of a story, and
another for the second word, and another for the third word, and so on. This is played in a
circle as quickly as possible. Johnstone's comments on the game are illuminating:
41 5Hauerwas describes his view of living life out of control in the sixth of his ten theses for the reform of
Christian social ethics in A Community of Character p.11: To do ethics from the perspective of those 'out
of control' means Christians must find the means to make clear to both the oppressed and the oppressor
that the cross determines the meaning of history. Christians should thus provide imaginative alternatives
for social policy as they are released from the 'necessities' of those that would control the world in the name
of security. For to be out of control means Christians can risk trusting in gifts, as they have no reason to
deny the contingent character of our existence.
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Anyone who tries to control the future of the story can only succeed in ruining it. Every
time you add a word, you know what word you would like to follow. Unless you can
continnally wipe your ideas out of your mind you're paralysed. ... Once you say whatever
comes to mind, then it's as if the story is being told by some outside force. ... The group
learn that this method of storytelling won't work unless they relax, stop worrying about
being 'obvious' and remain attentive.416
What is being described here is clearly an activity of the imagination; but
Johnstone is demonstrating the point I made earlier in this chapter in my distinction
between the imagination of creative effort and the practical imagination of habit - what
Johnstone calls 'being "obvious". I said earlier that the mistake in Christian ethics is to
regard the moment of decision as the occasion for spontaneous creativity I went on to say
that sin is a falling back on our own originality, our own ability to create a world.
Johnstone's game Word at a time' illustrates what happens when participants fail to trust
their own characters - characters that have been formed by the time the game begins.
The 'sin' in a game such as Word at a time' is to kill the story. This is done by forcing
which way the story is to go - trying to control its future, insisting on being clever or
original, or closing it without reference to the foregoing content whenever it threatens to
become obscene, psychotic, or unoriginal. The sin does not consist in having unconscious
thoughts, or in their disclosure, but in withholding those thoughts.
What is required is an imagination that enables us to keep the story going. This is
where it is important to remember that the story is not just our story. The originality lies in
the story already: this is the sense in which we are continuing to perform the Christian
story whose decisive elements have already been set in place. Nothing we can do will be
so bad that it could pervert the whole story. The creative side of the imagination is
416Keith Johnstone Impro p. 131.
417When Johnstone took to composing letters in this word-at-a-time fashion he found that they tended to
go through four discernable stages (pp 132-3). At first the letters were usually cautious or nonsensical and
full of concealed sexual references. Then they became obscene and psychotic, before developing deep
religious feeling, and finally expressing vulnerability and loneliness. Johnstone goes on to point out that
improvisations go through similar stages, provided they are not censored He comments: 'Sanity is ... a way
we learn to behave. (It) has nothing directly to do with the way you think It's a matter of presenting
yourself as sale. ... A Canadian study on attitudes to mental illness concluded that it was when someone's
behaviour was perceived as "unpredictable" that the community rejected them' (p. 83). His comments on
obscenity are similar. The point is that definitions of sanity and obscenity vary but are largely concerned
with making social behasiour predictable, safe, and therefore acceptable. But these are all epithets that the
Christian community is likely to question. Many of the fears concerning imprcnisation of this kind are thus
not well founded.
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employed in forming us to be the kind of people who have the courage to keep the story
going, even when it looks dangerous or when it threatens to reveal uncomfortable parts of
ourselves.
It is the aim of the forthcoming discussion to avoid the common shortcomings of
the various forms of Christian ethics. How can one prevent a deontological ethic from
callously saying 'no'? How can one prevent a consequential ethic from trying to control the
future? How can one prevent a narrative ethic from being limited to one interpretation of
one text?
5.3.2. Blocking and Accepting Offers
There are people who prefer to say 'Yes', and there are people who prefer to say 'No'.
Those who say 'Yes' are rewarded by the adventures they have, and those who say 'no'
are rewarded by the safety they attain. There are far more 'No' sayers around than 'Yes'
sayers, but you can train one type to behave like the other.418
Johnstone describes anything an actor does as an 'offer'. Every time an offer is
made, it can be either 'accepted' or 'blocked' by the other actors. To block means to
prevent the action from developing, or to 'wipe out your partner's premise'. 419 Saying no is
therefore usually a block (but not always, since it may enable the action to continue - for
example if one has been asked to leave and one refuses to do so). Johnstone describes
what it is like to be in the practice of accepting all offers.
Good improvisers seem telepathic; everything seems prearranged This is because they
accept all offers made - which is something no 'normal' person would do. ... Once you
learn to accept offers then accidents can no longer interrupt the action. ... The actor who
will accept anything that happens seems supernatural; it's the most marvellous thing
about improvisation: you are suddenly in contact with people who are unbounded,
whose imagination seems to function without limit ... People with dull lives often think
that their lives are dull by chance. In reality everyone chooses more or less what kind of
events will happen to them by their conscious patterns of blocking and yielding.4"
418 ibid p. 92.
419ibid p. 97.
420ibid pp. 99-100.
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Accepting in this way might be seen as a very dangerous exercise. It is a popular
perception that the Church, for instance, is principally concerned with saying no - that is,
in Johnstone's terms, blocking. It is worth noting that blocking is likely to be subtly
aggressive. While a commitment to accept allows space for the other and recognizes one's
dependence on the other, a determination to block undermines the other. Accepting shares
a space and requires imagination how to continue to do so; blocking denies the other
space and refuses to use the imagination.
It may be objected that accepting would be all very well in a prelapsarian world,
but is inappropriate in a world where there is much evil that must be resisted. This is an
argument familiar from criticisms of the nonviolent ethic propounded by Hauerwas and
Yoder. The response is similar to theirs: while the question of which response
(nonresistant or 'realist'/'responsible') is most effective is unresolved, the issue is rather
which response is the most faithful to the gospel. The mistake is to assume that giving up
the resort to violence is inextricably quietist and passive. There are ways of retaining the
initiative which are not violent.'
5.3.3. Overaccepting gifts
The most suggestive manner of retaining the initiative without 'blocking' is the
response that Johnstone calls 'overaccepting'. This is illustrated by a game called 'Presents'.
Imagine a game which is played in pairs. Person A thinks of a present they would like to
give to person B, and then mimes giving it to them. Person B has to guess what it is, and
use it accordingly. Person B then does the same to person A, and so on. The trouble with
421 John Howard Yoder is never short of illustrations on this theme. He contrasts the way native North
Americans chose a military option against the colonisers and were defeated_ The result is the demoralised
and degraded state of their culture today. By contrast the native South Americans were unable or unready
to defend themselves, and were overrun by the Spanish and Portuguese. Yet today their culture and
popuLation are a significant feature of South American religion and society. This is a perfect contrast of
blocking' and 'accepting'. John 1 -1. Yoder The Royal Priesthood: Essays Ecclesiological and Ecumenical
ed Michael Cartwright Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 1994 p. 213.
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this game is, of course, that it can be difficult to identify what the gift is; the players can
get frustrated with each other, as each mimes more and more outlandish gifts, leaving the
other more and more bewildered. Each actor seems in competition, and feels it. The secret
to make the game a success is, not to think of interesting things to give, but to concentrate
on making the thing one is given as interesting as possible. If person A simply holds out
two hands, as if to hold a box, person B may be delighted to receive an array of possible
gifts: 'Everything you are given delights you. Maybe you wind it up and let it walk about
the floor, or you sit it on your arm and let it fly off after a small bird, or maybe you put it
on and turn into a gorilla!' If the game is played this way, the stifling sense of
competition disappears, and great joy and energy are released.
To see all offers as potential gifts involves an enormous change in thinking.
Whereas putting the emphasis on the giver requires the kind of imagination that
determines the future, and can lead to great frustration if the gift is misinterpreted,
emphasizing the receiver requires an imagination that cooperates and adapts.
What the gift game pictures is a revolution in thinking about Christian ethics.
Person B has three options when offered a present by person A. She can say (1) no, I am
not going to receive this gift. Saying no appears, in the short term, to maintain one's own
security. Throughout Christian history there have always been groups which said no to all
'gills' which came their way from wider society. The Plymouth Brethren might be said to
represent this position today. There are many things to which it is often said the wider
church should say no to today. Everyone has their own list, sometimes including tobacco
and alcohol, sometimes abortion and euthanasia, sometimes nuclear weapons and embryo
research. Most churches have recognised that one cannot say no to one's culture
wholesale. To do so is to deny the goodness of God's creation, and to declare war on
society.
So, what else can person B do? She can say (2) what is this gift? What is it for?
What am I supposed to do with it? This is the way the game is usually played, as I have
described above. It is also the way the game is usually played in Christian ethics. Person B
accepts the gift, but does not know what the gift is. The dilemma of person B as to the
422Keith Johnstone Impro p. 101.
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nature of the gift corresponds to the moment of decision I discussed in chapter one. 423 For
just as the present is given by person A in the game, so are circumstances 'given' at
moments of decision, and the decision-maker must adjudicate between them. And just as
the game is frustrating when played this way, so is decision-making often immensely
trying. The assumption is often made that there is a right thing to do in each circumstance.
Such reasoning is often based on natural law. Natural law arguments tend to assume that
everything was created for a purpose, and that when it is employed about its correct
purpose all is well. This is the position of person B: desperately wondering what this gift is
for.
There is a third option. Person B can say (3) how do I want to receive this gift?
This is the transition that I have described in the way the gift game is played above. It is
not a question of what the gift is supposed to be: it is a question of what the gift can be.
One does not say What is this gift/of f?' - and even less Is this a good gift?'; one says I-low
can this gift be understood or used in a faithful way?', What does the way we accept this
gift say about the kind of people we are and want to be?', What can (or has) this gift
become in the kingdom of God?' The ethical issues are less about the gift itself than about
where it is perceived to fit into the story of the way God deals with his people and how
that fitting-in takes place.
When God builds his kingdom he does not toss away the raw material, as in (1)
above: nor does he accept us on our own terms, as in (2) above. Instead, he 'overaccepts'
us - he sees what we can be, and by the way he incorporates us into his kingdom, through
his incarnation, his cross and resurrection, he demonstrates his character, the kind of God
he is. In just the same way, Christian ethics, which is about imitating the character of God,
strives to overaccept the gifts offered by creation and culture.
In another overaccepting game, called 'It's Tuesday', inconsequential remarks (that
is, 'dull offers') are overaccepted so as to produce the maximum possible effect on the
acceptor. Thus:
A: It's Tuesday.
B: No ... it can't be ... It's the day predicted for my death by the old gyps! [Dies
horribly, saying] Feed the goldfish.
A: That's all he ever thought about, that goldfish. ... Filly years' supply of ants' eggs, and
what did he leave to me - not a penny. I shall write to mother.
"'See 1.2.2 above.
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B: Recovering] Your mother! You mean Mil/y is still alive? [and so on1424
The apparently trivial nature of what the actors actually say in this example should
not obscure the importance of what is happening. What overaccepting opens up is a whole
approach to nonviolent response by a Christian community schooled in the scriptural
story. The method is similar to what Milbank describes as Christianity's ability to
'outnarrate' all secular stories. Many of the 'offers' the Church in general or Christians in
particular receive are 'dull' ones, represented by Actor A's first remarks above. But many
offers are challenging, threatening, and urgent: the 'sectarian passivist' response would be
to block', while the 'responsible realist' approach might be to 'accept' without reservation.
The search for a third way leads us to overaccepting. Overaccepting fits the remarks of the
previous actor into a context enormously larger than his or her counterpart could have
supposed. This is exactly what the Christian community does with offers that come to it
from wider society. It overaccepts in the light of the Church's tradition and story seen in
eschatological perspective - a perspective much wider than urgent protagonists may have
imagined.
Tom Wright makes a very pertinent analogy when he speaks of world history as a
five-act drama.' The story moves through creation, the Jews, and Jesus, and finishes
with the eschaton. The Church finds itself in Act Four. While secular society supposes
itself to be in a one-act play (what Hauerwas calls The story that we have no story), the
Church knows itself to be bounded in past and future by God's decisive acts. Hence the
Church can overaccept the pressing secular demands by outnarrating them - fitting them
into a much larger story, one which begins at creation and ends with the eschaton, where
the main character is God, and where the definitive event is Jesus Christ.
Those who see world history as a one-act play can only see events as governed by
human choices at best and fate at worst. The perspective of the five-act drama transforms
fate into destiny. Conventional ethics, because it is so anxious to establish what is right for
everyone, everywhere, at all times, plays down the distinctive claims of the Christian story.
It assumes that we must accept the givens of the contemporary world, and make decisions
424Keith Johnstone Impro p. 102.
425N. T. Wright The New Testament and the People of God London: S.P.C.K 1992 p. 141.
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based on those givens. What I am suggesting, by contrast, is that we use our imaginations
to see how the gifts of creation and culture fit into the story of the way God deals with the
world, given that the fundamental decision has already been made - God's decision for
humanity and creation in Christ.
The temptation narratives in Matthew and Luke are a particularly illuminating
illustration of overaccepting.426 Jesus appears to say no: no to turning stones to bread, no
to jumping off the pinnacle of the temple and no to ruling the kingdoms of the world. As
the gospel unfolds, we see how each of the temptations is not so much suppressed as
fitted into a far greater story, a story of a much larger 'yes', of which the incarnation is the
most striking element.
The first temptation, 'command these stones to become loaves of bread', is the
desire to be independent of the grace of God, to have food on demand and one's future
secure. Something Israel had always wanted. Jesus of course says no to the gimmick. But
he says yes to bread, overaccepting it in the words 'This is my body, broken for you', and I
am the bread of life: whoever comes to me will never be hungry'.
The second temptation - 'throw yourself from the pinnacle of the temple, for the
angels will bear you up' is the desire, as Hauerwas comments, to be the priest of priests -
to force God's hand as the sacrifice God can't refuse. But throughout the gospel story we
see Jesus flailing not his own will but the Father's. The resurrection is the Father's
thorough endorsement of Jesus' whole life as the manifestation of the kingdom. Jesus says
yes to the Temple, not as a high diving-board, but as the new Temple, his body, the
Church.
The last temptation is about power. 'All these kingdoms I will give you, if you will
just worship me'. Jesus says yes to power - but the power of God is the power of humility
and weakness. Jesus says yes to peace - but peace can only come through the worship of
the living God. Jesus overaccepts this temptation on Ascension Day, ruling at the right
hand of the Father, and on Easter Day, as the power of love conquers the tomb. Jesus says
yes to the kingdoms because he is the King who reigns from the tree. The kingdom of
426Hauerwas discusses the temptations in The Peaceable Kingdom (pp. 78-9), when he sees them as the
recapitulation of God's way with Israel. See 4.4.4. above. My discussion is an imp	 uvisation on Hauerwas'
approach.
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God is crowned on the cross. Thus each of the devil's temptations is revealed as offering a
world far smaller, a story far shorter, than the one the kingdom reveals.
To return to a theme explored in chapter one above, it should now be much
clearer how my proposals about causality affect the rest of the thesis. 427 I argued that we
may see character as the formal cause, while the self is the material and efficient cause, and
the Church - the communio sanctorum - is the final cause. The shortcomings of
conventional ethics largely concern their concentration on the final cause - as if there were
a consensus on the other three causes. This is the attempt to do value-free ethics, where
outside observers are .all agreed on the first three causes and meet to debate the fourth,
final cause. I suggested that vvith Hauerwas the emphasis shifts away from the final cause,
or purpose, toward the efficient cause, or purposer. In other words, we do not act
according to the purposes contained in things in themselves (as in some natural law
approaches); things are, to a large extent, what we make of them. In the language of
improvisation, this enables us to make the journey from 'accepting' the simple facts of a
gift to 'overaccepting' - perceiving what that gift could be in the kingdom. Accepting the
gift keeps attention on the material and final causes - the nature and purpose of the gift
itself Overaccepting the gift shifts attention to the formal and efficient causes - where the
gift can be fitted into the story and how that fitting in takes place.428
Hauerwas expands on a similar notion of gift in the fourth of his 'ten theses toward
the reform of Christian social ethics':
Communities formed by a truthful narrative must provide the skills to transform fate
into destiny so that the unexpected, especially as it comes in the form of strangers, can
be welcomed as a gift.429
One may see an ethic overawed by fate as one which concentrates on material
causes, the unavoidable and unalterable igivenness' of things. An ethic of destiny, by
contrast, asserts that the kingdom, rather than the materiality of things, has the last word.
It is less a question of what things are, than of what they can become or are becoming.
421 See 1.5. above.
428Tne- problem lies not in lcnowing what we must do, but how we are to do it' Stanley Hauerwas A
Community of Character p. 131.
429 Stanley Hauerwas A Community of Character p. 10.
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Hauerwas' conception of the stranger as gift and Johnstone's conception of
overaccepting are highly suggestive when seen together. Hauerwas' phrase 'transform fate
into destiny' summarizes the nonresistant approach of renouncing violence while not losing
the initiative. It is upto the receiver to make something out of the gift, and communities
that have renounced violence are more commonly in the position of receiver than of
giver.' However this is not simply a matter of passively receiving one's fate.
It is helpful to make a distinction between 'givens' and 'gifts'. The emphasis in
'givens' is on the material and final cause; in 'gifts', upon the efficient and formal cause. It is
the task of the imagination to change or challenge the presumed 'necessities' of the world,
to resist the implication that what the Christian community receives are 'givens' rather than
'gifts'. In this sense, 'givens' are things that are simply there and the community must
simply adapt to, if it is to remain in the 'real' world, whereas 'gifts' are largely what we
make of them. For 'Christian realists', the task of Christian ethics is to adApt to such
'givens' as prevail in the contemporary world - the objective material causes of life. Ethics
becomes a process of adjudicating between competing igivens'.431 Since the emphasis of
givenness is on the giver, ethics is primarily seen from the point of view of those who are
in the best position to control the majority of the giving - that is, the powerful. It is thus
supposed that if Christians put themselves in positions of power they will influence the
'givens' in a positive way. This corresponds to Michel de Certeau's notion of a 'strategy, to
which I referred in chapter three. 432 A strategy concentrates on locating power in a
particular place, and making forays (we can here call them 'gifts') into unknown or enemy
territory.
For the nonviolent Christian community, by contrast, the only 'given' is the
Church's narrative: all else is potentially 'gift'. It is not therefore a question of putting
oneself in a position of power. Ethics is not principally about how to do the giving. God is
43°Hauerwas himself describes movingly how difficult it can sometimes be to be the recipient of a gifl,
when he tells of the gun his father gave him as a present and of his own self-righteous response. See A
Community of Character 145-147.
431 'We are not to accept the world with its hates and resentments as a given, but to recognise that we
live in a new age which makes possible a new way of life'. Stanley Hauenvas The Peaceable Kingdom p.
85.
432 See above 3.4.3.
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the only true giver. His story of how he deals with his people is the definitive 'given'.
Ethics is done by people who are on the receiving end, working out how to accept (or
'overaccept') things that present themselves as 'givens' but cannot be since there is only one
'given' - the narrative of scripture and the Church's tradition. This corresponds to Michel
de Certeau's notion of a 'tactic'. A tactic does not have a space of its own, but gets by
through hand to hand ad hoc encounters (what we can here call 'receiving'). It is the art of
the weak, rather than the powerful. 'Overaccepting' is one method of receiving, in that by
'overac,cepting' one places the apparent 'given' within a larger story and thus renders it a
The process of transforming fate into destiny can be seen as a threefold process:
first recognising that much of what seems 'given' is in fact 'gift' (this is the result of
reversing the importance of material and efficient causes); second realising that the key to
a 'gift' is not its intrinsic nature or purpose but in how we respond and accept it (this is the
efficient cause in action); and third receiving the gift in such a way that it becomes part of
the continuing story of the way God deals with his people. Thus is fate (a 'given')
transformed into destiny (a igift').4"
433The perspective I have outlined has common features with that of Garrett Green (Imagining God:
Theology and the Religious Imagination San Francisco: Harper and Row 1989 especially pp. 13745).
Green points out that living 'as if implies living contrary to (given') fact By contrast, living 'as'
aclmow ledges no 'given', but exposes the presumption of the generally accepted (given') 'as', and mats the
new 'as' as an 'is'. It is a welcoming of the postmodern rejection of 'given' definitions, and a recognition that
each rival 'as' must now be argued out - or performed Walter Brueggemann sees the Christian gospel as a
'counter-Has"'(The Bible and the Postmodern Imagination p. 15). He illustrates the revolutionary power of a
new 'as' by citing Andre Brink's novel A Change of Voices (New York: Penguin 1983), in which a group
of South African slaves hear that the British are about to invade and free them and, anticipating their
liberation, rise up and kill their owners. Brueggemann also (p. 16) commends the way David Bryant (in
his Faith and the Play of the Imagination: On the Role of Imagination in Religion Macon, Georgia:
Mercer University Press 1989) amends Green's 'see "as"' to 'take "as"'. Take "as"' implies a much more
active process than simple reception.
I suggest that the journey from Garrett Green's 'see "as"' to David Bryant's 'take "as"', corresponds
to the journey I have commended from Iris Murdoch's sion s to Keith Johnstone's 'overaccepting'. I am
proposing that the Christian community overaccepts what may previously have been regarded as givens -
and thereby treats them as gifts; this has much in common with Bryant's (and Brueggemands) notion of
'take "as"' - though I suggest the notion of 'overaccepting' is a more far-reaching one. I am also concerned
that 'take "as"' implies a choice - to take or to leave. But the Christian community seldom has such a
choice. Overaccepting gives the Christian community a way of addressing those forces and issues that
threaten to overwhelm it - a way of making part of their destiny what would otherwise become their fate.
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5.3.4. Skill
Hauerwas refers to the community's need 'to provide the skills to transform fate
into destiny'. What are these skills and how does one go about acquiring them? How is the
Christian community to develop the ability to treat apparent 'givens' as 'gifts', and thus
transform fate into destiny? It is clearly a great feat of the imagination, and, as such,
appears awesome and impossible to any but the most talented.
It is important to retain the distinction I made earlier in this chapter between
imagination as a feature of all perception (the imagination of habit) and imagination as a
creative enterprise (the imagination of moral effort). 434 The association of imagination
with creativity and improvisation with originality stresses their oddness and elusiveness. Is
this really how creative people experience their craft? More often it is discipline and
training that provide them with the skills to perceive the unexpected - that which lies
unrecognized or taken for granted because no one has the skill to see its significance. The
skills of the artist's craft may take years to develop. 'Spontaneity ... is but the outcome of
years of training and practice and thousands of experiments' 435 . This training includes the
discovery of the limits of the discipline which it seeks to explore.
Though imagination is not the preserve of the few, neither is it to be equated with
self-expression. Another fear about improvisation is that it is simply self-indulgence. To
the extent that it is an art, this is not the case. All artists operate within a tradition, using or
commenting on a set of shared guidelines.
An artist used to be seen as a medium through which something else operated_ He was
the servant of the God Maybe a mask-maker would have fasted and prayed for a week
before he had a vision of the mask he was to carve, because no one wanted to see his
mask they wanted to see the God's. When Eskimos believed that each piece of bone
only had one shape inside it, then the artist didn't have to 'think up' an idea. He had to
wait until he knew what was in there - and this is crucial. When he'd finished carving
his fiends couldn't say Tm a bit worried about that Nanook at the third igloo'. hit on/y.
'He made a mess getting that out!' or There are some very odd bits of bone about these
days'. ... Once we believe that art is self-expression, then the indivirtiA can be criticised
not only for his skill or lack of skill, but simply for being what he is.436
434Johnstone points out that moral effort arises only when people ny to limit their imagination to what
will be thought acceptable. Otherwise the creative imagination can be quite effortless. He shows how
ingenious people can be in maintaining prejudices in the face of overwhelming evidence, for instance
constantly adapting an argument in order to continue to discriminate against minorities (Impro p. 80-1).
433 Stanley Hauerwas Against the Nations p. 52.
436Keith Johnstone Impro pp. 78-9.
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An ethic based on community and shared tradition will not reduce art or ethics to
self-expression. It need not deny the self, but it understands that the self apart from
community and tradition is an abstraction. The Christian is given skills to transform self-
expression into Christian life. These skills are found in the narrative of Israel, Christ, and
the Church.
The convictions of the Christian community, which enable the community to
transform 'givens' into 'gifts', resemble the skills of the artist. These convictions picture a
world where the cross of Christ determines the meaning of history, the stranger is
regarded as a gift, the weak command unconditional care, and forgiveness is both a
possibility and a duty. These are convictions which become assumptions, habits and even
reflexes through years of practised use. It is these skills, rather than moments of rational
decision, that will frame Christian life.
Our convictions, then, are much like the skills of artists, forming us to be the kinds of
people capable of corresponding to the vnTty the world ought to be but is not Our
imagination prompts us to do what is necessary to share in God's vtay with the world.437
The obsession with escaping the prison of convention can deliver an improviser
into another prison: a prison of trying too hard to be original. This comes from a
misunderstanding of the nature of spontaneity.
The improviser has to realise that the more obvious he is, the more original he appears.
... People trying to be original always arrive at the same boring old answers. Ask people
to give you an original idea and see the chaos it throws them into. If they said the first
thing that came into their head, there'd be no problem.
An artist who is inspired is being obvious. He's not making any decisions, he's not
weighing up one idea against another. ... How else could Dostoyevsky have dictated one
novel in the morning and one in the afternoon for three weeks in order to fulfil his
contracts?'"
Accepting 'gifts' is not the business of moments of inspiration but of years of
practice. We may see the Sermon on the Mount and the parables of the kingdom in this
light. They train us to perceive givens as gifts. The poor, the hungry, the peacemaker, and
the persecuted for righteousness' sake are those whom God blesses,' This forms the way
437 Stanley Hauerwas Against the Nations p. 57.
438Keith Johnstone Impro pp. 87-8.
439Stanley Hauerwas and William Willimon Resident Aliens Nashville: Abingdon 1989 pp. 88-9.
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we see our own community. The vast proportion of things people do they do by habit.
The Christian community strives to form practices from its convictions, and form habits
from its practices. Thus it should act faithfully by habit rather than by conscious decision.
Decisions are a last resort: the real moral creativity and moral effort lie not at the moment
of crisis but in the formation of habits and practices. The gospels train our instincts not to
recognise and adjudicate givens but to perceive gifts. Though perhaps strange, and even
original, to the wider society, these actions seem obvious to the Christian community
itself they are unaware of making a decision - indeed, they do the first thing that comes
into their head, provided that they take the right things for granted (given). Ethics
therefore becomes a matter of training in taking the right things for granted.
5.3.5. Reincorporation
It is important for the understanding of Christian ethics as improvisation to
understand the relationship between providence and the written text of scripture. While
the Christian increasingly discovers what it means for the story of God to become one's
own story, this does not mean that the text is like a script from which the Christian actor
reads a 'part'. Hauerwas' description of casuistry in chapter seven of The Peaceable
Kingdom suggests more that the text forms the convictions and skills of a people, enabling
them to discover how to be faithful to the gospel in a new situation. This is exactly where
the analogy with improvisation in the theatre arises. The story told in scripture is not the
entire story of creation; but it is the definitive exposition of God's way with the world.
Whenever the Christian community faces a trying situation, it does not have an 'answer' in
a script, but it is able to respond in a manner analogous to 'overaccepting', by placing the
event within the larger, providential story which is under God's control. The response
cannot be violent, since that would contradict God's way of dealing with the world as
revealed in Jesus Christ. Neither can the response be to block - that is, to end the story -
since that would imply that the larger story were incapable of incorporating the situation.
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Where in the larger story the particular situation will fit is a matter for the skill of the
community to perceive. The particular skill which is required is that of memory.
In two essays, The Moral Authority of Scripture: The Politics and Ethics of
Remembering', and 'Remembering as a Moral Task: The Challenge of the Holocaust',
Hauerwas outlines the significance of memory in Christian ethics. 44° Memory is closely
related to the theme of narrative. Scripture enables the Church to remember the stories of
God so that those stories may continue to guide the Christian community's life. The
Church is a social ethic, serving society in that it nourishes its life remembering God's
presence in Jesus Christ.' This remembering is an active practice of moral enquiry, since
'questions about how to remember the stories [are] not just questions about "fact" or
accuracy, but about what kind of community we must be to be faithful to Yahweh and his
purposes for us. 442 This means both remembering the past and continuing to live in very
different circumstances:
HON% we use scripture is finally an affair of the imagination, but it is nonetheless a
political activity, since our imagination depends on our ability to remember and
interpret our traditions as they are mediated through the moral reality of our
community.443
Moral casuistry remembers, not just scripture, but the whole of the inherited
tradition of the Church. The moral adventure of casuistry seeks constantly 'a better
understanding of what it means to make God's story my story':
We continue to depend on the ... wisdom of our ancestors. Indeed, one of our first moral
tasks is always to preserve their memory as a lively memory - that is, as still part of the
conversation, across generations. Such preservation ... at least means that the wisdom of
the tradition often has the beginning word, even if we think we must dissent from it For
the standard of dissent is always faithfulness to the kingdom we find in the life and
death of Jesus - a standard to which our ancestors also rightly lay claim.
Improvising within a narrative is less a constant striving after being original, and
more a matter of remembering. A story is not simply a series of events happening one after
44 °See Stanley Hauerwas A Community of Character pp. 53-71, and Against the Nations pp. 61-90.
'Remembering as a Moral Task' pp. 74-5.
• 2.The Moral Authority of Scripture' p. 67.
• 3ibid p. 65.
444 Stanley Hauerwas The Peaceable Kingdom p. 134.
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another. Such sequences have no reason for stopping in any one place rather than any
other. It is not simply a matter of free association: a story requires 'reincorporation''.
Reincorporation is what marks the end of the story. When elements found earlier in the
story begin to be reincorporated, then some pattern emerges and a sense of completion is
possible. Christian ethics seen from an eschatological perspective is always profoundly
aware of the end of the story, and of the way this end reincorporates earlier (perhaps all
earlier) parts of the narrative. It is reincorporation that distinguishes the end from just
another event in the narrative.
If reincorporation is such a crucial skill in storytelling, then remembering becomes
correspondingly essential, and much more significant than originality. The improviser does
not set out to create the future, but responds to the past, reincorporating to form a story.
Johnstone describes a game in which actor A provides free-associated disconnected
material, while actor B is somehow to connect it:
k It vvas a cold winter's night The wolves howled in the trees. The concert pianist adjusted his
sleeves and began to play. An old lady was shovelling snow from her door ...
B: ... When she heard the piano the little old lady began shovelling at a fantastic speed
When she reached the concert hall she cried, That pianist is my son!' Wolves
appeared at all the windows, and the pianist sprang onto the piano. thick fur
growing visibly from under his clothes.446
The Christian community is in a position much more similar to actor B than to
actor A. The community is not able to determine the 'gifts' it is given: it is obliged to use
the skill of its convictions to transform the 'fate' (or givenness) of the disconnected gifts
into the destiny of a story consonant with the one given story. It does not do this by
changing the subject, or by refusing to continue; both of these would do violence to the
emerging narrative. This perspective sees all events in creation as offering possibilities for
narrative, needing skills nurtured by the gospel to be reincorporated.
These skills are not primarily those of moments of inspiration (or decision). The
future is formed out of the past.
The improviser has to be like a man walking backwards. He sees where he has been.
but he pays no attention to the future. His story can take him anywhere, but he must
still 'balance' it, and give it shape, by remembering incidents that have been shelved and
reincorporating them."'
445Keith Johnstone Impro p. 112.
446ibid pp. 116-7.
nbid p. 116; my italics.
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This picture of a man walking backwards is an immensely significant and fruitful one. The
only given in his life is that at which he is looking - the tradition of which he is a part. This
contrasts with the model of consequential ethics. An ethic based on the assessment of
consequences is likely to have both eyes fixed firmly on apparent realities of the future. Its
'solutions' to ethical dilemmas need not necessarily have much awareness of the past -
indeed, they may well be designed to be free from such considerations. The potential for
forming the future tends to be dependent not on an awareness of shelved elements in the
past which are ripe for reincorporation, but on control of the present. Whereas the
improviser looks back when stuck, the consequentialist looks forward. Yet as we saw in
the discussion of the eschatological perspective in chapter four, the story told by the
consequentialist is far too short: the perception of the future seldom accounts for the final
resolution of all things.
The good improviser, in the eyes of Johnstone, accepts all offers and perceives no
end to the story unless there has been a thorough reincorporation. Implicit in all
acceptance of offers, particularly the overacceptance illustrated above by It's Tuesday' and
the exchange of gifts, is the openness to a larger story. Each new development in 'It's
Tuesday' discloses a larger story than was disclosed in the previous speech. The
assumption that there always is a larger story is a state of mind - a skill. The Christian
understanding of this larger story is providence - not the notion that everything will come
out right in the end, but
the comiction that the events of history are under God's control. This manifests itself in
ways beyond both our discerning and our manipulating. Their pattern may occasionally
be perceived by the prophet, and later they will be celebrated by the community.448
So how does the Christian community respond in the face of a trying situation? Its
technique is to start by looking back into the history of the situation (the smaller story) and
the history of God's providence (the larger story) to see if there are any shelved elements
ripe for reincorporation." 9 The process of reincorporation therefore first looks back to
448John Howard Yoder What Would You Do? Second Edition Scottdale: Herald 1992 p. 35; quoted in
Stanley Hauerwas The Peaceable Kingdom p. 126.
"9'Shelved elements' can refer to all parts of the story. There is a tension, in the Bible as elsewhere,
between the large drama and the host of small ones - many of which resist the stream of the larger story.
'As we attend to the minor, unincorporated dramas of the Bible, we give folk freedom and permit to attend
to the minor, unincorporated ares of our own life, which are not to be run over roughshod, either by
imperial orthodoxy, by imperious ego-structure, or by rationalistic criticism.' (Walter Brueggemann, The
Bible and the Postmodern Imagination p. 70.)
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seek out the lost' elements in the story, but also anticipates the eschaton by imitating its
pattern - the pattern of reincorporating the gifts of creation in the strength of the givenness
of Christ.4"
The process I have described as 'reincorporation' is similar to the principle Yoder
describes as reconciliation.
[Christians] guide their lives not so much by 'How can I avoid doing wrong? or even
'How can I do the right? as by 'How can I be a reconciling presence in the life of my
neighbour?. From this perspective, I might justify firm nonviolent restraint, but
certainly never killing:151
The term reincorporation adds to the notion of reconciliation the idea of
providence, the larger story. The Christian community follows Christ's pattern of not
blocking evil, but reincorporating it within the larger story. We cannot know how to act in
situations if they are abstracted from any narrative context; our response is to place the
situation in as wide a narrative context as possible, including the larger story. We do not
throw away the text, but, our practices, habits, assumptions and instincts soaked in the
renewing pool of the Christian story, we face each new context ready to accept (or
overaccept) it faithfully.
I now move to a practical example, to test and illustrate whether what has been
said about imagination and improvisation stands up in the light of a pressing issue in
Hauerwas' work: severe mental and physical handicap.
45°}1auenias uses David Kelsey's description of scripture as a long 'loosely structured non-fiction novel.
It has subplots that appear minor but become central; yet it does not try to s uPPress these subplots or
characters that challenge the main story line. See The Moral Authority of Scripture' p. 67. This has a
clear application for relations between Jews and Christians, since Jews represent a substantial 'forgotten
strand' in the Christian story. The great social challenge for Christians is learning how to remember the
history of the Jews, as part of and essential to our history' (Remembering as a Moral Task' p. 75).
451 1H. Yoder ilhat Would You Do? p. 40.
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5.4. The Testimony of Mental Handicap
I shall consider the question of severe mental and physical handicap through the
eyes of Frances Young. In her book Face to Face', she tells the story of her life with her
son Arthur, from the joint perspective of theologian and parent. She begins to write in
1984 on the day after her sixteen-year-old son Arthur stood unsupported for a few
seconds for the first time. Arthur was born brain-damaged due to a small placenta. Frances
Young describes in detail a life which 'lacks event ... a kind of slow motion in which all
track of time gets lost!'" The details concern sleeping in leg splints, withstanding fits,
getting dressed, feeding, school, games, bathing, and so on. She goes on to raise questions
of grief; frustration, and theodicy, as well as tracing her own vocation to the ministry and
discussing the role of the Church and wider society to a child like Arthur.
Since Young makes no hint of being aware of Hauerwas' work, she provides an
ideal case history to set against Hauerwas' discourse. I shall trace the pattern of
improvisation through the four steps outlined above.
5.4.1. Step One: Accepting the Offer
Hauerwas begins his essay 'Suffering the Retarded' by recalling an advertisement
for the American Association of Retarded Citizens. Standing, broken-hearted, beside a
baby's cot, the parents say 'Our child was born retarded ... He will never have an
independent existence ... Our lives have been ruined ... Be tested early if you think you are
452London: Epworth 1985.
453i1id p. 6.
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pregnant ... Please do not let this happen to you - prevent retardation:454 In a success- and
independence-oriented culture, retardation is bound to be seen as an evil that needs to be
eliminated. How then is the handicapped child to be seen as a gift? A child with mental
handicap is a typically Hauerwasian example of a given that may become a gift - not by the
power of positive thinking, but through the fact that being committed not to kill the child
the community draw on their tradition for how to understand this child's presence in the
community.
There is a violence behind several conventional ways of dealing with retardation.
Sometimes the severely mentally handicapped are kept out of public sight - in institutions
often geographically secluded. Another approach, hinted at in the advertisement, is to
dispose of those whose difference from ourselves is intolerable. A third approach is to
assume that there is no difference between the retarded and the rest of society - to obscure
any suggestion to the contrary. Each of these approaches represents a failure to cope with
difference. In the language of improvisation, these are three ways of rblocicing'.4"
How does a community begin to 'accept' a severely handicapped child? The virtue
mentioned most often by both Hauerwas and Frances Young as needed in the community
is the acceptance of difference. This returns to the theme of the fourth of Hauerwas's
theses - that of welcoming the unexpected, especially the stranger as a gift. Hauerwas
starts out in characteristic vein.
The very way we are taught to perceive [the retarded] is an ethic. To begin our reflection
by asking 'How ought we to treat the retanied? is already too late, as it presupposes that
the category retardation makes sense.
In fact, retardation is 'a moral claim that puts some people at a disadvantage
simply because they seem different from us in humanly significant ways' 456; what the
'medical model' of handicap obscures is that the disadvantages that result from most
handicaps derive more from society's prejudices than from the handicap itself The
question becomes another characteristically Hauerwasian one: What kind of community
454Stanley Hauervvas 'Suffering the Retarded: Should We Prevent Retardation? Suffering Presence pp.
159-181.
455There is an analogy here between three historical was the Church has 'blocked other faiths -
keeping the infidel out of sight, killing him, or pretending he is the same as us.
456ibid p. 184.
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ought we to be so that we can welcome and care for the other in our midst without that
"otherness" being used to justify discrimination?' What is required is to become 'that kind
of people who are capable of recognizing the other without fear and/or resentment.'"
This is the point at which Hauerwas's approach becomes most telling. Truthful
stories such as Frances Young's remind us of both the necessity and the cost of rearing the
retarded in the family. But Hauerwas is able to point out that the recognition of difference
is implicit in the delegation to the family of the rearing of all children. For those who are
different know that being treated equally is not sufficient for being treated justly. If being
treated equally means having to forget who one is then the price is not worth paying, as
the experience of black Americans bears out. Therefore
The commitment of parents to their retarded children ... implies a more profound and
richer sense of community than the language of equality can provide ... The retarded are
a concrete test of the moral implications of a society's willingness to let the differences
occasioned by our familial heritages flourish.458
Thus we start with what we already take for granted - that parents should bring up
their own children, even if the parents are strange or the children different - and see that
this assumption makes diversity inevitable. The challenge is not to make new decisions,
but to face the consequences Of assumptions already made.
In addition to coping with difference, there is a second commitment of the
Christian community which is required if it is to 'accept' a severely handicapped child. It
must renounce the need to exert power over people's lives. This echoes Hauerwas's sixth
thesis:
Christian social ethics can only  be done from the perspective of those who do not seek to
control national or world history but %Ito are content to live 'out of control'.459
Frances Young describes this process in her own relationship with Arthur.
Realising that her need to control Arthur's life derived from her own needs and not from
his, she became more detached and allowed him to be more free of the 'binding cords of
possessiveness'.46°
45 'ibid pp. 185, 186.
458 ibid pp. 207-8.
459A Community of Character p. 11.
46 °Frances Young Face to Face p. 35.
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This renunciation of the impulse to control has implications for the moral status of
the mentally handicapped. They are not to be seen simply as recipients of care. The
Christian community should regard people as inherently valuable, not valuable for the
power they command. Christian community is not about those in the centre succouring
those on the margins: this would be another 'strategy' of the powerful. The Christian tactic
is to find itself on the periphery and make friends with those others it finds there.
5.4.2. Step Two: Overaccepting
The key to overaccepting is to locate this 'smaller story' into the larger story' of
the continuing way God deals with his people, as revealed in the narrative of Israel, Jesus
and the Church. The difference between improvisation as a model for Christian ethics and
improvisation in the theatre is that when it comes to overaccepting, the former has less
room for the latter's sense of the absurd and humorous. The story has to be a consistent
one. But what kind of story is the story of a retarded child?
Like most historiography, such stories beg the question of whose story is being
told. It is notoriously difficult to tell a story from the point of view of all the parties
involved. Is it a story of need: the parents' (or families') need for community support, the
retarded's need for parents, the parents' need to be needed, or the community's need for
parents of character, who will not shy away from the discomforts of such parenting and
the lack of 'progress'? Or is it a story of learning: the retarded learning from the parents to
live, the parents learning from the retarded what being a parent means, the community
learning from both what the issues at stake are and whether 'experts' are the best placed to
settle them? Or is it a story in which all the parties discover on their journey' that their
own self-understanding needs reassessment: parents reassess why we have children,
communities reassess what they mean by 'achievement', 'normal', 'suffering', and indeed
'community' itself (which community, for example, do we have in mind?), while the
retarded grows and gains some self-understanding for the first time? Or is it merely a story
of the marginalisation of the weak and different by the strong and normal, in which the
retarded cannot share their parents' or community's benefits, the parents cannot share the
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retarded's inner life, and the community (including the experts) can never understand the
grief, struggle, joy or insight of the parents?
Each of these could represent a different way of telling the same story. When it
comes to overaccepting, however, the story perceived by Christian social ethics is that
which responds to the revealed nature of God. I have listed four possible themes that
could each be regarded as central in the telling of the same story: need, learning, the
journey of discovery, and marginalisation. Each is attractive as a unifying theme.
Marginalisation appeals to the Christian concern for the weak and downtrodden - though
it is important to remember that the retarded are integral members of our community, not
simply recipients of charity. The journey of discovery appeals to a positive approach to
retardation, but may not do justice to the suffering involved. Learning clearly has an
important place, so long as learning that life is under God's direction is not limited to the
tragic climax of the Creon who through suffering has become wise.
Hauerwas' method of overaccepting, as he makes clear at the end of 'Suffering
The Retarded: Should We Prevent Retardation?' is that of need. The theological issue is
the same as between Athanasius and Arius: is the dependent derived Son a blot upon
God's divinity, or, from the perspective of self-communicating love, a mode of its
perfection? There must be a receptive, dependent, needy pole within the being of God.
Like God therefore, the retarded show us the character of our neediness; they are
'a prophetic sign of our true nature as creatures destined to need God and, thus, one
another'. Centrally,
The challenge of learning to know, be with, and care for the retarded is nothing less
than learning to know, be with, and love God God's face is the face of the retarded
God's body is the body of the retarded; God's being is that of the retarded For the God
we Christians must learn to worship is not a God of self-sufficient power. a God who in
self-possession needs no one: rather ours is a God who needs a people, who needs a Son.
Absoluteness of being or power is not a work of the God we have come to know through
the cross of Christ:461
Frances Young confesses that her experience with Arthur has placed her face to
face with God - hence the title of the book. She adds that the reality and presence of God
are the crucial determinants of any account. It was the absence of God, rather than his
461 Stanley Hauerwas Suffering Presence p. 178, quoting Arthur McGill, Suffering: A Test Case of
Theological Method Philadelphia: Westminster Press 1983 p.75.
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actual pain, that constituted Job's torment - in God's presence the demand for explanation
ceases.462
This is how the Christian community overaccepts a troublesome question like the
reception of a severely handicapped child. It does so with a story that means little or
nothing to a secular ear: but it recognises that the debate between Arius and Athanasius is
alive and well and experienced in the stories of retarded people.
5.4.3. Step Three: Forming Skills
The eighth of Hauerwas' ten theses toward the reform of Christian social ethics
focuses on the practices and habits that he sees as far more important than decision in
considering moral questions.
For the Church to be, rather than to have, a social ethic means we must recapture the
social significance of common behaviour, such as acts of kindness, friendship. and the
formation of families.
Trust is impossible in communities that almys regard the other as a challenge
and threat to their existence. One of the profoundest commitments of a community.
therefore, is providing a context that encourages us to trust and depend on one another.
Particularly significant is a community's &termination to be open to new life that is
destined to challenge as well as carry on the story.463
By opening her book with what could be called a Thick description' of her life with
Arthur, Frances Young tells the story in exactly the manner Hauerwas proposes in thesis
eight. It is a description of common behaviour in an uncommon situation. The
considerable detail demonstrates the depth and complexities of the story its ethics are not
to be decided by detached observers (even experts) with categorical imperatives at crisis
moments. The heart of the story, as told in Young's first chapter, is of the mundanities of
standing, walking, sleeping, dressing, feeding, being a family - mundanities which struggle
to become habits. This is indeed 'recapturing the social significance of common behaviour'.
462Frances Young Face to Face pp. 72-3.
463 Stanley Haucrwas A Community of Character p. 11.
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Skills are practised in the mundanities of life: but they need to be nurtured by a
community, especially when they involve the more creative side of the imagination.
Frances Young describes an experience of such a community in her worship in an inner-
city church, an experience of shared vulnerability.
The sense that every single member of that very assorted congregation mattered and had
a gift to contribute and that there was something about even the least to be respected ...
created an atmosphere and a level of relationship which I have scarcely encountered
anywhere else.464
Having seen diversity accepted in the inner-city church, she was able to take on chaplaincy
work at a mentally handicapped hospital with a renewed vision.
One of Origen's arguments for the truth of Christianity was that while philosophy had
only made the elite good, Christianity had lifted people of all levels of society and of
every' different type and race to a 'philosophical' way of life. ... Just as male needs
female, rich needs poor, white needs black, so intellectuals need the simple. ... The
church is itself when it bridges all these gaps and tensions between people of different
Icinds.465
5.4.4. Step Four Reincorporation
Reincorporation is a backward-looking exercise: it seeks out the lost or neglected
parts of the tradition and restores them to a place in the fulfilment of the story. Frances
Young describes an evening at a fellowship group in which reincorporation took place at
the instigation of one member's remark: the result is a vivid portrayal of the transformation
of fate into destiny.
I began by confessing that every now and again things happened which revealed that /
still had not resolved my deepest questioning ... When I had finished my long
confession, one member of the group commented that it sounded like a tragedy, and yet
what a rich life I had had. It still felt like a tragedy, living with meaninglessness ... The
tragedy was not so much Arthur as my sense of abandonment, my inability to accept the
existence and love of God at those deeper levels where it makes a real difference to one's
life. ... I had no hope for the future. Despair was lodged deep clown inside. ... It felt like
tragedy'. Yet my friend's comment on the richness of my life came aCIDSS as a healthy
rebuke. It is since that evening that I have been enabled to climb out of my black hole
464Frances Young Face to Face p 79.
465 ibid p. 83.
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and find complete release from the doubts and fears and self-concern that had
imprisoned me.466
This movement beyond tragedy is an ironic one which corresponds with the
description of irony I offered in chapter four. 467
 Irony and reincorporation are both ways
of rendering the eschatological perspective.
Frances Young considers fate and destiny in her prelude - and, with hindsight,
decisively favours the latter:
I can only look back on all that has happened with a sense of gratitude and awareness of
the grace of providence. Somehow now God seems behind and before everything... [I]t is
there in the Bible; whether you look at Jeremiah, or the Psalms, or Paul, you find that
sense that God had known, consecrated and appointed even before birth, a sense of
destiny.468
A feature of the experience was to bring her into a closer sense of sharing with
other marginalised groups in society - and these are exactly the people who one would
expect to 'reappear in the narrative' at a time of reincorporation. In her Psalm of
Testimony at the start of the book she notes the activity of the Lord in terms that speak of
reincorporation:
He shaped my ministry',
he took up into my ministry the whole of my past,
my studies and my sufferings - even my handicapped son.469
In chapter four above I explored how Christian hope, by assuring the future,
releases the past. The practice of the Jews throughout history in continuing to bring
children into a world of persecution is a remarkable statement of such a hope. The
description of reincorporation outlined in this chapter illuminates that claim. Perhaps the
most significant expression of Frances Young's hope is the fact that she had two more
children after Arthur, and that their upbringing was influenced but not dominated by their
brother.
466ibid p. 41.
467 See 4.5.3. above.
468ibid p. 1.
469 ibid p. 4.
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5.5. Summary
'The Significance of Vision: Toward an Aesthetic Ethic' is the most suggestive of
all Hauerwas' early essays. 4" He describes how we act in the world that we see, and
people act differently because they see different worlds; ethics commends certain ways of
seeing the world. This relates to George Lindbeck's discussion of the 'scriptural world' as
the real world. 471 Yet Hauerwas ceases to talk about vision, transferring his energy into
narrative. Phrases like becoming like the world one sees' are replaced by 'entering the
Christian story'. In Against the Nations Hauerwas picks up again on the creative
dimension in ethics by discussing the moral imagination.
In the moral imagination there is a tension between the imagination which is a
feature of all perception - what we might call habit - and imagination which perceives what
'might yet be' - what might be called moral effort. I argue that the time for moral effort is
in the formation of the Christian community: the moment of decision is not the moment
for moral creativity, but for falling back on habit. This explains Hauerwas' mature position
on 'decisionistre. Decisions are inevitable, but are not the correct focus for moral effort or
moral debate. It is too late to form a habit by this stage.
Several contemporary writers discuss the way hermeneutics involves the
performance of the scriptures, with musical and theatrical analogies. None of these
treatments adequately discusses the place of the written text in the living community, or
the way a community (rather than a preacher) performs the text. The Bible is not simply a
script.
I suggest that improvisation in the theatre offers a more suggestive model for
Christian ethics. It links with much of what I have discussed in earlier chapters about
formation, habit, skill, narrative, nonviolence, imagination, irony affirmation of creation,
the end of the story, not seeking to 'make the story come out right', ethics as a collective
exercise, avoiding sectarianism, and questioning the 'givens' of moral debate.
410Stanley Hauerwas Vision and Virtue chapter 2.
471 See 2.2.2. above.
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Improvisation is not about being clever or original, but about being so trained in one's
tradition that one trusts that the obvious is the appropriate. This is just how Hauerwas
sees Christian ethics.
I demonstrated in four stages the way the process of improvisation can work in
relation to mental handicap. The study also bore out many of Hauerwas' own insights
relating to the significance of mental handicap for Christian ethics.
In my use of the analogy of theatrical improvisation I have intended to many form
and content. What I have done in this chapter is, from the position of Hauerwas' thought,
to 'accept' the 'offer' that comes in the form of the insights of Keith Johristone's description
of improvisation in the theatre. Some of Johnstone's comments have been 'overaccepted'
by being seen in the context of a much wider story than he acknowledges. In the next
chapter I shall 'reincorporate' by showing how this analogy restores some of Hauerwas'
more controversial themes to a proper place in the in the larger, providential narrative. In
the whole process Johnstone's book has been understood not as a 'given', or summary of
the way things are, but as a 'gifl', to be received actively and not to be 'blocked'. The
exercise is one of keeping the story going, using the habits that practices form from skill,
and skills form from conviction, to transform our fate into our destiny.
It should also now be clear that the whole thesis is intended as a similar marriage
of form and content. Each of the chapters corresponds to one of the four steps of
improvisation outlined in this chapter. Chapter one 'accepted the offer' of human character,
in the largely philosophical terms suggested by Stanley Hauerwas' early work. Chapter
two 'overaccepted' by placing the smaller narrative of human character within the large
drama of God's revelation through the story of Israel, Jesus and the Church. Chapter three
concerned the 'skills' of the communion of saints: these largely concerned the imitation of
Christ and the establishment of an appropriate relationship with wider society. Chapter
four concerned 'reincorporation', the way God accommodates his whole creation in its
consummation, and thus the way belief in the eschaton ironically affirms Christians'
commitment to the 'trivial' details of faithful discipleship. Chapter five has therefore not
only concluded the thesis, but introduced a second reading of the thesis as an
improvisation on the work of Stanley Hauerwas.
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Conclusion: Some Criticisms Revisited
It is the aim of this conclusion to the thesis to reincorporate the stray parts of my
argument in order to create the sense of an ending, in accord with the manner of the
promised eschaton. The whole thesis has been structured with the model of improvisation
in mind, although this was not explained until 5.5. above. Chapter one accepted the offer
of human moral experience; chapter two overaccepted this experience in the light of the
Christian story; chapter three focused on the distinctive skills of the community, notably
peaceableness; chapter four showed how the eschaton reincorporates the stray elements in
Church and world. Chapter five overaccepted the description of theatrical improvisation in
the light of the account of Hauerwas' Christian ethics. The task of this conclusion is to
reincorporate the arguments and criticisms that have gone before. In this conclusion I shall
make clear what is gained by the extended analogy between theatrical improvisation and
Hauerwasian Christian ethics. I propose that theatrical improvisation both provides a
helpful analogy and exposition of Hauerwas' thought in practice and helps to make clear
how he may respond to his critics. I suggest seven constructive insights derived from the
model of improvisation in the theatre as described in 5.3. above.
First, improvisation offers a description of nonviolence that avoids some potential
pitfalls. Nonviolence can seem like a devious manner of getting one's way - a strategy that
avoids violence itself but can be highly manipulative and achieve similar ends. Such a
conception can have some appeal for consequential ethics. Nonviolent blockades and
embargoes are still the 'strategy of the strong, and still tend to leave the weakest
suffering.' An alternative, passive, kind of nonviolence can appear callous and self-
righteous, especially when it seems to identify righteousness with quietism. This has more
in common with some deontological approaches.
These pitfalls, of which Hauerwas is well aware, are avoided by a nonviolence
which commits itself to accept or overaccept. This position assumes the status of the
472For 'strategies' and 'tactics' see 3.4.3. above.
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weak, since it does not assume one is in a position to set the agenda. Instead it
concentrates on imaginative responses to the offers of others, committed to perceiving
those offers as potential gifts, and seeking resources in the tradition and the larger story to
accept these gifts without blocking since blocking is an implicitly aggressive act.473
Manipulation is excluded since the other has the first move; and quietism is excluded
because the onus is always on the receiver of the gift to make something of it, rather than
be determined by it - and thus to transform fate into destiny. Hauerwas is anxious to stress
that his form of peaceableness is not quietist or manipulative: overaccepting is a helpful
way of expressing how nonviolence retains its integrity.
Second, the fact that improvisation is a collective enterprise helps to address some
of the questions of truth raised in chapter two. Lindbeck is accused of being a fideist
because he wants to hold on to realism but he never discusses external reality - only social,
linguistic, and internal reality. Meanwhile Frei and Lindbeck appear to dehistoricise
scripture by speaking of it as a 'world' - almost a world of its own. Hauerwas does not
address the criticisms of Lindbeck. Nonetheless in chapter one we saw that he understands
community as the primary form of reality.' So he would, like Lindbeck, doubt whether it
would make any sense to talk about external reality (or truth) without first considering
social reality (what Hauerwas calls 'truthfulness' - communal norms, values, and practices),
linguistic reality (internal consistency) and internal reality (intention and sincerity). In
short, he would place metaphysics second to the practices of community. It is the activity
of this community which 'historicises' scripture: here Hauerwas would take a more Roman
Catholic view, that the Church is the embodiment of the witness of scripture.
Improvisation in the theatre makes sense of this collective emphasis of Hauerwas' thought.
Improvisation is not about individual initiative and instinct in a situation: one is always part
of a group of people in the middle of a story which is connected to all other stories, and
when stuck one looks back into the history of that story, not to external criteria.
473Keith Johnstone Impro p. 98.
474See 2.3.2. and 2.2.1. above.
475 See 1.6.1. above. His emphasis on community is how he finally avoids the suggestion that his
discussion of character is just another way of positing an 'internal' self
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Third, theatrical improvisation offers an understanding of the place of the written
text within a living community. The written text is more concerned with form than
content. It manifests the way God deals with his people, and specifically the definitive
manner in which he does so in Christ.' Christ does not block, but imaginatively accepts
every eventuality in the light of the larger story. This is vividly portrayed in the temptation
narrative.'" The passion narratives are marked by a change from the Christ who acts to
the Christ who is acted upon. The tension of the passion narratives can be expressed as the
drama of whether he who had overaccepted human life in his incarnate body can also
overaccept human death. What emerges is that even the cross is transformed from fate to
destiny when in the resurrection it is incorporated in the larger story as that story's
definitive action.
Accepting, overaccepting, and reincorporating are thus actions which the
community finds in its narrative and improvises in the world it experiences. They are
written into the pattern of incarnation, kingdom and eschaton. The narrative of the written
text of scripture forms the Christian community: the task of the community is to find ways
of accepting and overaccepting that keep the story going. These are the ways in which it
continues the vocation of Israel - to imitate the God it finds revealed in scripture.
Fourth, improvisation illustrates the distinction between the ethics that demands
effort and the ethics that requires following habit or instinct. The moment of decision is
not the moment for spontaneous creativity; the artistry of community and character
formation comes in the establishment of practices, the discipline of training, the learning to
take the right things for granted. The moment of crisis resembles the performance of the
improviser - there is nothing for it but to do the obvious thing. Yet the obvious thing to
the one schooled in the practices of Christian nonviolence may be far from the obvious
thing to the one who is not. This clarifies an ambiguity in the way Hauerwas speaks about
the moral imagination. It is clear that he sees sin as a failure of the imagination, and that he
encourages moral effort; but he has never made this connection between his work on
imagination and his work on the flaws in idecisionise The most frequent
This does not rule out content altogether. For instance the acceptance of circumstances as gills does
not undermine the definitive gifts that God gives to the Churc/r, and these are disclosed by the written text
477 Sce 5.3.3. above.
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misunderstanding about improvisation is that it is taken to be about spontaneity and
originality: in fact it requires years of apprenticeship to learn to do the obvious, just as
virtue requires formation in community. The community embodies the scripture's way of
seeing the world: this takes imagination and moral effort to bring about. The virtues that
emerge are like the skills of the improviser.
Fifth, improvisation makes clear the change in emphasis Hauerwas advocates in
Christian ethics. Natural law concentrates on material causes - what things are in
themselves, what they were created for. Situation ethics concentrates on final causes -
seeking the most loving solution, naively assuming a consensus on the other three causes.
I argued in chapter one that what Hauerwas is doing is asserting the primary significance
of efficient and formal causes - who is acting and how.' The language of accepting and
overaccepting makes this transition more vivid. Attention moves from the 'gift' itself -
what it is supposed to be, what is the right thing to do with it - to the receiver of the gift,
and the story of which the receiver is already a part. Ethics is about good people rather
than good actions, about an ongoing story rather than a moment of crisis, about the
practices of a community rather than the force of circumstance.
Sixth, improvisation corrects an impression gained by several of Hauerwas' critics
that Hauerwas advocates closed communities set apart from the world - in short,
sectarianism. In chapters three and four I suggested that the church-world distinction is
more about time than about space. The analogy of gifts and accepting I have outlined in
this chapter is inspired particularly by the fourth of Hauerwas' Ten Theses For The
Reform Of Christian Social Ethics. 479 Christian communities must retain their integrity: the
convictions and skills I have described do not come 'naturally', though the imaginative
potential is there. The written text (and, the text and tradition suggest, the Holy Spirit)
prevents any total perversion of the tradition. However these skills will not survive
unaided in a liberal individualist culture that 'presupposes that society can be organized
without any narrative that is commonly held to be true' and suggests that 'we are free to
478sele 1.5. above.
4791Conununities formed by a truthful narrative must provide the skills to transform fate into destiny so
that the unexpected, especially as it comes in the form of strangers, can be welcomed as a gill' Stanley
Hauenvas A Community of Character p. 10. All ten theses are consistent with my proposal.
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the extent that we have no storyi.480-Do a community is necessary. But that is not to say
that the community is isolationist. The stranger is a gift; the community is committed not
to block: in these circumstances the epithet sectarian hardly seems to apply. Overaccepting
offers a third way in addition to blocking or uncritically accepting. The great sin in
improvisation is to kill the story - to block without making any return offer. This is the
sectarian temptation: but it is clearly not a policy advocated by Hauerwas. He even
accuses his critics - advocates of the nation-state - of being more sectarian than him. In the
light of the model of improvisation, we can see that trying to 'make the world come out
right' is itself a form of killing the story, by attempting to foreclose it prematurely.
Seventh, improvisation corrects an unintended but implied world-denying tenor in
some of Hauerwas' writing. More extreme criticisms of Hauerwas have seen him as
advocating a new totalitarianism, with a totalising narrative that is quiet on the subtlety of
its oppressive power. The positive thrust of Hauerwas' ethic is that in eschatological
perspective, Christ's way with the world is the only one that is really there. The negative
implication of this is that all other human strivings are in vain, there is no revelation
whatsoever through 'nature', outside the Church there is no salvation. The doctrine of
creation seems somewhat underdeveloped. In chapter five I described the notion of
'reincorporation' with this in mind. Reincorporation is a backward-looking art, which
rediscovers hidden potential in disparate and hitherto neglected events tossed to one side
away from the mainstream of the narrative. These neglected elements include many of the
shameful periods in Church history. Liberation comes through the community's ability and
skill of reincorporating these lost elements. Reincorporation combines the notion of
providence, the larger, all-embracing story, with the practice of reconciliation: as
Hauerwas says, forgiveness is at the heart of community. Reincorporation remains true to
the issue Milbank identifies as the key to nonviolent creation - how to accommodate
difference without violence. Hauerwas' whole project may be understood in the light of
this aim: accommodating difference without violence. Reincorporation has the great merit
that it affirms the value of the most disparate elements in creation: yet it still recognises
that the Christian story and community are the key to transforming fate into destiny.
48°ibid p. 12.
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